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Summaries
Resumo
Nesta tese doutoral, que se insire na tradicio´n analı´tica da filosofı´a de lingua-
xe contempora´nea, enfro´ntome a algu´ns dos temas ma´is discutidos en relacio´n
coa sema´ntica dos condicionais da linguaxe natural. Tento ofrecer unha teorı´a
plausı´bel do seu significado, que sexa quen non so´ de dar unha solucio´n aos cre-
bacabezas cla´sicos (os paradoxos do condicional material e estrito, os problemas
de Goodman e Tichy´, as diferenzas entre os indicativos e os subxuntivos, etc.),
seno´n tame´n de explicar o seu xurdimento.
Argumento que as aproximacio´ns veritativo-condicionais ao significado fre-
cuentemente se cimentan en supostos implı´citos inxustificados e adoitan condu-
cir ao reducionismo sema´ntico. Pore´n, non hai ningunha razo´n para pensar que
algunhas das nosas expresio´ns mais sofisticadas deban ser reducı´beis a algu´n
vocabulario presuntamente ma´is elemental. En efecto, moitas tentativas de pro-
porcionar unha ana´lise veritativo-condicional de oracio´ns condicionais resultaron
flagrantemente circulares.
Un xeito ma´is natural de explicar o significado dos condicionais consiste en
esclarecer a funcio´n que levan a cabo en intercambios lingu¨ı´sticos ordinarios.
Dende esta perspectiva, as oracio´ns condicionais indicativas prese´ntanse como
instrumentos para confinar a validez do acto de fala realizado por medio da ora-
cio´n principal. Iso permı´tenos explicar tanto os paradoxos do condicional material
como a su´a utilidade na matema´tica, igual que unha serie de feno´menos tales como
os condicionais ‘biscuit’ e o papel dos condicionais na restricio´n cuantificacional.
No que respecta aos condicionais subxuntivos, eles son usados para realiza-
ren afirmacio´ns simples acerca do potencial inferencial do seu antecedente con
respecto a un escenario inferencial ben delimitado. Argumento que a nosa concep-
cio´n do mundo proporciona xusto un escenario ası´: o que sabemos da realidade
organiza´molo en padro´ns que frecuentemente posu´en unha natureza causal. Son
estes padro´ns os que sustentan o noso uso cotia´n de contrafa´cticos.
Palabras chave: condicionais, linguaxe natural, lo´xica, probabilidade, cau-
salidade.
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Resumen
En esta disertacio´n doctoral, que se inserta en la tradicio´n analı´tica de la filosofı´a
de lenguaje contempora´nea, me enfrento a algunos de los temas ma´s discutidos
en relacio´n con la sema´ntica de los condicionales del lenguaje natural. Procuro
ofrecer una teorı´a plausible de su significado, capaz no solo de dar una solucio´n
a los rompecabezas cla´sicos (paradojas del condicional material y estricto, los
problemas de Goodman y Tichy´, las diferencias entre los indicativos y subjuntivos,
etc.), sino tambie´n de explicar su surgimiento.
Argumento que las aproximaciones veritativo-condicionales al significado fre-
cuentemente se cimientan en supuestos implı´citos injustificados y suelen llevar
al reduccionismo sema´ntico. Ahora bien, no hay ninguna razo´n para pensar que
algunas de nuestras expresiones ma´s sofisticadas deban ser reducibles a algu´n vo-
cabulario presuntamente ma´s elemental. En efecto, muchas tentativas de propor-
cionar un ana´lisis veritativo-condicional de oraciones condicionales han resultado
flagrantemente circulares.
Una manera ma´s natural de explicar el significado de los condicionales consiste
en esclarecer la funcio´n que llevan a cabo en intercambios lingu¨ı´sticos ordinarios.
Desde esta perspectiva, las oraciones condicionales indicativas se presentan como
instrumentos para limitar la validez del acto de habla realizado por medio de la
oracio´n principal. Eso nos permite explicar tanto las paradojas del condicional
material como su utilidad en la matema´tica, al igual que una serie de feno´me-
nos tales como los condicionales ‘biscuit’ y el papel de los condicionales en la
restriccio´n cuantificacional.
Los condicionales subjuntivos, por su parte, realizan afirmaciones simples
acerca del potencial inferencial de su antecedente con respecto a un escenario
inferencial bien definido. Argumento que nuestra concepcio´n del mundo propor-
ciona justo un escenario ası´: lo que sabemos de la realidad lo organizamos en
patrones, frecuentemente de naturaleza causal. Son estos patrones los que susten-
tan nuestro uso cotidiano de contrafa´cticos.
Palabras clave: condicionales, lenguaje natural, lo´gica, probabilidad, cau-
salidad.
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Abstract
In this PhD dissertation, set within the analytic tradition of the contemporary
philosophy of language, I take on some of the most debated issues concerning the
semantics of natural language conditionals. I strive to give a plausible account of
their meaning, which would not only ward off the classical puzzles (paradoxes of
the material and strict conditional, Goodman’s and Tichy´’s problems, differences
between indicatives and subjunctives, etc.), but also explain why they arise in the
first place.
I argue that truth-conditional approaches to meaning are often based on un-
warranted implicit assumptions and tend to favour semantic reductionism. Yet
there is no reason for us to expect that some of our most sophisticated expressions
should be logically reducible to any purportedly more basic vocabulary. And
indeed, many attempts at a truth-conditional analysis of conditional clauses have
turned out to be blatantly vacuous.
A more natural way to explain the meaning of conditionals is to point out the
function they carry out in standard language exchanges. Approached from this
perspective, indicative conditional clauses are arguably best viewed as devices
limiting the validity of the speech act performed by the main clause. This offers
us a handle on both the paradoxes of the material conditional and its usefulness in
mathematics, as well as a range of other phenomena, such as the so-called biscuit
conditionals and quantification restriction.
Subjunctive conditionals, on the other hand, make simple assertions about the
inferential potential of the hypotheses introduced by their antecedents, given a
well-defined inferential scenario. I argue that our picture of the world provides
such a scenario—there are few bare facts, as almost all that we know about the
reality is organised in (roughly causal) patterns. It is these patterns that support
our everyday assertions of counterfactuals.
Key words: conditionals, natural language, logic, probability, causality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
‘Yet another dissertation on conditionals.’ If this was the first thing that
crossed your mind upon seeing the title of this essay, you’re excused—
the topic has really taken off within analytical philosophy since Frege
came up with his ingenious truth-functional analogue of the common
‘if’. Trying to keep up with the rapidly growing literature on the subject
resembles chasing a snowball down a snowy slope. It is therefore no
surprise that most reasonable people have for all effects and purposes
given up. Theorising about conditionals has taken a shape that we know
from cancer research—almost everyone seems to have carved up his or her
own niche topic, rarely feeling competent enough to venture to comment
on the work going on in other sub-areas of the field.
You are excused even if that first idea of yours came accompanied with a
sigh. I am afraid that unlike with cancer, the proliferation of philosophical
research into conditionals has produced disproportionately meagre results.
The chances that a new publication on the topic will contain a stunning
original insight, instead of some clever, but otherwise insignificant tweak
of an existing semantics, are admittedly slim. Intangible concepts, such as
‘similarity ordering’, ‘contextual salience’ or ‘conversational background’
abound, preventing any straightforward application of the intricate theo-
ries to real language phenomena. It is quite revealing that when Tetlock
and Belkin tried to glean some wisdom for their work on counterfactual
reasoning in history from the most popular philosophical theory on the
subject, they were left practically empty-handed.1
One reason for the current situation may be a publishing culture that
rewards neatly constructed articles focusing on very limited issues. This
approach doesn’t seem to do philosophy much good—she is much better
1(Tetlock and Belkin, 1996), p.18, fn. 2
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at broad strokes while leaving the details for special sciences to articulate.
People have come to expect her to lead the way, not to improve on the
navigational instruments once the course is set. The more technical a piece
of philosophical writing, the more likely it is to pass unnoticed by anyone
who might actually use it for some independent purpose. And when
philosophical theorising becomes an end in itself, it tends to get out of
hand.
But perhaps an even more important problem is that we seem to have
lost a clear idea of the actual goals of our theoretical endeavour. Are we
trying to elucidate the meaning of natural language conditionals? Are we
aiming to specify the circumstances that must obtain for a conditional to
hold? Should we guide ourselves by the way speakers use conditionals
in everyday conversational exchanges? And is there a difference between
these projects at all? Of course, each one of the mentioned theoretical
challenges deserves the attention of philosophers. However, before taking
the plunge, we should reserve some time to reflect upon the ultimate
aims of our analysis and ponder whether the method we have chosen is
really conducive to the desired results. We often talk about ‘theories’ and
‘accounts of’ or ‘approaches to’ conditionals as if the content of these terms
were self-evident, but I suspect that it is often far from obvious what the
purported explanations are supposed to be aiming at. My qualms are
probably ingenuous, but I sorely miss a reflection on the default methods
of philosophical inquiry into conditionals in the literature. Given the
abundance of the latter, this laxity is more than a little surprising.
I can’t promise you much by way of clear-cut arguments and neat
conclusions. In particular, I am not going to put forward any ‘alternative
semantics’ in this dissertation. What I will try to do is throw some light
on the origins of the philosophical problem of conditionals and how they
shaped the subsequent developments. I will present a historical outline
of those philosophical positions on the topic that have dominated the
literature since Frege, focusing on a few especially resilient puzzles along
the way. I will subsequently argue that one of the reasons for our failure
in tackling them may reside in our theoretical mindset—we are trying too
hard to emulate Frege’s feat with the material conditional for much more
complex natural language phenomena, which for all we know may not be
amenable to such treatment. I will claim that in natural language analysis,
purely formal methods have to come to an end at some point, lest they
should run the risk of sliding into triviality.
In the rest of this introductory chapter, I will very briefly acquaint you
with the rudimentary distinctions and concepts ubiquitous in the field.
I will then go on to present the origin of the problem of conditionals in
1.1. BASIC NOTIONS 3
analytic philosophy—Frege’s truth-functional conditional stroke and the
thesis (to which, as we’ll see, he didn’t subscribe) that it is equivalent to
the natural language ‘if’.
Given the many shortcomings of this position, the first part of the
dissertation, ‘The Theories’ (Chapters 2-5) will explore the most relevant
theoretical alternatives. We shall review probability approaches to indica-
tives in Chapter 2. Cotenability theories of subjunctives are the subject
of Chapter 3. The most popular theory of (mainly subjunctive) condi-
tionals, the Stalnaker-Lewis similarity theory, will occupy us in Chapter
4. In Chapter 5, we will have a look at some theoretical possibilities that
have arisen mainly in reply to the success of the similarity theory: Lycan’s
and Gauker’s theories of conditionals, Kratzer’s and Veltman’s premise
semantics, as well as the causal theories of subjunctives.
In the second part of the dissertation, named ‘Conditionals in natural
language’, I try to confront my disappointment with the actual yield of
this avalanche of theorising. As I have already suggested, I will argue
that much of the defects of the current research programme are down to
inadequate methodological assumptions. Chapter 6 is entirely devoted to
indicatives, and strives to show that sometimes a simple account of mean-
ing can accomplish more than a sophisticated formal semantics. Chapter 7
is more speculative in nature and tries to supply the missing link between
indicatives and subjunctives, while bringing out the latter’s role in our
intellectual lives.
1.1. Basic notions
1.1.1. Conditional conjunctions
‘If you’re reading this, the chances are that you’re going to be in Santiago de
Compostela in a few weeks.’ There is perhaps no natural language expres-
sion that plays such a privileged role in our inferences as the conditional
conjunction2 “if”, occasionally followed by “then” in the main clause. In
logic and linguistics, the subordinate clause is known as the antecedent, or
sometimes as protasis, and the main clause as the consequent or apodosis.
2In the entire work we have to bear in mind the distinction between two meanings of
the word ‘conjunction’. The first is the meaning it has in general linguistics, in which it
refers to any operator whose task is to create compound sentences out of simple ones. The
second is the meaning it has in logic, where it stands for the truth-functional sentential
connective ‘∧’. Whenever there is danger of confusion, I will use ‘logical conjunction’ for
the second case.
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However, we will not be concerned here exclusively with this particular
linguistic expression, but rather with the sort of linguistic contribution it
is designed to make. There are many other ways of putting very much
the same message across in English, for instance by means of conjunctions
such as “unless” or “whenever”. Alternatively, you can sometimes use
inversion, as in
(1) Had I known she would be here, I might have stayed home reading
the latest EU regulation instead.
and
(2) Should you have any questions about that contraption, don’t ask
me—I have no clue.
Finally, sometimes simple stacking of sentences is all that you need:
(3) We go in there, we don’t come out.
(4) Comes love, nothing can be done.
(5) No Waterloo, no Whig history.
(6) Brug open, motor uit!3
Though the subtle differences between these options can undoubtedly
teach us plenty, we will be mostly looking at what they have in common
rather than at what makes them different. The latter task would most likely
be better handled by linguists, not philosophers of language (although the
distinction between them, if there ever was a clear one to begin with, is
getting blurred by the day).4
1.1.2. Indicatives vs. subjunctives
It should be clear from the above examples that conditionals admit of
many different kinds of propositions as arguments. They can vary in tense
3The examples are, respectively, from a scout’s report before the Little Bighorn battle,
a classic jazz song, (Ferguson, 1999), p.9, and finally, an exhortation often found on Dutch
moveable bridges across navigable canals:‘Bridge open, motor off!’
4For a view dissenting from this generous stance on conditionals, compare (Lycan,
2001), p.3, where examples analogous to (1)-(6) are considered non-conditional in nature.
That seems to be chiefly down to the prominence Lycan awards to syntax in the devel-
opment of his theory. There is no doubt that these examples differ in their syntax from
typical if-then sentences; however, I think conditionality should be regarded as a matter
of meaning rather than one of syntax. Anyway, it is the semantic dimension I am after
here. For a similar conclusion, see (Rescher, 2007), pp.3-4.
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and modal scope, and they can be to various degrees elliptical. Moreover,
examples (2) and (6) show that the illocutionary force of the consequent
does not even have to be assertive, but can be directive instead. We can
also easily come up with examples of conditional promises, excuses and
pronouncements.
If we restrict ourselves to purely assertive conditionals, we will find that
the literature has traditionally distinguished between two broad classes of
them: subjunctives and indicatives. An example of a subjunctive conditional
would be
(7) If you had studied something useful, you would not have to become
a PhD student.
And here goes an example of an indicative conditional:
(8) If the Neanderthals could talk, we will never be able to reconstruct
their language.
Every respectable text on conditionals seems to begin with a lament
on how inadequate this terminology is. This would be understandable if
most theorists rejected the distinction that underlies it, yet the opposite is
true. Anyway, I for one am not going to join the choir—I think that the dis-
tinction is crisp enough to begin with and the chosen terms actually quite
felicitous. On an intuitive level, the difference in meaning between indica-
tives and subjunctives appears to be quite straightforward. Tentatively,
the antecedent of an indicative presents a live epistemic possibility and the
assertion made by the consequent is subject to this possibility turning out
to be actual. On the other hand, the antecedent of a subjunctive typically
introduces a hypothesis that is accepted as false and the consequent makes
an assertion about a non-actual course of events. That’s why subjunctives
are often simply called counterfactuals.
Now, I agree that these are mere pre-theoretical hunches that have to
be confirmed, elaborated on and eventually explained by serious theory,
but they are strong enough to provide a good starting point for inquiry
into conditionals. Moreover, the distinction between ‘indicatives’ and
‘subjunctives’, as characterised above, is very neat across many natural
languages and often, though not always, it really matches the grammatical
moods traditional grammarians refer to when employing these terms. For
instance, Bennett maintains that the English subjunctive has little to do with
‘subjunctive conditionals’, but this has been put into question by Gauker.5
In Spanish, indicatives do use the ‘indicativo’ mood and subjunctives the
5See (Bennett, 2003), p.11 and (Gauker, 2005), pp.226-240. Bennett, in my view,
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past ‘subjuntivo’ mood, while other languages employ all kinds of different
devices to mark the distinction. However, this is largely irrelevant for
our purposes—one can argue that we are warranted in introducing new
terminology if (i) it is useful, (ii) it doesn’t give rise to confusions and
(iii) is readily applicable to a wide array of intended phenomena. I wish
all our terminology complied with these desiderata as much as the terms
‘indicative’-‘subjunctive’ do.
To represent an indicative conditional with antecedent A and conse-
quent C formally, I shall be using the simple arrow:
(9) A→ C
For subjunctives, I shall opt for the special boxarrow symbol introduced
by D. Lewis:
(10) A  C
Finally, I’ll use Stalnaker’s corner whenever no distinction is made
between the two types of conditionals:
(11) A > C
For a long time, many theorists believed that the choice of the subjunc-
tive form was no more than a way for the speaker to signal her lack of belief
in the antecedent and that except for this minor detail, both varieties of
conditionals were evaluated following the same procedure. This changed
when E. Adams put the following pair on the table:6
(12) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy in Dallas, then no one else would
have.
(13) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy in Dallas, then no one else did.
If the Warren Commission is to be trusted, then it is reasonable to believe
that it was Oswald who killed Kennedy and that he acted alone. Someone
who has those beliefs may, though, very well end up rejecting (13) and
accepting (12). This suggests that a lack of credence in the antecedent is
not the only feature that sets subjunctives apart from indicatives, yet the
search for a more comprehensive explanation of the difference has proved
surprisingly difficult. Before plunging into it, though, a few words about
the material conditional are in order.
erroneously focuses on the main clause. Gauker also attacks the arguments against the
syntactic distinction between subjunctive and indicative mood in English marshalled in
(Dudman, 1988). Dudman’s arguments do not translate into other languages (say, Slavic
ones), which do seem to mark this very semantic difference in a systematic way. This
suggests that syntax is not always a reliable guide to semantics.
6(Adams, 1970), p.90
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1.2. The material conditional
1.2.1. Forefathers
Frege
The material conditional made its entry into logic in 1879, when Frege de-
fined the meaning of the conditional stroke in his Begriffsschrift as follows:
If A and B stand for contents that can become judgments (§2), there
are the following four possibilities:
(1) A is affirmed and B is affirmed;
(2) A is affirmed and B is denied;
(3) A is denied and B is affirmed;
(4) A is denied and B is denied.
Now
A
B
stands for the judgment that the third of these possibilities doesn’t take
place, but one of the three others does.
(Frege, 1967), pp.13-14
The affirmability of Frege’s conditional stroke thus depends function-
ally on the affirmability or deniability of the contents in its antecedent
and consequent—its semantic contribution doesn’t go beyond banning the
possibility of affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent.
Frege was explicit about the fact that he wasn’t putting this technical
device forward as an accurate counterpart of the common conditional. He
claimed that the conditional stroke could only be translated by means of ‘if’
on the condition that it was asserted without clear commitment to either
the antecedent or the consequent. And even in such cases, Frege felt that
‘if’ conveyed an idea of a causal link between the conjoined contents that
was absent in his conditional stroke.7
Unlike most of his followers, Frege didn’t consider this divergence to be
a reason for worry. As one of the pioneers of formal languages, he seems
to have had a clearer idea of their limitations than many of those who
later came to take them for granted. The job of the system (at least at that
7(Frege, 1967), p.14
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stage of its development) was to allow precise rendering of mathematical
reasoning, and Frege repeatedly suggested that this objective could not
be achieved without pruning natural language of many of the features
irrelevant for this particular project. A formal language is as specialised
a tool as a microscope—its very precision precludes its use for everyday
purposes. If mathematicians managed to cram their axioms and theorems
into the mould provided by the artificial conditional stroke, then nothing
more could be asked of it.8
At a later stage, Frege abandoned the somewhat pragmatic-sounding
talk of affirmation and denial (Bejahung and Verneinung) for the talk about
truth-values as referents of the thoughts expressed by sentences combined
by the conditional stroke. In the new idiom, a conditional such as
(14) C
A
refers to the Truth (or simply, is true) whenever C refers to the Truth or A
refers to the Falsity. This is more or less the interpretation under which
Frege’s conditional stroke, and, for that matter, the whole of his logic, was
adopted by posterity.9
On the other hand, and more importantly, Frege doesn’t seem to have
undergone any radical change of mind about the relation between logic
and ordinary language (‘die Sprache des Lebens’, as he called it), as the
following passage attests. It comes from his Gedankengefu¨ge, finished a
mere two years before his death, and it deals with the question whether the
binary operation on judgeable contents corresponding to the conditional
stroke can be adequately rendered by ‘if’:
But here, indeed, doubts may arise. It may perhaps be maintained
that this does not square with linguistic usage. In reply, it must
once again be emphasized that science has to be allowed its own
terminology, that it cannot always bow to ordinary language. Just
here I see the greatest difficulty for philosophy: the instrument it
finds available for its work, namely ordinary language, is little suited
to the purpose, its formation having been governed by requirements
wholly different from those of philosophy. So also logic is first of all
obliged to fashion a useable instrument from those already to hand.
And for this purpose it initially finds but little in the way of useable
instruments available.
(Frege, 1963), p.11
8See (Frege, 1967), especially pp.6 and 12.
9See (Russell and Whitehead, 1964), p.7.
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To sum up, Frege’s invention of the conditional stroke was never meant
as an attempt at a precise analysis of natural language—there was no
questioning of its artificial nature.
Russell
After proving Frege’s attempt to justify logicism to be inconsistent, Russell
took it from where Frege left off. He embraced Frege’s use of the conditional
stroke in logic, but found his two-dimensional formulae rather impractical
and opted for Peano’s notation instead. Eventually it was the notation and
terminology adopted in the Principia Mathematica which set the standard
in the literature.
In the new notation, the conditional stroke is replaced by the one-
dimensional symbol ‘⊃’, usually called horseshoe in the literature. It comes
originally from the letter C, placed by Peano between two propositions in
order to affirm that the first is a consequence of the second. An inverted
C stood for the inverse of this relation and gradually evolved into the
horseshoe as we know it today.10 Frege’s (14) now becomes the much
more economical and perspicuous
(15) A ⊃ C.
The truth-function expressed by these conditionals, which is of course
identical to that of Frege’s conditional stroke, was dubbed ‘material im-
plication’ by Russell. That’s why I shall henceforth call the substitution
instances of (15), in accordance with a widespread usage, ‘material con-
ditionals’. The term ‘implication’ was warranted, according to Russell,
because A ⊃ C amounted to the most straightforward ground upon which
C could be inferred from A.11 And Russell called it ‘material’, so as to
distinguish it from the ‘formal implication’, which he defined as a relation
between two propositional functions, as stated by the formula
(16) ∀x(Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ(x))
Russell claimed that our uneasiness about the notion of material impli-
cation were chiefly due to conflating it with its formal counterpart. If we
obtain the statement of a material implication without deriving it from one
of a formal implication, it is usually because we have already proved the
falsity of the antecedent or the truth of the consequent.12 Yet in either of
10(Sanford, 1989), p.51
11(Russell, 2010), p.34
12(Russell and Whitehead, 1964), p.20-1
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these two cases, the material implication is rather useless for the purposes
of inference—either we had already proved what we were after, or we can
never use the implication in a modus ponens, given that the minor premise
is ruled out.
Observe that if a material implication is derived in a sound system
of pure logic, then it must be logically true, which in turn means that C
follows logically from A. This distinction presupposes a semantic notion
of consequence and as such could not be made by Russell, but it does
explain the rationale behind his views on the conditional connective he
used. The only intuitively problematic cases in Principia Mathematica are
therefore instances of the Principle of Explosion and its converse, but these
are easier to accept in the context. It is only if the material implication is
wrenched from its natural habitat, i.e. a classical deductive calculus, that
the horseshoe displays paradoxical behaviour.
1.2.2. Paradoxes
Under paradoxes of material implication we understand a large group of valid
patterns of inference and logical truths involving the material conditional,
which sound unacceptable if the horseshoe is replaced by the ordinary
‘if-then’. The most famous ones are
(CAC) C ∴ A ⊃ C
and
(NAAC) ¬A ∴ A ⊃ C
If the first inference pattern is translated into natural language with
the help of an ‘if’, it will justify the inference from any proposition C to a
conditional with C in the consequent and any proposition A whatsoever
in the antecedent. This seems to validate, for example, the following piece
of reasoning:
(17) Tomorrow is Friday. Therefore, even if I’ve mixed up the dates,
tomorrow is Friday.
If, on the other hand, we do the same with the NAAC pattern, we will be
compelled to accept any conditional introducing a hypothesis incompatible
with an accepted proposition:
(18) The stores do not open tomorrow. Therefore, if the stores open
tomorrow, they won’t have any customers.
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And there is more. The following formula is a logical truth:
(19) (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A)
So for any two formulae, either one implies the other or vice versa. Again,
this can be warranted in a classical deductive calculus, where the principle
of bivalence guarantees that any proposition will either be inferrable (if
true) or unavailable as the minor premise in a modus ponens (if false).
However, a natural language translation can sound very bizarre indeed:
(20) Either if I get extra holiday this year, I’ll spend an entire week
reading Hegel, or if I spend an entire week reading Hegel, I’ll get
extra holiday this year.
Other important inference patterns valid on the material interpretation
that nonetheless have suspicious substitution instances when rendered
by natural language ifs (whether indicative or subjunctive) include An-
tecedent Strengthening (AS), Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) and Contrapo-
sition (CP).13
There is not much evidence that Russell disagreed with Frege about
the technical nature of his notion of implication. In particular, he doesn’t
seem to have intended his material conditional as an analysis of the natural
language ‘if’:14
And although, while relations are still regarded with the awe caused
by unfamiliarity, it is natural to doubt whether any such relation as
implication is to be found, yet [...] there must be a relation holding
between nothing except propositions, and holding between any two
propositions of which either the first is false or the second true. Of
the various equivalent relations satisfying these conditions, one is to
be called implication, and if such a notion seems unfamiliar, that does
not suffice to prove that it is illusory.
(Russell, 2010), p.35
Arguably, if the material implication were considered by Russell to be at
the semantic core of our everyday ifs, he could not have deemed it that
unfamiliar to a common reader, let alone to a mathematically sophisticated
13Counterexamples to these and other inference patterns have become something of
a stodgy fare in the literature on conditionals, so I feel free to refer you to some of the
classics for details: (Stalnaker, 1968), pp.48-49; (Lewis, 1973a), pp.31-36; (Sanford, 1989),
pp.95-97 and 108-111; (Edgington, 2007), pp. 143-145; (Woods, 1997), p.25; (Bennett, 2003),
pp.138-145 and 159-168; and many more.
14But see (Sanford, 1989), p.65.
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one, after all. This of course does not mean that this truth-function cannot
appropriately be rendered by means of ‘if-then’ in the context of a classical
deductive calculus, which of course Russell explicitly admits—this may
well be one of the tasks to which ifs are particularly well-suited. However,
this is still a far cry from an argument for semantic conflation of indicative
and material conditionals.
The question about their relationship was bound to be asked at some
point, though, especially with the boom of logically-minded analyses of
natural language that began with logical positivists. Natural indicative
conditionals validate, by and large, inferential connections (either essential
or merely accidental ones) between propositions, wherefore they are fitted
for use in Modus Ponens. Yet so do material conditionals. If uncertainty
about the truth value of the component propositions, alluded to by Frege,
were all there was to the difference between the two, then maybe the
perceived awkwardness of some uses of the material conditional could be
explained by pragmatic, rather than semantic considerations. This is the
idea that inspired Grice’s theory of implicature.
1.3. Identity Thesis
1.3.1. Conversational Implicature
One of the philosophically most fruitful defences of the identity thesis
(which identifies ordinary ‘if’ with the material conditional) was carried
out by H. P. Grice in his William James Lectures in the 1960s. Despite the
enormous success of his theory of conversational implicature, which has
spread well beyond the narrow confines of philosophy of language, many
tend to forget that Grice’s foremost reason for advancing it was to provide a
good explanation of the relation between logical devices and their alleged
natural language counterparts. For Grice, such an explanation had to
fulfil two rather conservative criteria: it should not put into question the
validity of classical first-order logic as the logic of the ordinary English, and
it should be wary of cluttering our semantics with a multiplicity of new
meanings. This section will be devoted to an outline of Grice’s position, as
well as to the criticism it has stirred among dissenting theorists.
Modified Occam’s razor
I will not start our exposition head-on with an analysis of the celebrated
notion of implicature, as I believe that in order to approach it correctly, we
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have to set it in the broader context of Grice’s general semantic project.
Grice made use of this notion in order to explain why an expression could
contribute to the meaning of an utterance in several different ways, without
attributing multiple conventional meanings to it. The seemingly anoma-
lous behaviour of an expression should thus be explained by conversa-
tional interplay between a speaker and her audience. The ultimate goal of
this strategy is to maintain linguistic meanings as lean as possible and put
their apparent proliferation down to pragmatic phenomena.
Grice introduces a heuristic rule of thumb called Modified Occam’s
Razor (MOR), which underlies his project of semantic analysis. According
to the MOR, the entities that must not be multiplied beyond necessity are
meanings. Or, in an alternative formulation put forward by Grice himself,
no derivative meaning should be attributed to a piece of vocabulary if it
is possible for an audience to retrieve this meaning without possessing
additional semantic knowledge.15 Grice adds that if we accept the further
supposition that it is easier to contextually augment rather than diminish
the logical force conventionally conveyed by a sentence, then it follows that
our semantic analysis should not only render our vocabulary as univocal
as possible, but also as logically weak as possible.16
Conversational implicature
Implicature, according to Grice, is a device used by a speaker to communi-
cate information that goes beyond the strictly truth-conditionally evaluable
content conveyed by an utterance.17 Hence, the implicatum is not a log-
ical consequence of the proposition expressed by the speaker. We speak
about conventional implicature when the audience retrieves this information
by dint of the linguistically codified meaning of the vocabulary used by
the speaker, which nonetheless does not contribute to the truth conditions
of the utterance. By contrast, if this additional information is obtained
through a pragmatic interpretive inference guided by the presumption of
rationality of the speaker, we are dealing with a conversational implicature.
We will have more to say about the former when discussing the theories
by Jackson and Strawson; at this point we will focus on the conversational
15(Grice, 1978), p.47-48
16Grice admits that he can’t justify this additional principle, but he finds it very appeal-
ing intuitively. We will see that this latter premise is tacitly present in Grice’s argumen-
tation in favour of the Identity Thesis, but we have to bear in mind that it is independent
from the main clause of the MOR. The additional requirement does not automatically
inherit the MOR’s theoretical plausibility.
17(Grice, 1975), pp.24-25
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implicature, which lies at the core of Grice’s take on the counterintuitive
consequences of the identity theory.
Suppose you have the following conversation with a friend:
You: I’m going to do some shopping.
Friend: It’s May 1.
Although quite trivial, this exchange would be quite unintelligible
should we pay attention only to the explicit, truth-conditionally evaluable
content involved in it. So as to understand your friend’s contribution to
the exchange, you have attribute to him belief in the following proposition:
(21) On May 1 the shops are closed.
This content does not appear explicitly anywhere in the above conver-
sation, but its availability to both you and your friend is crucial to the
success of the exchange. Neither is it a logical consequence of any other
explicit proposition involved in the conversation and it might change, or
even be unavailable, were the same explicit content conveyed in special
circumstances of utterance. To put it in a more straightforward way, there
are propositional contents that the audience must retrieve in order to pre-
serve the presumption that the speaker is trying to make her utterances as
conversationally helpful as possible, or, which is the same, the presump-
tion that she follows the Cooperation Principle, as set forth by Grice.18 These
contents receive the name of conversational implicatures.
Grice distinguishes between generalised and particularised conversa-
tional implicature.19 The former is invariably triggered in typical occa-
sions of utterance of the proposition in question, while the latter requires
a specific context to arise. A paradigmatic example of a generalised con-
versational implicature is supplied by our common use of the existential
quantifier:
(22) Some of the students took part in the meeting.
typically implicates
(23) Not all the students took part in the meeting.
but we certainly would not want to say that (22) entails (23). The prag-
matic inference that leads to the conclusion (23) is based on the reasonable
18(Grice, 1975), p.26
19(Grice, 1975), pp.37-38
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assumption that if the speaker were committed to a logically stronger
proposition than (22), such as ‘All the students took part in the meeting’,
it would be appropriate for him to affirm the latter proposition instead of
the former. This is the general strategy used by Grice in order to explain
the behaviour of logical vocabulary in natural language.
Disjunction, conditionals and conversational implicature
Grice’s defence of the identity thesis for conditionals and disjunctions
is exposed respectively in (Grice, 1967) and (Grice, 1978), and follows
more or less the same lines. In both cases he urges us to consider the
arguments of a ‘strong theorist’, who claims that the meaning of the natural
language counterparts of our logical devices consists of a truth-functional
core and a further indication (called ‘the indirection condition’ in the case of
conditionals) to the effect that ‘there are non-truth-functional grounds for
affirming them’. In this way the ‘strong theorist’ can explain the intuitive
invalidity of inferential patterns like (CAC) or (NAAC).20
In both cases the only ground for asserting the conditional would reside
in our previous knowledge of the truth value of either the antecedent or the
consequent. While this is sufficient for the truth of a material conditional,
it cannot warrant an assertion of the corresponding indicative conditional,
according to the strong theorist. The same is true for disjunction—we
would most certainly object to an assertion of ‘A or B’, should it be moti-
vated solely by the speaker’s belief that A is true.
Grice points out that the MOR requires us not to regard this non-
truth-functional extra as a part of the linguistic meaning of our logical
vocabulary, if we are capable of explaining its emergence as a case of
generalised conversational implicature. He then tries to come up with
such an explanation.
A speaker who asserts ‘A ⊃ C’ exclusively on the basis of his belief in
the truth of C violates the conversational maxim ‘Make your assertion as
logically strong as possible’. The assertion of ‘A ⊃ C’ or ‘A∨C’ under these
circumstances would be, to use a phrase of Stalnaker’s, ‘pointless, hence
misleading’.21 This is why an audience with no reason to suspect that the
speaker is not following the Cooperation Principle typically retrieves the
implicature about non-truth-functional grounds for the speaker’s asser-
tion.
There is more evidence to the effect that the ‘indirection condition’ is
20See page 10.
21(Stalnaker, 1975), p.147
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actually a conversational implicature—it possesses some of its defining
traits. First, it is quite non-detachable from the truth-conditionally evalu-
able content of the utterance, as it is trigged by the assertion of any formula
classically equivalent to the material conditional in question. And second,
there are certain circumstances of utterance under which the implicated
content is cancelled, whether by means of speaker’s explicit instruction, or
contextually.
Conversational implicature in D. Lewis
Grice was not the only theorist to resort to the theory of conversational
implicature to explain the quirks of indicative conditionals in natural lan-
guage. David Lewis, who had applied possible-world semantics to past
subjunctive conditionals, adopted a variety of Grice’s theory for indicatives
in order to explain the intuitions at the base of E.W.Adams’s work without
sacrificing the truth-functional account of indicative conditionals.22 As we
will presently see, Adams’s probabilistic conditionals verify
(24) p(A→ C) = p(C/A)
which in general differs from p(A ⊃ C).
Lewis felt compelled by his triviality results to reject the thesis that
probabilities of indicative conditionals are conditional probabilities. Nev-
ertheless, he was also interested in showing that there was an intimate
connection between the acceptability of a conditional and the conditional
probability of its consequent with respect to its antecedent. The challenge,
as with Grice, consisted in explaining this connection while keeping the
linguistic meaning of the indicative identical to that of the material condi-
tional. In order to defend the identity thesis, Lewis adduced the impressive
success of classical logic and the fact that embeddability of probabilistic
conditionals in truth-functional formulae would have to be severely con-
strained in order to avoid triviality. The upshot was, according to Lewis,
that natural language indicative conditionals could not be Adams’s prob-
abilistic conditionals.
Lewis, as well as Grice, suggested that a speaker should not assert a
conditional only on the strength of her knowledge of the falsity of the
antecedent. If in addition the conditional probability of the negation of the
consequent over the antecedent is high, the conditional will most certainly
lack in assertibility. The formula that expresses the total loss of assertibility
will then be
22(Lewis, 1976), pp.137-139. See Chapter 4 for details of Lewis’s take on subjunctives.
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(25) p(¬A) × (p(¬C/A))
hence the formula expressing the resulting assertibility of a material
conditional would be:
(26) As(A ⊃ C) = p(A ⊃ C) − p(¬A) × p(¬C/A) = p(C/A)
Lewis went on to say that the same reflection was applicable to any
other logical constants capable of expressing the same truth function as the
material conditional.
Criticism of Grice’s and Lewis’s account
The elegance of Grice’s theory has been unanimously acknowledged and
only reticently have many theorists rejected it as an adequate explanation
of the differences between mathematical and natural conditionals. First,
I will expound the criticism other authors have levelled at Grice, and
afterwards I will present some general considerations that make me share
their opinion.
Frank Jackson offers examples of acceptable conditionals with very
improbable antecedents and others with very probable consequents.23 An
instance of the former type would be
(27) If the sun goes out of existence in ten minutes’ time, the earth will
be plunged into darkness in about eighteen minutes.
and of the second type
(28) Even if I vote against the candidate X, he will still win.
On Grice’s account, these conditionals should strike us as mischievous,
as it would be much more informative to simply state their antecedents
and consequents, respectively. The fact that they don’t suggests that there
is more to assertibility of conditionals than their logical force and proba-
bility of the embedded propositions. We could go even one step beyond
Jackson’s examples and consider a conditional that would be perfectly
acceptable in an arithmetic reductio, despite having an impossible an-
tecedent.
(29) If m + n , n + m, then (0m)n , (0n)m
23(Jackson, 1987), pp.20-21.
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What is more, Jackson calls into question even the crucial premise
of any Gricean treatment of conditionals—it seems that a speaker may
legitimately opt to affirm a logically weaker proposition in retribution for
a considerable gain in robustness, that is, the ability of the affirmation to
withstand evidence to its contrary. Bennett considers Jackson’s objections
to Grice’s and Lewis’s theory as conclusive.24
Dorothy Edgington focuses on the distinction between ‘learning a
proposition is true’ and ‘finding it fit for assertion’, which is at the heart of
Grice’s and Lewis’s proposals.25 Her conclusion is that there is no evidence
of competent language speakers recognising this tension in their everyday
use of conditionals. Even though her objection is expressed on a fairly re-
duced space, we can develop the intuition behind it invoking Grice’s own
dictum as to the distinction between ‘what is said’ as opposed to ‘what is
implicated’ by the utterance:
If nonconventional implicature is built on what is said, if what is said
is closely related to the conventional force of the words used, and
if the presence of the implicature depends on the intentions of the
speaker, or at least on his assumptions, with regard to the possibility
or nature of the implicature being worked out, then it would appear
that the speaker must (in some sense or other of the word ‘know’)
know what is the conventional force of the words he is using.
(Grice, 1978), p.49
Here Grice seems to be suggesting that the proposition expressed by an
utterance by virtue of the linguistic meaning of the chosen vocabulary must
be consciously accessible to the speaker in order to trigger any implicatures.
A similar position is advocated by the contextualist approach to the line of
divide between philosophical semantics and pragmatics.26 Undoubtedly, it
would be very strange if competent speakers were so wrong about the use
of the conjunction ‘if’ that they would not be able to identify the inferences
justified only on the strength of its conventional meaning, without resorting
to any contextual criterion of assertibility.
As for my own criticism, I would like to speculate that the reason Grice’s
take on conditionals has not been as successful historically as its ingenuity
might have us expect was its failure to comply, if not with the letter, then
at least with the spirit of the MOR.
24(Bennett, 2003), p.33
25(Edgington, 1986), pp.9-10
26See for instance (Blakemore, 2002), (Recanati, 2004) or (Wilson and Sperber, 2004).
However, this objection had already been raised by Mackie: (Mackie, 1973), p.80.
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We have seen that it is a reasonable requirement for our semantics
not to attribute more derivative meanings to a piece of vocabulary than
those strictly required to explain its functioning in a language. However,
Grice has not made any attempt to justify the additional and independent
requirement to the effect that the attributed conventional meaning should
be as logically weak as possible. And it seems that the loss of generality
incurred by Grice’s theory of indicative conditionals is too high to warrant
this additional assumption in case of indicative conditionals. The fact is
that Grice offers at least three further independent pragmatic explanations
in addition to the one we have discussed so far in order to account for yet
other anomalies entailed by his defence of the identity theory based on
conversational implicature.27
For instance, he is forced to face the generally acknowledged intuition
that negations of conditionals are sometimes understood as conditional
negations of their consequents—an intuition that cannot be dealt with
by appealing to the maxim ‘make your assertion as logically strong as
possible’. He solves the problem by introducing an ad-hoc interpretive
mechanism which conveniently alters the syntactic order of the words in
uttered sentences. What is more, he admits his incapacity of explaining
the failure of the law of contraposition in examples where conditional
probability is involved. However, a probabilistic account of indicative
conditionals can cope with all these alleged paradoxes in one fell swoop.
Theorists working under what we will call ‘the Ramseyan paradigm’
have interpreted these problems as evidence that a unified semantic ac-
count of indicative conditionals would be preferable to Grice’s theory,
even if it were forced to attribute more logical force to conditionals. How-
ever, Grice’s work offers yet another possible way of escape for identity
theorists, by means of his theory of conventional implicature. This path was
be chosen by F. Jackson and P. Strawson.
1.3.2. Conventional Implicature
Once the attempts to explain away the paradoxes of material conditional
by means of conversational implicatures failed, it seemed unavoidable to
conclude that the inferential behaviour of conditionals in contexts charac-
terised by imperfect certainty must somehow be codified in their linguistic
meaning. This realisation, however, need not imply an abandonment of
the identity thesis, although it must be slightly modified. Conventional im-
plicatures are an identity theorist’s last stand—they allow him to preserve
27See (Grice, 1967), pp.83-85.
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truth-functionality of indicative conditionals, while he can also maintain
that the expectation that the conditional probability of the consequent with
respect to the antecedent be high arises by default and not by virtue of any
pragmatic interpretive mechanism. Whereas F. Jackson draws on Grice’s
theory of conventional implicature explicitly, I believe that P. Strawson’s
theory of conditionals presupposes something very like that.
Conventional implicature in Grice
Unfortunately, Grice’s loci classici for the study of the subject of conven-
tional implicature are very spare and fairly succinct. In his (Grice, 1975),
Grice devotes to this linguistic phenomenon only a few brief remarks:
In some cases the conventional meaning of the words used will deter-
mine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said.
If I say (smugly), He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave I have
certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words,
to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows
from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said that he is an
Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to say that I
have said (in the favoured sense) that it follows from his being an
Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and
so implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say that my utterance of
this sentence would be, strictly speaking, false should the consequence
in question fail to hold. So some implicatures are conventional, unlike
the one with which I introduced this discussion of implicature.
(Grice, 1975), p.25
To sum up the passage, the speaker commits himself to the content
implicated conventionally by the linguistic meaning of his words, but
this content does not enter into the truth-conditional evaluation of the
utterance. The truth conditions of an utterance determine ‘what is said’,
not ‘what is implicated’.
Other classical formulation of the theory can be found in (Grice, 1961).
In this article Grice compares the properties of two different types of content
suggested, as opposed to entailed, by the linguistic meaning of the words
used in a sentence.
(30) Smith has left off beating his wife.
The proposition suggested by (30),
(30’) Smith used to beat his wife.
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has the status of a presupposition, that is, its truth is a necessary condition
for (30) to have a truth value. The situation is different with
(31) She was poor but honest.
The content suggested by the contrastive conjunction ‘but’, according to
Grice, is the existence of some kind of opposition between poverty and
honesty. This content, he argues, is independent from the truth-conditional
assessment of the sentence (31), which is equivalent to
(31’) She was poor and honest.
It is of crucial importance, therefore, not to conflate two semantic cate-
gories in Grice: on the one hand, the conventional meaning of the expres-
sions used in an utterance, and on the other hand, ‘what is said’, that is, the
propositional content that determines the truth conditions of an utterance.
Now that we have sketched out Grice’s original position, we should
inquire into its connection with the above-discussed Modified Occam’s
Razor. Grice is fairly unambiguous on this point: the MOR mediates
between the contents retrieved by pragmatic interpretive inferences and
linguistically codified meanings. It enjoins us to attribute linguistic mean-
ings as univocal and (according to a further assumption) logically weak as
possible to our vocabulary. It follows that the MOR is of little help in dis-
tinguishing between the ingredients of linguistic meaning that contribute
to the truth conditions of an utterance and those that make up the conven-
tional implicatures conveyed within the speech act. To draw this line is an
extremely elusive task, which, according to Grice’s view, should be guided
fundamentally by the intuitions of competent language users.28 It seems
that if competent language practitioners consistently attribute the same
truth value to two sentences, one of which uses words that are somehow
semantically stronger than those of the second one, this additional content
conveyed by the former sentence should be explained by an appeal to a
conventional implicature triggered by the words in question. Language
users will typically perceive some contextual violence if the weaker expres-
sion is substituted for the stronger one in inadequate contexts, but they will
not be prone to deny the truth of the proposition expressed under these
circumstances, on condition that the weaker proposition was originally
considered true by them. In paradigmatic cases, the audience will object
to the tone of the utterance, but not against its explicit content.
Consider the following utterance:
28For a good review of this question, see (Bach, 1999).
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(32) Not even a student can afford such a holiday.
We will tend to regard (32) as true if the holiday costs exceed the income
of a common student, but even then we will not be happy with the content
suggested by the utterance of this sentence, which is that students enjoy
above-average incomes.
If this rendering of Grice’s account is viable, we might think that the
relation between the conventional implicatum and what is said is the same
as that between the conversational implicatum and linguistic meaning—
the task of semantic analysis would consist in making ‘what is said’ as
logically weak as our linguistic intuition allow.
The theory of conventional implicature can be and was applied to the
analysis of conditionals. They would present two layers of conventional
meaning: one that specifies their truth conditions (i.e., if the identity thesis
is endorsed, those of the corresponding material conditional) and an ad-
ditional rule that would specify the adequate contexts for their utterance
(thus making them prima facie logically stronger). Once we have dismissed
Grice’s original theory based on conversational implicature, this is as close
as we can get to the full-fledged identity thesis.
Conventional implicatum as inferential connection
We can interpret Strawson’s criticism of Grice’s theory of indicative condi-
tionals as making an implicit use of a concept akin to that of conventional
implicature.29 Strawson himself strove to defend the ‘strong theorist’s’
position, without being familiar with the details of Grice’s proposal.
His theory draws on the close relationship between the sentential oper-
ators ‘if’ and ‘so’. The main argument in favour of introducing the strong
condition of existence of non-truth-functional grounds for assertion in the
conventional meaning of sentential structures built with an if-operator is
that Grice’s analysis would make it impossible for a language to include an
operator with a meaning analogous to ‘so’ that could relate non-asserted
propositions. However, the linguistic meaning of ‘so’ resides in the very
indication of a relation of dependence between the propositions it connects,
and to which the speaker commits herself. A semantic analysis guided by
the MOR doesn’t seem to be able to uncover any more fundamental layer
of its meaning (although its truth conditions are just those of the logical
conjunction).
Bennett criticises Strawson’s account, pointing out that there are many
acceptable conditionals where this strong connection between the an-
29(Strawson)
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tecedent and the consequent is absent.30 Nevertheless, Strawson explicitly
states that this conditional link may be as weak as one can imagine and
often is completely context-dependent. According to Strawson, ‘so’ func-
tions as an inference marker even in compound sentences such as
(33) Melbourne is in Australia, so the sea is salt.
where it is exclusively the context which determines the acceptability of
the inference (think, say, of a multiple-choice test with unique solutions).
However, even if Bennett’s critique should be viewed as misguided,
attention must be drawn to the purely negative character of Strawson’s
theory—he does not develop an independent proposal, he only purports
to reply to Grice’s work. And the manner in which he does so is con-
troversial: precisely because ‘so’ always connects propositions to which
the speaker commits herself, if it has any additional meaning compared to
the logical conjunction this cannot be explained by conversational impli-
catures. However, since conditionals typically feature propositions whose
truth value is left undetermined, this kind of analysis remains viable. And,
unless we reject the MOR, if it is viable, it should be preferred to others.
Strawson’s proposal did not attract many followers31, but we should
underline the strategy that lies at its foundations. Structures featuring
the particle ‘so’, appealed to by Strawson to warrant his ‘consequentialist’
account of if, are considered by Grice’s followers as paradigmatic cases
of conventional implicature . Strawson himself compares it with ‘but’,
which suggests the presence of a contrastive, rather than consequential
relation between the propositions it connects. That is why we have in-
terpreted Strawson’s position as an account of conditionals in terms of
truth conditions equivalent to those of ⊃ and a further assumption codi-
fied linguistically about the presence of a consequential relation between
the antecedent and the consequent. From this point of view, Strawson’s
theory is much more conservative than those of the theorists who deny
that conditionals have truth conditions (see next chapter) and it can be
reproduced in Gricean terms.
Conventional implicatum as inferential availability
F. Jackson defended a view analogous to Strawson’s, but advocating a dif-
ferent conventional implicatum for indicative conditionals. According to
Jackson, instead of suggesting that there is an ad-hoc inferential connection
30(Bennett, 2003), p.45.
31See again (Bennett, 2003), p.45.
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between the antecedent and the consequent, indicative conditionals con-
ventionally signal that they are fit for their fundamental purpose—their
use in Modus Ponens.
Jackson finds it necessary to replace Grice’s account based on conversa-
tional implicature for reasons we have expounded above. It is fundamental
that we realise that all arguments against Grice are based on application of
probability to deductive logic. Grice himself probably would have viewed
accounting for reasoning under circumstances of imperfect certainty as ex-
traneous to his project, as he sought a uniform conditional logic. Lewis’s
first proposal, as well as Jackson’s, attempts to bridge the gap between the
two logics. Lewis later acknowledged the theoretical superiority of Jack-
son’s account and abandoned his own proposal based on conversational
implicature.32
To explain how ordinary conditions of utterance affect the behaviour
of our logical vocabulary, Jackson introduces the technical term of robust-
ness.33 A proposition p1 is robust with respect to p2 for a given belief system
if and only if the speaker affirming it will not abandon her belief that p1
should she learn that p2 obtains. It follows that robustness is a relative
affair, that is, the robustness of p1 will vary with different values of p2.
Moreover, robustness is a matter of degree, as the speaker may be more
or less disposed to discard p1 on learning p2. The third characteristic of
robustness is that it is always a function of the system of beliefs of a par-
ticular speaker and not an intrinsic semantic property of the vocabulary
used in assertion. It might for instance be argued that our mathematical
beliefs should be maximally robust with respect to any possible evidence;
however, since our rationality is finite, in practice they often fail to fulfil
this desideratum.
Learning the speaker’s subjective robustness of certain propositions
with respect to others may be quite interesting for the audience. This
information may often be retrieved by carrying out inferences guided
by Grice’s Cooperation Principle. With most disjunctive assertions, the
speaker signals their robustness with respect to the elimination of each
of the disjuncts. For instance, when asked about Pedro’s whereabouts, a
speaker who replies by affirming
(34) Pedro is in the kitchen or in his study.
typically commits herself to affirming
(35) Pedro is in his study.
32(Lewis, 1986b), p.584, fn 6.
33(Jackson, 1987), pp.22-25
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should she learn from a reliable source that Pedro is not in the kitchen.
However, as this interpretation is based on a conversational implica-
ture, it can be explicitly cancelled by the speaker, as Grice shows.34 A
speaker, playing hide-and-seek, could tell the fellow players
(34’) Pedro is in the kitchen or in his study, but I won’t tell you which
one it is.
By such an utterance, the speaker makes it clear that she believes the
disjunction in virtue of her believing one of the disjuncts and she would
therefore withdraw her credence from the former should she abandon the
latter.
This conversational implicature is absent in the utterances of certain
classes of disjunctions, in which one disjunct entails the other, and the
speaker would therefore abandon the entire disjunction should she change
her mind as to the second one. Jackson points out that in these cases we
use words that signal unilateral robustness:
(36) He is in the kitchen, or anyway, somewhere in the house.
The situation with conditionals is analogous, according to Jackson.
Our purpose in carrying out conditional assertions lies in entitling our
audience to use them in Modus Ponens. We require that a speaker who
affirms a conditional commit herself to the inference from the antecedent
to its consequent. However, if the material conditional A ⊃ C is affirmed
chiefly on the grounds that the speaker believes ¬A is true, detachment
with A (if it despite all appearances turns out to be true) does not guarantee
that the inference should be truth-preserving. This is why Jackson argues
that beside determining its truth conditions, the conventional meaning of
an indicative conditional includes an additional assertibility rule, by which
the speaker commits herself to the validity of the corresponding Modus
Ponens, should the antecedent turn out to be acceptable. In Jackson’s
idiom, an indicative conditional signals robustness of the corresponding
material conditional with respect to the antecedent. Formally,
(37) As(A→ C) = p(A ⊃ C/A) = p(C/A)
We have shown that if conditional assertibility is construed in this
manner, it will equal the conditional probability of the consequent over
the antecedent, that is (as happened previously in the case of Lewis’s
formula), we obtain the desirable Adams’s thesis on independent grounds
and retaining the spirit, if not the letter, of the identity thesis.
34(Grice, 1978), pp.44-45
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We must give Jackson’s theory its due—it has several advantages. One
of them is that it deftly manages to avoid Lewis’s triviality results35, by
denying the premise that the probability of a conditional is the conditional
probability of its consequent over its antecedent. Since the truth conditions
of an indicative conditional ‘If A, then C’ are those of the corresponding
material conditional, its probability equals the probability of the disjunc-
tion ¬A ∨ C. Another point in favour of this theory is that it reconciles
the conservative tradition with the more radical approach epitomised by
Ramsey and Adams, and it seems to explain the link between our log-
ical practice and the functioning of the run-of-the-mill natural language
conditionals.
Nevertheless, by many critics’ lights36, the theory also has significant
drawbacks. Jackson argues in favour of the thesis that an indicative
possesses the truth conditions of the corresponding material conditional,
claiming that it would be discriminatory to deprive it of them, as most
language structures also have them.37 Now this is undoubtedly a highly
controversial claim, but the real problem is that it makes the relation be-
tween our logic and our natural language even less clear than before. He
affirms that
[...] one who knows only (Adams) lacks nothing in the way of linguis-
tic understanding of indicative conditionals-—after all, how many
competent speakers of English know about the truth conditionas of
indicative conditionals, or, indeed, about truth-conditions at all, in
the philosophical sense? But this is consistent with insisting that one
who does not know that A → B is true if and only if A ⊃ B lacks
something in the way of philosophical understanding.
(Jackson, 1987), p.58
The lack of generality of this proposal is in my view due to its failure
to attribute consistent semantic function to truth conditions over the set of
expressions of our language. In a familiar model, to know the truth con-
ditions of a sentence means to know how to constrain the set of epistemic
possibilities in view of its truth conditions. In this way, the speaker and
her audience can exchange information about the world.
That’s why it would be extremely paradoxical to find a natural language
expression, used over and over again in our daily language practice, whose
truth conditions we would systematically fail to recognise. The knowledge
35See Section 2.3.1.
36See (Edgington, 1986) or (Bennett, 2003), pp.39-44.
37(Jackson, 1987), p.57
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of the proposition expressed by such an expression would not be a matter
of the man in the street, but rather require an esoteric training at philosophy
faculties. What kind of role could these truth conditions play in commu-
nication? Jackson himself implicitly admits that there is none. But then it
would be extremely interesting to have a look at the analysis by which a
philosopher isolates the truth conditions of an expression that competent
speakers use without being aware of them.
Of course, users of language may be wrong about the metalinguistic
explanation of their utterances and we all carry out inappropriate speech
acts at times. However, the possibility of practically all users of language
being wrong about when an expression they use on a daily basis is to
be considered true or false is almost a contradiction in terms. We have
seen that the original Grice’s theory draws heavily on competent speakers’
intuition in order to identify the presence of a conventional implicature
(there is no test analogous to the one with conversational implicature). This
suggests that we should be at least wary of the unintuitive consequences
of Jackson’s theory.
1.3.3. Conclusion
It seems that the main motivation behind the defence of the identity thesis
are worries about the link between natural-language reasoning and our
logical calculi, which would supposedly be endangered should we aban-
don the material analysis of our natural-language conditionals. The gen-
eral view among Gricean theorists seems to be that a change of paradigm
would imply sacrificing too many of our achievements in logic and its
philosophy.38 Dissenting authors, however, maintain that many of these
supposed achievements are illusory.
When discussing the alternative accounts I will attempt to show that
many of these worries are unfounded and due to an erroneous conception
of the task of our logic—particularly the thesis that one of the objectives
of logic is to provide us with the meaning of our natural-language logical
vocabulary. I believe the right thing under these circumstances would be to
turn Grice on his head and start analysing the behaviour of the natural in-
dicative conditional and then attempt to show under which circumstances
material conditional would be a good approximation to it.39 If this could
be achieved, the problem would probably be resolved to the satisfaction of
both parties involved in the strife.
38See (Lewis, 1976), pp.136-137.
39See Section 6.3.3.
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However, this is a task I shall only undertake in the second part of this
dissertation. Meanwhile, we have still much to learn—in the first part
of the dissertation, we shall review and assess a wide array of analytic
theories of conditionals that have been put forward as rivals to the ma-
terial conditional since approximately the middle of the 20th century. I
shall try to acquire some insight into the valid intuitions that gave rise to
these theories, while identifying the source of their difficulties or outright
failures. My purpose is to glean from this analysis a clear picture of the
pre-theoretical properties of natural language indicatives and subjunctives
that any reasonable theory should strive to account for.
Subjunctives were obviously much less amenable to the material treat-
ment than indicatives and hence from the very outset invited a radically
different approach. They entered the spotlight with Nelson Goodman’s
and other cotenability theorists’ abortive attempt at analysing counterfac-
tuals in terms of lawlike regularities. This approach invited some follow-
ers, but never quite attained the popularity of Stalnaker-Lewis ordering
semantics, which has been dubbed as ‘pretty much everybody’s favourite
theory of counterfactuals’. However, we shall also take a look at some
alternatives. William G. Lycan has attempted to tweak ordering seman-
tics by means of replacing possible worlds by events. Angelika Kratzer’s
premise semantics based on the notion of lumping has been shown to
be mutually intertranslatable with Lewis’s system; it nevertheless differs
from the latter in its theoretical underpinnings, which are actually closer
to cotenability accounts. Kratzer’s work has been very well received espe-
cially among linguists and linguistically minded philosophers and there
has been a number of adaptations of her ideas both in analysis of subjunc-
tives and indicatives. Some of them have sought common ground with
the so-called intervention semantics, based on the idea of causal networks.
David Sanford’s analysis in terms of ‘patterns of dependence’ bears rela-
tion to intervention semantics as well as to Goodman’s approach based on
cotenability.
As for natural language indicatives, we have already witnessed the re-
silience of the material interpretation, bolstered by the ingenuity of Paul
Grice’s theory of implicature. Nevertheless, the persistent difficulties of
this treatment led to the development of an alternative ‘probability condi-
tional’, which exploited an early insight by Frank Ramsey. This has since
become something of a mainstream approach to indicatives, championed
by such philosophical heavyweights as Ernest Adams, Dorothy Edging-
ton, Jonathan Bennett and others. However, rival theories also abound.
Stalnaker intended his similarity-based conditional to work equally well
for indicatives as for subjunctives—these hopes sustained an important
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blow from Lewis’s triviality results. Lycan’s theory was originally de-
signed for indicatives. Christopher Gauker’s semantics of conditionals
makes use of the idea of abstract contexts, conceived as set-theoretical
constructs on a universe of literals. Kratzer’s restrictor approach, though
devised with the eye on improving on Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals,
was also meant to be applicable to indicatives. Victor Dudman has formu-
lated what has been called the relocation thesis, related to Adams’s take on
subjunctives and partially subscribed to by Edgington, according to which
would-subjunctives differ from will-indicatives only regarding their tense.
And this is only a selection of the most influential theories: there is still
more (say, Peter Ga¨rdenfors’s inductive logic) that simply had to be left
out for the sake of brevity.
All in all, perhaps the most bewildering thing about this panorama are
the striking differences between the proposals. How can there be such
a rich variety of treatments of what is essentially an everyday linguistic
phenomenon? I shall argue that despite appearances, there is much less
disagreement about the fundamental issues than meets the eye. Each of
these proposals exploits quite a few accurate intuitions about our use of
conditionals—the danger hides in overstating their explanatory power.
Surprising though it may sound, I submit that we do not have to throw
in our lot with any of these analyses, provided we are capable of taking
them for what they’re worth and nothing more. In second part of the
dissertation, I shall try to explain their valid insights by answering crucial
questions about the role of conditionals in our intellectual life.

Part I
The theories
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Chapter 2
Ramsey Test
2.1. Ramsey and some basic probability notions
One of the first authors to advocate an approach to conditionals radically
opposed to explanations based on Frege-Russell’s material conditional was
F. Ramsey. His simple account of how indicatives are evaluated in practice,
which was at loggerheads with the assumption that there was nothing
more to it than a mere truth table, has inspired a whole host of scholars of
diverse theoretical hew and has been dubbed ‘Ramsey Test’ in his honour.
For Ramsey, disputing about a conditional amounts to disputing about
what the degree of belief in the consequent given the antecedent should
be:
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and
arguing on that basis about q; so that in a sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, ¬q’
are contradictories. We can say they are fixing their degrees of belief
in q given p. If p turns out false, these degrees of belief are rendered
void. If either party believes ¬p for certain, the question ceases to
mean anything to him except as a question about what follows from
certain laws or hypotheses.
(Ramsey, 1929), p.143
The outline of the argument should be clear—if ‘if p, q’ were a material
conditional, ascertaining the antecedent’s falsity would suffice to settle
the question about its truth. Since it obviously doesn’t, the analytical
hypothesis must be spurned.
It doesn’t seem to me that Ramsey regarded this brief remark as a
mature piece of semantic theory. He rather appears to have meant it as
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an intuitive description of actual practice lending support to his theory of
causal laws—otherwise he would probably not have added it as a mere
footnote in an unpublished paper. Note also that it only covers the cases
where the antecedent is either regarded as indisputably false or else its
truth value is in question. And neither does it as much as hint at how this
hypothetical addition of the antecedent to the stock of one’s beliefs should
look in detail—the idea of a minimal conservative revision that many have
read into it is at best implicit. And what about the case where you reject
the antecedent without being completely certain about ¬p? Should the
addition look different in the indicative and in the subjunctive case? These
are only a few crucial questions that the original formulation of the Ramsey
test was not devised to answer.
It is therefore more than a little bewildering that so many authors should
have turned Ramsey’s insight (which was not put forward as a proposal
about the meaning of conditionals) into the cornerstone of a new conditional
semantics. We will inspect Stalnaker’s treatment of indicative conditionals
in Section 4, reserving this one for accounts based on conditional probabil-
ity. But before proceeding, we have to fix some terminology.
A classical probability space K is defined as a set of state descriptions
with a defined probability measure. A state description represents simply
a distinct way things may turn out to be. The degree of granularity of a
probability space varies with the requirements of the modelled epistemic
situation. State descriptions with the maximum degree of granularity will
be called ‘possible worlds’—they can provide an answer to all imaginable
factual queries. Sentences of the language correspond to subsets of the
probability space and can be assigned probabilities in accordance with
Kolmogorov’s probability axioms. They imply, for instance, that p(>) = 1,
p(⊥) = 0 and for all φ, p(¬φ) = 1−p(φ). If K comprises only a finite number
of state descriptions, the probability of any sentence will equal the sum of
the probabilities of the state descriptions in the corresponding subset of
K. If K is infinite, only its subsets will in general be apt to bear non-zero
probability (any state description will in general have zero probability).
Conditional probability of A given B, p(A/B), is defined as p(A∧B)/p(B).
It represents the likelihood of A should B turn out to be the case. If p(B) = 0,
then B cannot turn out to be the case under any circumstances and p(A/B)
will remain undefined. Even though the definition may suggest otherwise,
p(A/B) and p(A ∧ B) are conceptually on a par, and it is often easier to
ascertain p(A/B) and derive p(A ∧ B) from it. It was Ramsey’s very idea
about conditional probability that was to play a central role in Adams’s
probabilistic approach to conditionals.
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2.2. Adams’s probability logic
E. Adams elaborated Ramsey’s original idea into a full-fledged treatment
of indicative conditionals in the course of the 1960s. Its complete presen-
tation was given in (Adams, 1975) and an updated version was presented
in (Adams, 1998). Among the many champions of Adams’s theory, D.
Edgington, J. Bennett and K. A. Appiah stand out.
Adams, as opposed to Jackson, took Ramsey’s insight to its ultimate
consequences. If it is true that people endorse or reject indicatives based
only on the probability they award to the consequent given the antecedent,
then why should we ever expect probabilities of such conditionals to be
anything else than conditional probabilities? What happens if take the
Ramsey test at face value and treat the equation
p(A→ C) = p(C/A) =de f p(A ∧ C)p(A)
as a basic fact about indicative conditionals?1
Before exploring the consequences of such a decision, some terminol-
ogy is in order. I shall call the right-hand formula, following Ha´jek and
Bennett, the ratio formula. The whole equation will henceforth be referred
to, following Bennett, simply as the Equation.2 An alternative, and frankly
a little corny label for the Equation you may also find in the literature
is Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability or CCCP3; as well as the
more sober the (Hypo)thesis.4 Stalnaker’s (Hypo)thesis, for reasons that will
become obvious shortly, is an interpretation of the Equation that assumes
that the probabilities of conditionals thus defined should otherwise behave
just as any other unconditional probabilities. Adams’s thesis, on the other
hand, construes the ratio formula merely as a measure of a conditional’s
assert(a/i)bility.
To make matters worse, neither Stalnaker nor Adams subscribe to ‘their’
respective theses any more—Stalnaker put forward his one in (Stalnaker,
1970), only to discard it upon the publication of Lewis’s triviality results,
while Adams toyed with ‘Adams’s thesis’ as a rendering of the Equation
in his early (Adams, 1965), but later (that is, as of (Adams, 1975)) settled for
simple ‘probability’, construed as a measure of ‘reasonableness of belief’5,
1Note that according to this equation, p(A→ C) remains undefined for p(A) = 0.
2(Bennett, 2003), p.58
3For younger non-Russian speakers, ‘CCCP’ is the Cyrillic initialism for the USSR.
This seems intentional; hence the corniness.
4(Ha´jek and Hall, 1994), p.75-6
5(Ha´jek, 2012), p.147
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even though he continued to deny that such probabilities should satisfy
Kolmogorov’s axioms. Partly to defend his terminology, Adams supplied
an independent rationale for accepting the Equation, based on Jeffrey’s
decision theory. Very roughly, the argument shows that decision makers
are best off in the long run if their degree of credence in a conditional equals
the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent.6
And now for the real thing. The immediate upshot of taking the Equa-
tion seriously is that natural language indicatives cannot be material condi-
tionals, since the probability of a material conditional can diverge widely
from the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent.
This is because the uncertainty7 of a horseshoe equals p(A∧ ¬C) while the
uncertainty of an indicative conditional on this account equals p(¬C/A),
that is p(A ∧ ¬C)/p(A). Since p(A) ≤ 1, the former uncertainty will never
exceed the latter and thus p(A ⊃ C) ≥ p(A→ C). This argument also shows
that the only way for the probability of a material conditional to equal the
conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent is for p(A) to
equal 1 or p(A ∧ C). Hence p(A ⊃ C) = p(A→ C) only in the extreme cases
when the antecedent is perfectly certain itself or implies the consequent
logically.
As the truth conditions of the material conditional can’t give us what
we want, it would seem that the obvious next thing to do is to look for al-
ternative ones, ones that would guarantee the probability of the indicative
conditional to match the conditional probability of the consequent given
the antecedent. Yet we will see in the next section that D. Lewis proved,
with the help of only a handful of apparently harmless assumptions, that
in general no such truth conditions can be found. The power of these re-
sults has led Adams, as well as other authors who have embraced the ratio
formula, to conclude that the probability of indicative conditionals doesn’t
amount to the probability of their truth and that indicatives thus cannot be
called true or false (or, for that matter, ‘propositions’) in the standard sense
of the word.8
Be it as it may, if for one reason or another we are not in a position to
formulate truth conditions for indicative conditionals, we run into a funda-
6See Chapter III of (Adams, 1975) and Chapter 9 of (Adams, 1998).
7Uncertainty of a formula is defined as the rate of its improbability, or one minus its
probability.
8(Adams, 1998), p.199. Now, although I am sympathetic to the probabilistic treatment
of indicatives, and certainly wouldn’t want to downplay the importance of the triviality
results, I believe this conclusion should be put into perspective. As well as in the next
section, I will take this subject up in Section 6.3.1 when I address the issue of subjectivity
of indicatives.
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mental problem concerning their logic. If we wish to formalise their infer-
ential behaviour within a deductive system, the standard truth-conditional
notion of validity will no longer be up to the job.
Remember that a valid argument is standardly defined as one whose
premises cannot be true without the conclusion winding up true as well.
Model theory supplies a mathematically precise way of cashing in this
informal definition. Our problem here comes down to the realisation that
indicative conditionals are either not properly conceived of as true or false
in a model, or else their models should be of an altogether different kind
than those of simpler (or, on this view, ‘factual’) propositions. Either way,
the usual notion of validity will be inapplicable to arguments combining
indicatives with simple propositions. This is why Adams comes up with
his probabilistic criterion of validity instead:
Probabilistic Entailment A set of formulas Θ probabilistically entails ψ
iff the uncertainty of ψ cannot exceed the sum of uncertainties of all
formulas in Θ.
Here, the modal ‘cannot’ should be interpreted as making tacit reference
to probability assignments satisfying Kolmogorov axioms and proper to
all formulas in Θ together with ψ.
This definition generalises classical truth-conditional validity for ar-
guments involving probabilistic conditionals. That is, if there are only
classical formulae among Θ and ψ, then Θ implies ψ classically if and only
if it also does so probabilistically. However, as soon as conditionals make
their entrance, the former notion of validity is no longer available and the
probabilistic one must be applied instead.9
The combination of the ratio formula and the probabilistic notion of
entailment manages to throw light on the most egregious paradoxes of the
material conditional. For instance (CAC),
(38) C ∴ A→ C
9There is some superficial vacillation about this definition in Adams (see Bennett’s
remarks in (Bennett, 2003), p.129). The ‘probabilistic soundness criterion’, as announced
at the very beginning of (Adams, 1975) and evoked a few times throughout Chapter I,
requiring that the premises of a valid argument cannot be probable while its conclusion
is improbable, is out of step with the definition given here, which in turn is equivalent
to the one put forward in Chapter II (p.57) and explicitly adopted by Adams in (Adams,
1998), p.131. The bottom line is whether we would like to label arguments such as the
one from the famous Lottery Paradox as probabilistically invalid. Since the latter option
only brings limited benefits at the huge cost of dissociating the two soundness criteria as
the number of premises grows, the definition championed here has generally been found
preferable.
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is probabilistically invalid, since no matter how probable (shorn of com-
plete certainty) C comes out on a given probability distribution, p(C/A)
may still be very low, provided most of A lies outside C. This requires that
A should itself be very improbable, which agrees with intuition—typical
examples that bring out the paradoxicality of (38) include the likes of
(39) Tomorrow is Friday. Therefore, even if I’ve got mixed up with the
dates, tomorrow is Friday.
The same goes for the complementary pattern (NAAC)
(40) ¬A ∴ A→ C,
since unless the possibility A is completely excluded, the probability of
A → C can be arbitrarily low despite ¬A’s likelihood. Now it is the very
premise that requires that the antecedent should be very improbable for
the counterexample to go through:
(41) The stores do not open tomorrow. Therefore, if the stores open
tomorrow, they won’t have any customers.
The invalidity of the above inference patterns is sometimes generically
chalked up to the alleged ‘non-monotonicity’ of probabilistic reasoning.
However, we have to be careful, for such formulations can easily lead us to
error. Probabilistic validity, as defined, is monotonic with respect to the log-
ical strength of the premises. Where non-monotonicity enters the picture
is when new information is combined with the accepted premises in order
for us to draw new conclusions. In view of the fact that such an addition
can drastically subtract from the probabilities of the premises, the ‘static’
notion of validity can only be applied to their posterior uncertainties, that
is, to the uncertainties of the premises conditional on the new information.
This is how Adams accounts for the fact that sometimes highly probable
premises coupled with new information entail very unlikely conclusions.
The basic idea is that conditional antecedents work analogously to such
new information.10 They can introduce hypotheses capable of trumping
the accepted assumptions. This doesn’t make validity non-monotonic,
but rather implies that conditional antecedents do not work as ‘additional
premises’ in sustaining the consequent. The correct diagnosis, therefore,
should be that the deduction theorem, also called conditional proof, fails for
Adams conditionals: Θ,A ∴ C doesn’t guarantee Θ ∴ A→ C.
Besides the inferences valid for the material conditional but generally
recognised as paradoxical, however, Adams’s logic also renders invalid
10(Adams, 1998), p.142
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some patterns that have long been considered to make up the backbone of
conditional logic. They are Antecedent Strengthening, Hypothetical Syl-
logism, Contraposition and Disjunctive Syllogism. While there certainly
are examples that cast a shadow of doubt on these inferential patterns,
renouncing them faces us with the new theoretical challenge of explaining
the origin of their unmistakable halo of validity. I shall take this topic up
in Section 6.3.3, where the issue of alleged polysemy of our indicatives will
be addressed.
2.3. Truth conditions and triviality
2.3.1. Lewis’s proofs and their legacy
No exposition of probability as applied to conditionals can be complete
without touching upon the triviality results which we briefly mentioned
in the preceding section. The original proof was given in D. Lewis’s ‘Prob-
abilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’.11 The bottom line
of Lewis’s argument was that attempts to formulate standard truth condi-
tions of indicatives in a way that would make their absolute probability
conform to the ratio formula, were doomed to failure. Since Lewis’s first
paper, a whole industry in triviality proofs has taken off, with the aim of
proving the same or analogous results with simpler or slightly modified
assumptions.
Perhaps the most notorious proposal equating probabilities of condi-
tionals with conditional probabilities, and certainly the one that spurred
Lewis to come up with the triviality results, was put forward in (Stal-
naker, 1970). In this article, Stalnaker suggested that compliance with the
equation should be regarded as a minimum requirement on a reasonable
account of truth conditions of conditionals (at that point he hadn’t yet
delved into the distinction between indicatives and subjunctives). He be-
lieved his own treatment satisfied this criterion, while Lewis’s couldn’t.12
Lewis showed that such requirement had some extremely unpalatable
consequences.
The idea behind Lewis’s reasoning is quite simple, but not less brilliant
for that matter. If Stalnaker is right and A → C is a regular proposition,
that is, it divides the probability space (conceived as a set of state descrip-
11(Lewis, 1976)
12The reason was that the material interpretation of indicatives was obviously at odds
with the equation and Lewis’s logic for counterfactuals didn’t validate Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle (CEM), implied by the Equation. See (Ha´jek and Hall, 1994), p.77.
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tions or possible worlds) into two regions according to its truth value in
each of them, then its probability must comport with standard probability
theorems. In particular, it should satisfy expansion by cases:
(EbC) p(A→ C) = p(A→ C/B) × p(B) + p(A→ C/¬B) × p(¬B)
for any proposition B. Moreover, if we assume, as seems reasonable, that
the meaning of a conditional is preserved between p and the probability
function pB obtained from p by conditionalising on B, then the Equation
also guarantees that the following reduction principle should hold:
(RP) p(A→ C/B) = p(C/A ∧ B)
In other words, the conditional probability of a universal probability condi-
tional given another proposition should equal the conditional probability
of the consequent given the antecedent and this other proposition. Now all
ingredients are in place to derive the paradox—it suffices to take any con-
ditional A→ C that is contingent (i.e. with neither p(A ∧ C) nor p(A ∧ ¬C)
equal to 0) and expand it with respect to its very consequent:
p(A→ C) = p(A→ C/C) × p(C) + p(A→ C/¬C) × p(¬C)
= p(C/A ∧ C) × p(C) + p(C/A ∧ ¬C) × p(¬C)
= 1 × p(C) + 0 × p(¬C)
= p(C)
This means that irrespective of our choice of A and C (under the speci-
fied conditions), they turn out to be probabilistically independent. Lewis
proved that this can only work for trivial languages, which lack the re-
sources to express more than two incompatible sentences with non-zero
probability.
The above informal presentation of the argument, corresponding to
Lewis’s first triviality result, takes for granted that our conditional should
satisfy the Equation across all possible probability functions. As this re-
quirement may justifiably seem excessive (not all probability functions
represent viable belief systems), Lewis later generalised the result for
probability conditionals for any class of probability functions closed un-
der conditionalisation on the cells of finite partitions of the probabilistic
space as well as for any class of probability functions closed under Jeffrey
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conditionalisation.13
Stalnaker’s project was proved inviable by the very first triviality result
and he didn’t hesitate a second to jettison it upon acquainting himself with
Lewis’s work. Philosophically relevant attempts to resuscitate a truth-
conditional account of indicatives that would comport with the Equation
have been extremely scarce since. However, van Fraassen’s work con-
stitutes an interesting exception—in a much-discussed article14, he called
into question Lewis’s assumption that conditionals should preserve their
meaning across probability assignments, which he chalked up to Lewis’s
metaphysical realism.15 According to van Fraassen, distances between pos-
sible worlds should not be construed as fixed features of an independently
existent reality, but only as representations of belief revision policies. It
is therefore not unreasonable to admit that a change of a probability as-
signment can impinge on the extension of a Stalnaker conditional. This
move undercuts Lewis’s proof, as the uniformity assumption is required
for (RP).
Against this, Stalnaker (at that point his suspicion of the ‘Stalnaker’s
thesis’ measured up to his earlier confidence in it) proved that the Equa-
tion entailed triviality with the help of his C2 logic and free conditional
embedding even in the absence of Lewis’s uniformity assumption.16 Ha´jek
in turn proved, in what he later called the ‘wallflower argument’17, that
in any finite model (of cardinality greater than 2) conditional probabilities
strictly outnumber unconditional ones, hence there must be at least some
conditional sentences whose probability doesn’t equal the ratio formula.18
Many other mathematically minded philosophers also rose up to the
challenge of exploring how far triviality could be pushed. You could for
instance further relax the requirement on the conditional to preserve its
meaning across probability assignments or argue that neither ordinary nor
Jeffrey conditionalisation are reasonable models of belief revision. How-
ever, it has been proved by N. Hall that even such drastic manoeuvres
cannot ward off triviality. Unless two probability functions are orthogonal
(that is, they respectively assign perfect certainty and uncertainty to some
13See (Lewis, 1986b). Despite the relaxed assumptions, the guiding idea behind the
proof of triviality results two to four remains basically the same as in the first one.
14(van Fraassen, 1976)
15See Section 4.3.1.
16See (Stalnaker, 1976). As van Fraassen championed a different logic than Stalnaker,
his own proposal was not directly affected by Stalnaker’s argument. However, Stalnaker
had originally used the Equation only as an argument in favour of C2 and he was more
loath to give up the latter than the former.
17(Ha´jek, 2012), p.156
18(Ha´jek, 1989)
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sentence), Stalnaker’s thesis must fail at least for one of them on pain of
triviality.19 If you think that no reasonable model of belief revision can
turn a probability assignment into an orthogonal one, you had better give
up Stalnaker’s thesis.
All these problems have led many scholars, including Stalnaker, to
frown upon the Equation as their ultimate source. Remember, however,
that when we defined Stalnaker’s thesis, we characterised it as a particu-
lar interpretation of the Equation, which combined it with a propositional
construal of indicatives. The latter assumption guarantees that probabil-
ity assignments to compound formulae with embedded conditionals will
exist and satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms, which is a usual requirement for
a triviality proof to go through. Even Ha´jek’s proof, frugal as it is with
premises, only keeps its edge if you want to assimilate conditionals to
non-conditional propositions.
However, there is another way of looking at things. P. Egre´ and M.
Cozic have come up with a particularly helpful interpretation of triviality
results—perhaps they should rather be viewed as showing the undefin-
ability of conditional probability operators in terms of unary probability
operators together with binary propositional connectives.20 From this van-
tage point, indicative conditionals, as bearers of conditional probability,
broaden the expressive power of our vocabulary beyond what could be
said with only simple propositions.21 This opens a way out for the cham-
pions of the Equation—retain the latter and blame all the trouble on the
auxiliary part of Stalnaker’s thesis, which equated the content of condition-
als to that of simple propositions. D. Edgington has argued convincingly
that this is the right way to go.
2.3.2. Edgington against truth conditions
In her (Edgington, 1986), Edgington put forward an argument, whose
main inspiration bears striking similarity to Lewis’s proofs, in favour of
the thesis that indicative conditionals lack (non-conditional or otherwise
19(Ha´jek and Hall, 1994), p.97.
20See (Egre´ and Cozic, 2011); a similar point is also made in (Edgington, 2007), p.206. Of
course, Cozic’s and Egre´’s actual proposal follows Lewis-Kratzer’s restrictor approach to
indicatives, striving to bestow truth conditions on them while at the same time endorsing
the Equation (see Section 5.2). This, however, doesn’t prevent one from using their clever
idea for different theoretical purposes.
21This is reminiscent of Brandom’s dictum to the effect that with the introduction
of conditionals, one can explicitly say what she otherwise only could display in her
inferential behaviour. See for instance (Brandom, 2001), p.60.
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non-trivial) truth conditions. In this context, this amounts to the contention
that indicative conditionals do not divide the probabilistic space into two
disjunct regions according to their truth value in each state description.
Their task is to say something about the probability space as a whole, not
about any particular possible state or world.
The material conditional being the only sensible truth-functional can-
didate for the meaning of indicatives, Edgington sets off by dismissing the
case for it, using arguments that will have become familiar to the reader
by now. She then goes on to argue that any attempt at a truth-conditional
but non-truth-functional account is bound to slip back to the material in-
terpretation. The bottom line is that if indicatives have truth conditions,
they must be those of material conditionals. As these are obviously at odds
with the meaning of indicatives, we are forced to conclude that the latter
lack truth conditions altogether.
What does it mean for an account to be truth-conditional without being
truth-functional? Such an account attributes to the conditional a meaning
akin to that of ‘because’: for ‘ψ, because φ’ to be true, it is necessary but not
sufficient that both ψ and φ be true. Applied to a conditional, there must
on such an account exist at least one line of the truth table for A and C in
which A→ C can consistently have two different truth values. If we cannot
find such a line, we are back in the mire of the original truth-functional
account. The following table brings out the situation:
A C A ⊃ C C, because A A→ C
1. T T T T/F ?
2. T F F F ?
3. F T T F ?
4. F F T F ?
Edgington enjoins us to imagine we are in a state where the truth values
of the line in question obtain and ask ourselves whether we know enough
to decide about the indicative. This is straightforward for the second line
(with A true and C false, A → C must be false) and almost equally so for
the first line (with both A and C true, A→ C arguably cannot fail to be true
as well—remember that on the level of particular states/possible worlds
there is no room for uncertainty. So ‘even if A, C’ seems like a safe bet.)
The situation is more complicated with lines 3 and 4. We have no clear
intuitions about A → C when A is false, as predicted by the Equation.
Edgington argues that given the truth of the consequent on line 3, we
should be more inclined to judge the whole conditional true, but this is
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no knock-down argument. She proceeds rather by making use of the
previously established result, asking us instead to imagine we are in a
situation where we are uncertain between line 3 (or 4) and 1. This seems
to be enough for perfect certainty about the conditional, which, together
with the assumption of truth-conditionality, implies we have to regard the
conditional as true also on lines 3 and 4. But then we wind up with the
truth table of the material conditional and our conditional turns out to be
truth-functional after all.
That we are asked to combine lines 3 and 4 with line 1 only has to do
with the structure of Edgington’s broader argument, as outlined above,
and lacks deeper significance. We could of course combine them with line
2 in order to obtain exactly the opposite result. This poses no difficulty
to Edgington’s thesis—it is only because indicatives are not properly eval-
uated at the level of state descriptions (as any respectable ‘proposition’
must) that we can end up with conflicting intuitions about their truth val-
ues at some of them. If indicatives had truth conditions, the argument
goes, our judgement would not hinge upon which other state descriptions
are compatible with our knowledge.
This argument is presented in an even more succinct and poignant form
in (Edgington, 2007):
Two prima facie desirable properties of indicative conditional judge-
ments:
(i) Minimal certainty that A∨B (ruling out just ¬A∧¬B) is enough
for certainty that if ¬A,B; [...]
(ii) It is not necessarily irrational to disbelieve A yet disbelieve that
if A,B.
The truth functional account satisfies (i) but not (ii). Stronger truth
conditions may satisfy (ii), if they allow that the conditional can be
false when A is false. But they cannot satisfy (i): for any stronger
truth condition, ruling out just A∧¬B leaves open the possibility that
‘If A,B’ is not true.
(Edgington, 2007), pp.169-170
The upshot is that if you conceive of indicatives on a par with non-
conditional propositions, Edgington’s (i) will require them to be at most as
logically strong as material conditionals, whereas (ii) will pull in the exact
opposite direction—if the antecedent’s lack of probability cannot guaran-
tee the probability of the whole conditional, then neither can the mere
falsity of A ∧ ¬B.
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However, you can keep both (i) and (ii) provided you maintain your
allegiance to the Equation, but reject the rest of Stalnaker’s thesis. This
is the way out championed both by Adams, Edgington and Bennett. An
indicative, on such an account, does not introduce yet another piece of
information, independent of the truth of its antecedent and consequent.
Rather than that, it is a device tasked with the management of imper-
fect information. Assignment of fixed truth values to the operands of an
indicative conditional, which occurs at each possible world or state de-
scription, takes away the uncertainty that is vital to its job description,
thus rendering it useless. That’s why conditional probability is all there is
to say about the acceptability indicatives and that’s also why their mean-
ingful embeddability within compound sentences turns out to be severely
restricted.
2.4. Conclusion
We have witnessed the many advantages of a probabilistic approach to
indicative conditionals. However, they should not make us jump to
conclusions—it is all to easy to get hold of the wrong end of the stick
and convince ourselves that in view of Adams’s and Edgington’s argu-
ments, indicatives are correctly conceived as mere devices for expressing
subjective conditional probabilities and cannot therefore be properly called
true or false.22 In Chapter 6 we will see why such a construal of the results
we have reviewed here is riddled with difficulties. We shall also examine a
simple alternative, which is compatible with the insights about conditional
probability, but doesn’t give rise to the problems besetting the subjectivist
construal. However, before that, we need to devote some attention to the
treatment subjunctive conditionals have received in the literature.
22This is the view championed, among others, by A. Gibbard in (Gibbard, 1981) and J.
Bennett in (Bennett, 2003).

Chapter 3
Cotenability
The first analytic theories of subjunctives appeared in the 1940s and were
pioneered by authors such as Roderick Chisholm, Nelson Goodman and
Nicholas Rescher. I will dedicate more space to them than is customary in
contemporary essays on the topic, chiefly because I’ll try to show that later
analyses, often unwittingly, had to face very similar challenges. Sound
understanding of the technical difficulties encountered by early writers
on subjunctives will give us a handle on the solutions put forward by
their successors. Another reason is that the early scholars tried to connect
the meaning of subjunctives with their actual use in rational practice—a
commendable attitude that, inexplicably, has been all but lost since the
advent of modern similarity-based possible-worlds semantics.
A recurring theme among the first writers on subjunctives is the de-
fence of the latter as meaningful and valuable pieces of discourse, against
suspicions from some corners of analytic philosophy. The qualms of an em-
piricist can easily be understood: counterfactuals seem to make statements
about unrealised possibilities and as such lack direct empirical testability.
What they convey is not expressible in classical logical formalism, as the
material conditional is blatantly inadequate for this task (coming out true
whenever its antecedent turns out to be false). And apart from not being
truth-functional, as Quine famously remarked, many of them seemed to
resist motivated evaluation altogether, which cast a shadow of doubt on
the very possibility of a systematic theory of natural language counterfac-
tuals1. The most pressing task for early authors on counterfactuals was
therefore to show that they featured widely in respectable discourse and
were thus not a mere product of imagination-driven daydreaming.
We can see examples of this both in Chisholm and Rescher. The former
1(Quine, 1966),p.14-15
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claims, for example, that
[...] adequate understanding of science and history requires the ability
to consider the consequences of hypotheses known to be contrary-to-
fact.
(Chisholm, 1946), p.290
According to Chisholm, counterfactual hypotheticals are essential in pre-
cautionary and deliberative reasoning and they supply the grounding for
successful applications of dispositional predicates. They are also widely
used in philosophical analysis, even by authors that might be regarded as
the most reluctant to admit them, such as logical positivists. Rescher makes
similar points and, in particular, he underscores the crucial role of the pos-
sibility of entertaining ‘belief-contravening suppositions’ in reasoning by
reductio ad absurdum.2
Once counterfactuals acquired analytic philosophy’s seal of approval,
such forays into their natural habitat have been mostly regarded as super-
fluous and excised from papers and books on the topic. I for one think
that’s a pity. After a few decades of focusing on a fixed as well as circum-
scribed set of examples, we run a great risk of losing sight of when and why
we actually tend to employ counterfactual reasoning, which is as likely as
anything to provide a clue to the meaning of subjunctives.
Many scholars follow D. Lewis3 in labelling these early approaches
as ‘metalinguistic theories’. They agree on tracing back a counterfactual’s
truth (or, in case of non-truth-conditional accounts, assertibility) in one way
or another to the validity of a certain implicit argument, which supplies the
connection between the antecedent and the consequent. On this account,
a counterfactual makes a metalinguistic statement to the effect that this
argument is valid. We can represent the latter schematically as
A, ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψn ∴ C4,
where ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψn stand for some true factual statements that function as
collateral premises.5
2(Rescher, 1961), p.178
3(Lewis, 1973a), p.65-77
4Since for the authors we are considering in this section ‘validity’ means ‘logical
validity’, ‘∴’ should be read as ‘entails’.
5Most early theorists did not draw a clear distinction between propositions and their
linguistic expression, so they did not allow for the possibility of an utterer tacitly referring
to matters of fact inexpressible in his language. This was remedied in Kratzer’s premise
semantics.
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The exact nature of the connection between the counterfactual and the
corresponding argument is construed slightly differently by each author.
For most of them (Chisholm, Goodman, Rescher), the counterfactual only
asserts that there is such an argument, yielding what we shall call the basic
schema of metalinguistic theories:
Basic Schema MT A > C is T iff there are propositions ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψn sat-
isfying the condition Φ, such that ‘A, ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψn ∴ C′ is a logically
valid argument.
However, for Mackie a counterfactual is itself an abbreviated, ‘telescoped’
version of such an argument and does not express a higher order state-
ment.6 The upshot is that for him, counterfactuals are neither true nor
false, but rather valid or invalid (or acceptable/inacceptable) depending,
of course, on the validity of the unabridged argument. Since I believe
that the issue of whether a typical counterfactual makes a metalinguistic
claim or not is secondary to the problem of restricting the set of collat-
eral premises, I have opted for Goodman’s term ‘cotenability’ in order to
characterise the early theories of subjunctives.7
This approach to counterfactual conditionals roughly follows the pat-
tern of C.I. Lewis’s treatment of strict implication, which he also conceived
as making what we now would call a meta-linguistic statement and thus
differing radically from Russell’s and Whitehead’s material conditional, a
mere truth-functional operator. The strict implication A J C was intro-
duced to codify the relation of entailment between A and C, without any
additional premises:
A J C is T iff ‘A ∴ C’ is a logically valid argument.8
So when n = 0 in the Basic Schema, the connection between A and C will
be purely logical and the counterfactual will degenerate to a strict impli-
cation. Actually, the fact that some implications with false antecedents
(which in natural language would arguably be expressed by means of
6See (Mackie, 1962), p.68 and (Mackie, 1973), p.69.
7Moreover, there is certainly nothing metalinguistic in the current revival of this kind
of analysis by A. Kratzer, as we shall see in Section 5.2.
8See (Kneale and Kneale, 1962), p.554. In this connection, it is worth pointing out
that both Goodman and Chisholm were C. I. Lewis’s graduate students at Harvard. We
shouldn’t forget, however, that Lewis had a proof-theoretic notion of entailment in mind
(see, for example, (Korte et al., 2009), p.532). Lewis’s work follows the syntactic paradigm
of Principia Mathematica and as such precedes Tarski’s distinction between syntactic and
semantic consequence.
50 CHAPTER 3. COTENABILITY
counterfactuals) are acceptable and others not was one of the arguments
C. I. Lewis advanced to show the unfitness of material implication to codify
the information these implications convey.9
This explains why A J C entails A  C. However, more often that not,
logic alone will not suffice to bridge the gap between the antecedent and the
consequent of a counterfactual—some additional mortar must be brought
in so as to make them stick together. Consider Goodman’s example
(42) If this match had been struck, it would have lighted.
If (42) sounds acceptable, it seems that this is only thanks to certain facts
about the match (e.g. the chemical composition of its head, dryness, etc.)
and its environment (e.g. the presence of oxygen, etc.), as well as a general
principle that connects scratching such a match under the given conditions
to its lighting. As these informal considerations suggest, we can draw a
rough-and-ready distinction between two kinds of supporting statements.
Most scholars have distinguished between
1. Relevant conditions: actual matters of fact that have to be added to the
antecedent in order to infer the consequent.
2. Laws: general connecting principles that shore up the inference from
the relevant conditions and the antecedent to the consequent.
As a result, a satisfactory analysis of counterfactuals should explain a)
how relevant factual conditions are selected, and b) how to distinguish
nomological generalisations, capable of supporting counterfactuals, from
merely accidental ones. Each of the early theories had to address these two
problems—we will take on them one at a time.
3.1. Relevant conditions
Given a subjunctive, the problem of relevant conditions concerns the re-
striction of the set of actual facts eligible as additional premises in the
argument that backs it.10 It is not difficult to see why a metalinguistic
theory must impose such a restriction. After all, in a prototypical case the
9See (Lewis, 1912), p.529.
10In (Bennett, 2003), the term ‘relevant conditions’ is rejected as a misnomer, because
‘irrelevant conjuncts [...] cannot lead to any conditional’s being accorded a truth value
that it does not deserve.’(p.307). The crucial point is rather to keep illegitimate facts out
of the set of additional premises and that’s why Bennett prefers to call this set ‘Support’.
This reflects a fundamental difference in the spirit of metalinguistic approaches on the
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set of all facts will include the negation of the antecedent, which certainly
should not be let in, on pain of making all counterfactuals trivially true
(since an argument with contradictory premises is valid regardless of its
conclusion). While everybody agrees on this much, how to carve the set
of relevant conditions further is matter of some dispute.
3.1.1. The liberal wing: Chisholm, Rescher and Mackie
Perhaps the most liberal stance on the issue of relevant conditions was
taken by some of the earliest writers on counterfactuals . Consider the
following pair of examples:
(43) If Apollo were a man, he would be mortal.
(44) If Apollo were a man, some man would be immortal.
Chisholm observes that there is no prima facie reason to prefer one over
the other, even though they cannot be asserted in the same breath. We
could take on board as collateral premise either what we know about
Apollo’s immortality (a relevant condition) or what we know about human
mortality (arguably a lawlike generalisation). According to Chisholm, it is
the context of enquiry that dictates the proper choice.11
But are there any bounds to what we can take in as collateral premise?
This is a crucial point, and Chisholm opts for the simple answer: there are
none. He suggests that the speaker has virtually complete freedom over
the choice of statements that back her counterfactual.
At first, Chisholm conjectured that this was usually due to antecedent
ambiguity, which had to be pragmatically resolved through a process of
recovery of the speaker’s meaning. Later he slightly changed the picture,
bestowing different roles on the antecedent and the supporting premises.
He called the former supposition and the latter presuppositions. Presupposi-
tions no longer simply expand the supposition—their role is different, as
they are assumed rather than merely entertained (as the supposition is). Sim-
one hand and world-based approaches on the other: whereas an ideal analysis of the first
kind would positively specify which actual facts support a counterfactual, an analysis of
the second type will content itself with smuggling them in along with a plethora of other,
irrelevant facts. Bennett is basically right, and Goodman’s strategy of restricting the set
of additional premises instead of building it up from the bottom bears him out on this.
However, since there is little risk of confusion, in deference to the history of the subject, I
stick with Goodman’s terminology.
11(Chisholm, 1946), pp.304-305. The mythical nature of the example is not meant to
have any bearing on the analysis.
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ply making the presuppositions explicit in the antecedent would therefore
distort the import of the original counterfactual.12
The main point still stands, though—the recovery of presuppositions is
still crucial for resolving the vagueness of a counterfactual. Admittedly, if
the listener doesn’t work out what the speaker’s choice of presuppositions
is, the communication will break down. However, and crucially, this will
be due to the pragmatic inefficiency of the speaker and not to any genuine
disagreement. There is simply no right selection of supporting premises.
The very liberalism of Chisholm’s picture makes it urgent to explain
how the tacit understanding between the speaker and her audience, which
determines the background against which a counterfactual is evaluated,
comes about in a particular context of inquiry. But such explanation will
be in order even on a more restrictive approach, as long as it admits certain
margin for variation. It is to Chisholm’s credit that he drew our attention
to this phenomenon, even though he didn’t even begin to explain it and in
all likelihood exaggerated its magnitude.
The leeway Chisholm’s theory accords to speaker’s communicative
intentions certainly seems excessive. Some combinations of collateral
premises give rise to inconsistent sets—something that Chisholm explicitly
allows. So you can properly assert, while pointing to a wooden stick,
(45) If that were gold, some things would be malleable and not mal-
leable.
This can be achieved simply by taking as supporting truths both the mal-
leability of gold and the non-malleability of wood. Bennett argues that
counterfactuals with possible antecedents and impossible consequents are
never true and thus always unacceptable.13 Hence, according to Bennett,
at the very least a consistency restriction should be imposed on the set of
collateral premises.14
Should we impose more restrictions on the set of collateral premises?
Rescher largely shared Chisholm’s intuitions about the contextual pliability
of counterfactuals and attempted to provide an explanation. If our beliefs
12(Chisholm, 1955), pp.102-103
13(Bennett, 2003),p.306
14However, Chisholm could dodge this objection by admitting that impossible conse-
quents are indeed unacceptable, but on pragmatic rather than semantic grounds—they
signal that the premises of the implicit argument are inconsistent, and as we are hardly
ever interested in assessing such arguments, the speaker’s behaviour would flout the
Gricean maxim of relevance. It is not that a speaker could not assert such a counterfac-
tual without saying something false, it is rather that in asserting it he could not make a
germane contribution to the conversational exchange.
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are S1,S2, ...,Sn, then what he calls a ‘belief contravening supposition’ ¬S1,
will more often than not be inconsistent not only with S1, but also with
the set of beliefs {S2, ...,Sn} as a whole. Rescher, as opposed to Chisholm,
insisted that our counterfactual scenarios must be logically consistent and
empirically congruous, so some of the latter beliefs will have to be shed
along with S1. And since there usually will be a number of ways to
curb this set so as to make it consistent with ¬S1, logic alone is not in a
position to determine which of a competing pair of counterfactuals will be
acceptable.15
So is there any other criterion that could help us break the tie? There is
indeed, according to Rescher, though only for nomological counterfactuals—
that is, counterfactuals based entirely on a covering law. Since covering
laws play a privileged role in our epistemic lives, we are reluctant to give
them up and prefer to forgo some factual beliefs instead when faced with
a choice. Based on these considerations, we can adjudicate between (43)
and (44) after all—Rescher predicts that as (44) contravenes a lawlike gen-
eralisation, (43) will be preferred by most speakers. Nevertheless, in the
case of hypothetical counterfactuals, which do not exemplify covering laws,
there is no such criterion and it is the so-called dialectical background that
is called for to settle the dispute (a move highly reminiscent of Chisholm’s
recourse to speaker’s meaning). This is exactly the case with the pair which
made Quine question the whole enterprise of searching for a theoretical
account of natural language counterfactuals:16
(46) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been
French.
(47) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been
Italian.
So while adherence to laws is non-negotiable for Rescher, he roughly fol-
lowed Chisholm’s liberal line as far as relevant conditions are concerned.17
Mackie, for his part, somehow thought that his non-truth-conditional
account of counterfactuals relieved him from the duty of specifying the
15(Rescher, 1961),p.181-2
16(Quine, 1966),p.14-15
17Almost half a century later, in his (2007), Rescher further developed what remains es-
sentially the same theory. The inconsistency that arises when a counterfactual supposition
is added to a set of beliefs is handled partly by appeal to ‘fundamentality prioritization’,
which enjoins us to award precedence to propositions in accordance with the role they
play in the system of our beliefs (manifested in the Meaning-Existence-Law-Fact hierar-
chy), and partly by appeal to the ‘questioner’s prerogative’, which breaks ties between
propositions of otherwise equal standing. See (Rescher, 2007), pp.89-137.
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restrictions on tacit premises very thoroughly.18 He accepted Rescher’s
point about laws, but explained it pointing to the inductive grounds on
which they are believed. However, as regards relevant conditions, he went
with the liberal flow of the time. He argued that cases of ties were just
that—ties. Since counterfactuals are never really true or false, there is no
prima facie hurdle to viewing both of a pair of competing counterfactuals
as unfit for use.
Does the liberal version of the metalinguistic account fare better with
laws given pride of place? It is highly doubtful. Chisholm, Rescher and
Mackie all seem to take for granted that in a conversational exchange,
the interlocutor who asserts a counterfactual, or the one who puts forth
a counterfactual question, should be able to tighten up the slack in her
description of the counterfactual scenario if requested to do so. But that’s
a tall order. More often than not we do not have the slightest idea of the
facts that underpin our counterfactuals, even if we are quite positive about
there being such facts. Bennett argues that we can affirm
(48) If I had pressed the button, the red light would have gone on.
in the absence of any knowledge about the wiring that connects the button
with the bulb. The meaning of a counterfactual guarantees only that
pertinent additional premises exist, not that the speaker is able to produce
them on request.19
This may not be the best possible example, as we can imagine someone
asserting (48) based on a direct lawlike connection between pressing the
button and the red light (most of the ‘laws’ we apply in our daily reason-
ing are reducible to more fundamental facts and principles). Moreover,
Chisholm does state explicitly that in asserting a counterfactual, we are
only committed to the existence of some adequate collateral premises and
not to knowing what they exactly are.20 We might therefore suspect that
what Chisholm really had in mind was that the speaker had to be prepared
to strengthen the antecedent (or make his presuppositions explicit, as the
case may be) only in case and to the extent that the basic schema produced
conflicting results.21
18(Mackie, 1962), p.74 and especially (Mackie, 1973), p.69. I consider Mackie’s laid-
back approach unjustified. You still have a theoretical duty to explain what makes a
premiss admissible in the collapsible argument hinted at by a counterfactual, regardless
of whether the latter makes an ordinary or a higher-order statement.
19(Bennett, 2003), p.304
20(Chisholm, 1946), p.299
21However, this interpretation seems to be contradicted by the examples in (Chisholm,
1955), in which the whole underlying argument is invariably made explicit when resolving
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This way of shrugging off the problem won’t do, however. First, it
still places an unrealistic burden on the speaker—few of us could fill in
even an incomplete argument form for any counterfactual that we have
confidently advanced. This suggests that an analysis along the lines of the
basic schema is not something that underlies our usage of counterfactuals,
but rather an attempt at a rational reconstruction of this usage. Such
reconstructions may play a crucial role in spelling out the truth conditions
of counterfactuals, but accounts that presuppose conscious access to them
must shoulder a huge burden of proof.
Second, and crucially, if Chisholm’s theory were true, counterfactual
reasoning would simply boil down to questions about logical validity. This
is what Chisholm has to say about counterfactual questions:
Similarly, if we ask, “What would American policy in Asia be if
Stevenson were President”, our question is incompletely formulated;
a more explicit formulation would be, “Supposing that Stevenson
were President, and presupposing so-and-so, but not so-and-so, what
would be the consequences with respect to American policy in Asia?”
(Chisholm, 1955), p.104
The implausibility of this approach is reflected by the question-begging
flavour of such questions. Chisholm seems to suggest that by raising a
counterfactual question, the speaker only invites the interlocutor to do
some ‘data-crunching’ for her and churn out the logical consequences of
the premises she has in mind. However, a moment’s reflection clearly will
show that this picture is unsustainable. Reasoning under counterfactual
assumptions is not arbitrary and there are constraints on how the coun-
terfactual scenario is built up. Counterfactual questions, far from being
trivial, call on the interlocutor to use his own resources to envisage such a
scenario.
Third, relegating the problem of collateral premises to the realm of
pragmatics doesn’t let us off the hook. There are really two issues that
need to be addressed—on the one hand, the contextual sensitivity that
some counterfactuals such as (43) and (44), or (46) and (47) show, and on
the other, the specification of collateral premises suitable for filling in the
basic schema. Authors such as Chisholm, Rescher and Mackie seemed to
believe that an appeal to speaker’s meaning or contextual salience would
not only solve the first problem, but also the second one. However, this
still leaves us in the dark about the mechanism of selection of the relevant
counterfactual ambiguity. It seems that Chisholm progressively set more and more store
by pragmatic, rather than semantic restriction of the set of available premises.
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facts by the speaker, as well as about the audience’s miraculous capacity
of working out the full purport of the speaker’s contribution. It behoves
us to provide an explanation of these phenomena, regardless of whether
they are semantic or pragmatic in nature.
3.1.2. Goodman’s take on cotenability
One can only wonder what the fate of Goodman’s classic (1947) article
would be under the present publishing culture. There are certainly not
many authors nowadays that dare to admit to a double failure and still get
published—on the contrary, any limp in an analysis tends to be carefully
concealed rather than openly acknowledged. The fact that despite the
apparent handicap, this paper managed to set the agenda for research into
counterfactuals for the decades to come, should give us pause. Maybe
the quality of a paper should not be assessed exclusively by its ultimate
theoretical success, but also by whether it raises interesting questions and
approaches them in a novel yet rigorous way.
What distinguished Goodman from the other early writers and earned
his article a prominent place in the debates on this topic to this day, was how
squarely he confronted the problem of truth conditions of counterfactuals.
He briefly addressed antecedent ambiguity, but he rightly observed that
a solution to this problem could not be overstretched to also cover the
problem of restrictions on the set of relevant conditions, which remains
even if ambiguities are resolved and ties are broken.22
In order to approximate the intuitive truth conditions of counterfactu-
als, Goodman, argued that a number of requirements must be placed on
the set of true relevant conditions S in the argument underlying the sub-
junctive A  C. I shall enunciate a groomed version of these conditions,
as they emerged from Goodman’s discussion with Parry23, trying to iron
out some technical imprecisions that somewhat obscured the final analysis.
1. {A} ∪ S must be both logically and non-logically consistent, or ‘self-
compatible’. By ‘non-logical self-incompatibility’ Goodman means
violation of a non-logical (e.g. causal) law. An incompatible set of
premises would of course render any underlying argument valid,
irrespective of the consequent. Non-logical incompatibility allows
this by dint of empty covering laws.
22(Goodman, 1947), pp.115-116
23See (Parry, 1957) and (Goodman, 1957).
3.1. RELEVANT CONDITIONS 57
2. ¬A must be compatible with each Si ∈ S, that is, the denial of the
antecedent must not strictly imply any relevant condition in S, nor
may any Si contain as an essential component a proposition strictly
implied by ¬A. This rather verbose requirement is introduced by
Parry in order to get rid of conditions that strictly depend on the fact
that the antecedent is false and therefore do not deserve to be retained
in counterfactual scenarios. A trivial example is ¬A ∨ C, which in
case of a counterfactual will be true regardless of C, thus validating
any underlying argument.24
3. S must be compatible both with C and ¬C. That is, S alone should
not decide about C—only after adding A to S should everything fall
into place. Compatibility of S with ¬C guarantees that A  C will
not come out as true only because C happens to be true (typically in
conditionals of the ‘even-if’ sort).25
4. {A}∪S must lead by law (again, logical or non-logical) to C. This guar-
antees that the set S really does the trick of validating the underlying
argument.
5. There must be no alternative set of truths S′, compatible with C26,
such that {A} ∪ S′ is self-compatible and leads by law to ¬C. This
must be required as we are never prepared to accept both A  C
and A  ¬C as true. The idea is that if there are two alternative sets
of facts satisfying the other conditions and leading respectively to C
and ¬C, then we are bound to reject both subjunctives.
These requirements make up quite a mouthful, but seem to square rea-
sonably with our pre-theoretical use of subjunctives. But are they also
sufficient? Despite all the efforts, they can be shown to be incomplete.
Take first an ‘even-if’ conditional such as
(49) If Jones were in Carolina, he would still be a moron.
Here the subjunctive might be true solely in virtue of its consequent hap-
pening to be true and the antecedent incapable of changing anything about
that fact. But according to requirement 3 put forward by Goodman, S has
to be compatible with both C and ¬C, so we cannot simply include ‘John
24The rider ensures, in quite a radical way, that such inadequate facts don’t sneak in
as parts of more complex propositions.
25Requiring compatibility of S with C is actually redundant in view of the other re-
quirements, but following Goodman, I state it for perspicuity’s sake.
26The rationale for this provision is the same as in the case 3.
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is a moron’ in our collateral premises. However, if we forgo requirement
3, we will get too many of such subjunctives:
(50) If Jones were on the North Pole, he would still be wearing a suit
and a bow tie.
You might argue that (50) is still excluded by our other requirements—not
because S is incompatible with ¬C, but rather because S is incompatible
with A (say, in virtue of a ‘law’ that stipulates that no-one in their sane mind
wears a suit and a bow tie on the North Pole). However, general recourse
to such an approach clashes with non-monotonicity of subjunctives with
respect of the strength of their antecedents. In most cases we are capable
of coming up with possible additional circumstances that would render a
counterfactual more palatable:
(51) If Jones were on the North Pole shooting a TV stunt, he would be
wearing a suit and a bow tie.
A seems to have been compatible with S after all.
Our predicament does not end here, however. As Goodman himself
points out, more should be excluded from S, as it might contain proposi-
tions that wouldn’t be true if the antecedent were. Take (42), for example
(42) If the match had been struck, it would have lighted.
The match wasn’t struck and it didn’t light. Now if you include the fact
that it didn’t light in your S, based on the very same law as in the latter
case you may end up with a counterfactual such as
(42*) If the match had been struck, it would not have been dry.
The reason being that as much as in (42) the law excluded the possibility
of not lighting of a dry match struck in the presence of oxygen, in (42*) the
law excluded the possibility of being dry of a non-lighting match struck in
the presence of oxygen.
However, even though (as befit them) the members of the liberal wing
didn’t find (42*) objectionable, for most of us it clearly isn’t a patch on
(42). There seems to be a fundamental asymmetry between the condition
of dryness and lighting that our analysis fails to account for. Dryness,
as opposed to non-lighting, is transposed to the counterfactual situation
introduced by striking the match.
Unlike with the other problems, the structure of this puzzle doesn’t
depend on the particulars of Goodman’s approach, so that any account of
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counterfactuals that relies heavily on covering laws will have to cope with
it. We shall see that most non-trivial such theories will struggle to explain
the asymmetry between matters of fact that this problem reveals and as a
result many authors will choose to posit this asymmetry by fiat.27 Because
of its importance, this problem is often referred to as Goodman’s puzzle in
the literature.
In an attempt to address the difficulty, Goodman’s final analysis re-
places the notion of compatibility in the requirements 1-5 with the notion
of cotenability:
Cotenability A is cotenable with S if it is not the case that S would not be
true if A were true.28
While this analysis is not completely trivial29, recourse to cotenability, of
course, leaves it blatantly circular. And although there are cases of virtuous
circularity in semantic analysis, this doesn’t seem to be one of them. The
counterfactual in the definition of cotenability supports too much weight
of the analysis for it to retain any interest. The task of explaining how
counterfactual scenarios are constructed, while avoiding the use of sub-
junctives for this purpose, has haunted writers on this subject ever since.
As we will see, technical notions such as ‘similarity of possible worlds’
(Stalnaker & Lewis) or ‘lumps of thought’ (A. Kratzer) have been intro-
duced, with varying degrees of success, for the very purpose of warding
off this kind of circularity.
27See in particular Section 5.3.
28Goodman defines self-cotenability of the set {A}∪S as cotenability of A with S, which
poses some problems—since A  C doesn’t in general imply C  A, self-cotenability
of sets of propositions doesn’t seem to be well-defined. Also, as a side-remark, it is worth
mentioning that self-cotenability is a strictly stronger notion than that of self-compatibility,
which it replaces.
29For instance, it validates Conditional Excluded Middle as follows: take any true C.
Then if it is not the case that A  ¬C, by Goodman’s definition of cotenability, {C} is an
acceptable value for S and so trivially A  C. Hence in any case, (A  ¬C)∨ (A  C).
For a false C, ¬C is true and the conclusion follows by the same argument and Double
Negation. Therefore, if CEM is to be rejected for subjunctives (as many have argued that
it should), Goodman’s condition in the definition of cotenability of S with A must be
strengthened to something closely resembling A  S, making the circularity even more
obvious. This is the general notion of cotenability that I shall employ for the purposes of
comparing cotenability approaches with possible world ones—see Section 4.5.
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3.2. Laws
We have seen that metalinguistic theories distinguish between actual mat-
ters of fact relevant for the truth of subjunctives (relevant conditions) and
general connecting principles or lawlike generalisations that sustain the in-
ference from the relevant conditions and the antecedent to the consequent.
So even if we knew how to determine relevant conditions, we would still
need to provide criteria to tell lawlike generalisations from the merely ac-
cidental ones in order to provide a satisfactory and complete analysis of
subjunctives. As Goodman showed, accidental generalisations are not up
to the task of shoring them up. Whereas the fact that in vacuum all objects
fall with equal acceleration supports
(52) If this hammer and this feather were dropped from the same height
in the vacuum, they would reach the ground simultaneously,
the accidental fact that all coins in my pocket are silver doesn’t support
(53) If this copper coin were in my pocket, it would be silver.
As with relevant conditions, we find precious little consensus on how to
account for this difference in the early literature.
Chisholm’s liberalism accorded no special position to universal gener-
alisations, whether accidental or lawlike. They could be scraped along with
any other propositions the speaker deemed undesirable. That’s how you
could assert a counterfactual such as (44), which contradicts an arguably
non-accidental generalisation ‘All men are mortal’.30
Rescher, as I have remarked, roughly shared Chisholm’s laissez-faire
approach, but among collateral premises he gave pride of place to cover-
ing laws. There is no further explanation of the lawlike nature of some
universal generalisations—it is not that they sustain subjunctives because
of being nomological, but they are nomological because we use them to
sustain subjunctives:
[...] because the nomological use of counterfactuals represents a de-
termination to retain the appropriate covering generalization [...] at
the cost of adapting all else to it.
(Rescher, 1961), p.190
Naturally, this does not really leave us much better off, since the question as
to why we give preference to certain generalisations rather than to others
when we assess subjunctives remains unanswered.
30(Chisholm, 1946), p.303.
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Mackie had more interesting things to say about laws. First, he re-
marked that nomological/accidental character of a generalisation was not
codified semantically. The same generalisation can be treated as merely
accidental or lawlike without inducing any change in the universal propo-
sition itself. Where the difference lies, according to Mackie, is in the sort of
grounds on which we believe the generalisation in question. To be justified
in treating a universal as a lawlike generalisation means to believe it on
good inductive grounds—that is why a causal law enables us to ‘go be-
yond the cases for which the law has been checked, and so to advance open
conditionals’, as well as counterfactuals, whose antecedents are prone to
alter the extension of the subject term.31
However, the difficulties with such an account of lawlike generalisa-
tions had already been pointed out a whole thirty years earlier by Frank P.
Ramsey:
The difference according to Braithwaite is that universals of law are
believed on grounds which are not demonstrative. This will not do
because
(a) some universals of law are not believed at all
(b) some universals of fact are believed on non-demonstrative grounds
(c) some universals of law are believed on grounds which in his
sense are demonstrative.
(Ramsey, 1928), p.128
As for (a), Ramsey argues that to say that some characteristics of the off-
spring are caused by certain unknown genes does not mean to say that
there is good inductive evidence for the link between some genes and the
characteristics in question. The purpose of his example is to show that the
idea of a causal relationship between two phenomena does not seem nec-
essarily to concern the grounds upon which it is ascertained—we know
that a certain property must have been caused by a gene, even though
we do not know which particular one, and so cannot have any inductive
evidence about this relationship. Braithwaite and Mackie might perhaps
argue that this quantification involves misleading scope ambiguity, but at
a second glance, this looks implausible. Surely there is a clear difference
between the causal law that ensures that there are genes causing certain
phenotypic characteristics and the causal law between concrete genes and
31(Mackie, 1962), p.73. Mackie calls ‘open conditional’ an indicative conditional whose
antecedent remains undecided, that is, a typical specimen of this kind of conditional.
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the characteristics in hand. Nothing in Ramsey’s example prevents us from
giving the existential quantifier a large scope.
Point (b) is also relevant for our discussion. Ramsey points out that
certain accidental generalisations are believed on grounds that are not
demonstrative, such as testimony or some kind of reductio. But they can
undoubtedly also be believed on inductive grounds: imagine I run into a
sizeable anti-government protest in the centre of the city. I cannot oversee
all the participants, but by the insignia, banners and chants of those in my
immediate surroundings I can make out that they are socialists. I conclude
by an inductive argument that all participants in the demonstration are so-
cialists. But this, of course, remains an accidental generalisation, incapable
of sustaining a counterfactual such as
(54) If I took part in the protest, I would be a socialist.
There may of course be good reasons to oppose government policy while
being liberal or even communist.
As regards (c), Ramsey admits it is not as clear as the other points and
his supporting example indeed doesn’t strike me as very convincing:
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‘Whenever this balloon was filled with hydrogen and let go, it rose’;
this, or something like it only more complicated, is surely (sic) a
universal of law and yet might be believed as a result of observing all
its instances.
(Ramsey, 1928), p.129
I doubt whether nomological generalisations are ever believed on grounds
that are exclusively demonstrative (that is, based entirely on an inspection
of all their instances, as opposed to using these instances in an inductive in-
ference to an underlying causal link). This is in all likelihood a conceptual
problem. Someone who believes that she has proven a nomological gener-
alisation demonstratively (in Ramsey’s sense) can be construed simply as
not having grasped the difference between accidental and non-accidental
generalisations. On the other hand, checking the very same instances and
accepting a causal law on their strength may be quite unexceptionable,
as long as it is not suggested that checking the instances is ‘all there is to
justification’ of such a law. Checking instances is never by itself completely
sufficient to warrant belief in a causal law.
It was his own account of universals of law that forced Ramsey to
accept something like (c). According to Ramsey, the special nature of these
universals was due to their aptness as fundamental generalisations (that
is, general axioms and theorems deduced without recourse to existential
statements) in the system of all knowledge. This is a very peculiar theory,
which of course has to explain how we can bestow such a status on a
generalisation even if we, as a matter of fact, don’t know everything.
According to Ramsey, we organise what we do know in a deductive system
and we ask ourselves what the effects on the system would be if we knew a little
more. The axioms and general theorems of the resulting system are then
what we call ‘laws’.32
This theory was adopted by Lewis, who used it to explain why criteria of
similarity between possible worlds placed such an extraordinary emphasis
on laws.33 But Lewis’s approach purports to avoid Ramsey’s reliance
on omniscience, shifting the emphasis to deductive systems as abstract
objects instead. Some of the latter are true, and from among them we
can select those that best combine perspicuousness and logical strength.
Laws of nature are those universal generalisations that feature as axioms
or theorems in all the best performing systems.
Some modification seems indeed necessary in order to give plausibility
to Ramsey’s theory, as falling back on omniscience is clearly ineffectual.
32(Ramsey, 1928), p.131
33(Lewis, 1973a), p.73
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We can of course entertain the counterfactual possibility of knowing all
there is to know, but such a mental experiment leaves us in the dark about
what our beliefs then would be (otherwise the possibility wouldn’t be
counterfactual anymore and we would know everything already as it is!).
But it is by no means clear whether Lewis’s account fares any better on this
point. For how could we ever be justified in calling any generalisation a
natural law, given the widely acknowledged limitations of our knowledge
of the world?
Lewis contends that his take on the problem doesn’t require us to en-
visage the best axiomatisations themselves—it is enough that we try to
approximate this ideal to the best of our capacities. But then the recourse
to the best possible deductive system seems utterly gratuitous. The gener-
alisations that we treat as laws will simply turn out to be those propositions
appearing in our best deductive systems, whose main purpose is to sys-
tematise the knowledge we have (as opposed to the knowledge we would
have if we knew everything). So, all things considered, for Lewis the differ-
ence between laws and accidental generalisations boils down to a matter
of scope, a law being a generalisation that covers vast swathes of fact in
one fell swoop.
Ramsey very soon realised that his idea didn’t work, but instead of
settling for a conservative revision along Lewis’s lines, he opted for a
radical change of picture. The purpose of laws does not reside only in
systematising the welter of known facts, as might seem reasonable from a
semi-divine vantage point granted by possible-worlds semantics—in real
life a law often precedes the facts it is meant to govern. Lewis’s approach
is very neat at a high level of abstraction, but it faces severe difficulties
explaining the role of laws in our mental lives, which are fraught with
uncertainty.
Thus, a mere year after his first take on the problem of the distinction
between accidental and lawlike generalisations, Ramsey returned to it
in another pregnant paper, calling the former conjunctions and the latter
variable hypotheticals. Variable hypotheticals, according to the new theory,
express ‘an inference we are at any time prepared to make, not a belief
of the primary sort.’34 This time round, a sharp line of divide separates
propositions, which allow us to get our bearings in the physical world, and
variable hypotheticals, or causal laws, which set forth rules for inferring
propositions:
Variable hypotheticals are not judgments but rules for judging ‘If I
meet a φ, I shall regard it as a ψ’. This cannot be negated but it can be
34(Ramsey, 1929), p.134
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disagreed with by one who does not adopt it.
(Ramsey, 1929), p.137
The interesting and confusing point about variable hypotheticals is that
if we try to enunciate their truth conditions or apply them in practice, we
end up with mere material conditionals, which have the status of con-
junctions. But this does not mean that our distinction between variable
hypotheticals and conjunctions is spurious, but rather that the import of
the former cannot be fully expressed in terms of truth conditions. Variable
hypotheticals, on Ramsey’s account, sustain both future predictions and
‘assertions about unfulfilled conditions’35, that is, counterfactual condition-
als, providing an interesting and much neglected link between indicatives
and subjunctives.
Most of these points were explicitly acknowledged by Goodman, even
though he didn’t sever laws from ordinary propositions as radically as
Ramsey did. In order to exclude hybrid cases, he defined non-accidental
generalisations as those statements whose ‘acceptance does not depend
upon the determination of any given instance.’36 But he also set out to
inquire what the rules of acceptance of laws, as general statements that
go beyond particular instances, should be, as he found most contemporary
theories of confirmation grossly inadequate for the task. In an attempt at a
solution, he put forward a non-formal theory of induction and suggested
that a hierarchy of universals statements, ranked by their degree of en-
trenchment, could account for differences in their aptness for sustaining
counterfactuals.37 However, it is by no means clear whether this notion of
entrenchment can be satisfactorily defined in terms of confirmation—it is
not the certainty with which I or anyone might believe that all the coins in
my pocket are silver that impinges on the acceptability of (53), but rather
something like its inferential role within the system of our beliefs. One of
our goals should therefore be to clarify the latter notion.
Be it as it may, if we accept that there is more than a grain of truth to
Ramsey’s and Goodman’s treatment of counterfactuals, we will still need to
develop their proposals further in view of the plain fact that apparently by
far not all subjunctives are sustained by lawlike regularities. Take, for example,
Edgington’s example
(55) If I had known you were coming, I’d have baked a cake.38
35(Ramsey, 1929),p.143
36(Goodman, 1947), p.126
37(Goodman, 1983), p.122
38(Edgington, 2007), p.140
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You might come up with a pseudo-law underwriting this subjunctive in
order to save the day for metalinguistic theories, but it surely seems as a
highly artificial move. We can easily imagine a follow-up dialogue between
the original speaker, her niece and a by-stander:
You: Oh, so whenever you know she’s coming, you
bake her a cake?
Dorothy: Well... not always, but this time I had plenty of
flour and chocolate in the pantry.
You: Ok, so whenever you know she’s coming and
you have all what you need, you bake her a cake.
Dorothy: Usually I do, but I must feel like it, of course.
And then, I don’t even need to have all the in-
gredients ready—if I have time, I can always do
some shopping.
Dorothy’s niece: But don’t forget that if I’m currently on a diet,
you make a salad instead.
The quest for all the relevant features of the situation that shore up the
counterfactual in (55) can go on for quite some time, and even then remain
inconclusive. Full generality is notoriously difficult to come by when non-
accidental generalisations are involved and even our best laws contain a
tacit ceteris paribus clause. We tend to view this as a nuisance and therefore
dismiss it by chalking it up to the existence of myriads of theoretically
possible, but practically irrelevant defeating conditions for any given law.
However, the ubiquity of counterfactual reasoning, which more often that
not relies just on such defeasible regularities, reminds us that this is the de-
fault human way of approaching generality and should therefore deserve
a closer and more equitable inspection.
Edgington puts her finger on a signal issue—our use of counterfactuals
precedes the highly theoretical activity of formulating natural laws. The
inferences which they make manifest more often than not fall short of the
lofty standards required of exact sciences; on the contrary, they tend to be
highly contextual and seldom readily systematisable. Let us for a moment
return to Goodman’s original example:
(42) If the match had been struck, it would have lighted.
I can easily imagine my grandmother assenting to or even asserting this
counterfactual, while being quite sure she has never given a moment’s
thought to the alleged natural law sustaining it and that she probably does
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not know that the presence of oxygen is necessary for the process to take
place (though she does take good care to store her matches in a dry place).
Now, of course, linguistic meaning being determined by social norms, a
speaker does not always have complete control over the truth conditions of
his assertions. But even if the rendering of truth conditions of subjunctives
in terms of something like the Basic Schema were roughly right, we would
still miss an account of what people unaware of the elements of such an
analysis actually try to accomplish by asserting them. As (55) and the
urge to make the underlying inference explicit by means of something
like a variable hypothetical suggest, cotenability theories, with their focus
on logically sound arguments, seem to overly intellectualise the practice
of counterfactual reasoning. If we really wish to get to the heart of the
matter, I submit that we must treat my grandmother as a competent user
of counterfactuals, rather than a mere dilettante.
3.3. Conclusion
We have seen that a review of the early literature on subjunctives raises
many an interesting problem, which the later authors would have to face
in one way or another. It offers, therefore, a good vantage point to assess
the conceptual innovations of their successors. Moreover, the approach
of metalinguistic theories, while perhaps excessively rationalistic, keeps
reasonably close to the actual uses of subjunctives (at least in some do-
mains), with a view to making them comprehensible. By analysing newer
proposals, which sometimes tend to dodge this desideratum, in the light of
their forebears, we can reasonably hope to re-establish the missing link be-
tween the practical use of conditionals and theoretical accounts that strive
to explain it.

Chapter 4
Similarity
Semantic considerations have accompanied modern modal logic since its
very beginnings, as the following passage by C. I. Lewis attests:
Any set of mutually consistent propositions may be said to define a
“possible situation” or “case” or “state of affairs”. And a proposition
may be “true” of more than one such possible situation—may belong
to more than one such set. Whoever understands “possible situation”
thereby understands “consistent propositions”, and vice versa. [...]
In these terms, we can translate p J q by “Any situation in which p
should be true and q false is impossible”.
(Lewis, 1918), p.333
This opens the theoretical possibility of evaluating propositions in different
possible situations, construed as consistent sets of propositions. But what
do we mean by consistency anyway?
Two principal notions of consistency have developed since the dawn
of classical logic: the logical or model-theoretical notion on the one hand,
and the logically stronger semantic or modal one on the other. While ‘a
is red’ and ‘a is blue’ are intuitively and therefore modally inconsistent,
they are consistent on the logical conception, as there is no way to derive
a contradiction from two propositions devoid of logical operators.1
For this reason, early logicians assumed that sets comprised exclusively
of atomic propositions were always consistent—inconsistency was always
put down to the presence of logical operators. This attitude was reflected
in the picture of language put forward in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and later
1By the completeness theorem for first-order logic, any two simple propositions must
be simultaneously satisfiable. That is so, because an interpretation does not have to attend
to the actual meaning of predicates when fixing their extension.
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adopted by many logical positivists. Nevertheless, it did not take long for
them to realise that there was a stronger notion of consistency at work in
natural language. Later theorists made use of this latter notion to underpin
the idea of a possible world and reinterpreted Lewis’s strict implication
accordingly. This is the convention I will follow in this essay as well. Thus,
‘He is a bachelor’ strictly, though not logically, implies ‘He is unmarried’.
However, C.I. Lewis’s work in logic was still firmly anchored in the
axiomatic-deductive tradition of Principia Mathematica and had not been
affected by the semantic revolution ushered in by Go¨del’s and Tarski’s
work in the 1930s. Attempts to formulate a model theory for modal logic
began with Carnap, who used sets of atomic sentences (which, as we
have seen, were by definition deemed logically consistent) as elements
of the universe of his model. The two crucial improvements introduced
by subsequent modal logicians concerned the possibility of relaxing the
accessibility relation on the universe (which Carnap fixed as universal),
and the use of the full-fledged notion of possible world, which supplied a
complete valuation of the set of atomic sentences of a language (and thus
of their Boolean compounds as well).2
In the 1970s, the semantic turn in modal logic reached also the litera-
ture on counterfactuals. Theories based on the notion of possible world,
drawing heavily on Kripke’s legacy, replaced the earlier metalinguistic
approaches and have come to dominate the literature on counterfactuals.
Pioneered by R. Stalnaker and D. Lewis, they added another parameter to
normal modal models in order to enable the valuation of counterfactuals
at possible worlds: a selection function (Stalnaker) or an ordering relation
based on relative similarity (Lewis). One of the advantages of such an
approach is that particular choices in semantics (for instance, imposing
different constraints on the ordering relation) come hand in hand with
particular outcomes in resulting logic, which can in turn be tested against
actual language use. We will therefore first examine the formal structure
of these theories and only then will we address the related philosophical
and linguistic issues.
2In particular, this involves work by A. Prior, S. Kanger, J. Hintikka and especially S.
Kripke from the 1950s and early 1960s. See (Korte et al., 2009), p.536.
4.1. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK: STALNAKER 71
4.1. The basic framework: Stalnaker
4.1.1. Semantics
Although Stalnaker’s theory can be considered as a particular case of
Lewis’s, for historical and expositional reasons I will present the former
first and only then analyse the rationale behind the generalisations put
forward by Lewis. Stalnaker’s theory aims at providing a general se-
mantic framework for all conditionals, both indicative and subjunctive,
while Lewis generalised Stalnaker’s theory for subjunctives, but espoused
F. Jackson’s account of indicatives.
Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals comprises two basic compo-
nents:3
1. A model structure, that is, a modal logic modelM. It equals an ordered
triple 〈K,R, λ〉, where K is the universe of all possible worlds, R is an
accessibility relation that permits the valuation of formulae prefixed
by standard modal operators  and ♦, and λ is a special impossible
possible world, designed to deal with impossible antecedents. Except
for λ, M is a standard model for a normal (that is, Kripke-frame)
modal logic.4
2. A world-selection function f : P(K)×K→ K. That is, f takes a proposi-
tion and a possible world into a possible world. The world-selection
function is interpreted as an abstraction from a ‘change function’
which represents the subject’s methodological policies for belief re-
vision by taking an acceptance state (set of possible worlds) and
a proposition into another acceptance state. For Stalnaker, condi-
tional propositions are the product of projecting such policies onto
the world, so they should be interpreted according to a change func-
tion of someone who knows all the facts.5 The world-selection func-
tion f , reducing acceptance states to just one actual world, aims to
accomplish just that.
3(Stalnaker, 1968), p.45
4Actually, in a classic modal semantics, the model explicitly contains a valuation
function V, which assigns a truth value in a possible world to any wff of the language
(See (Blackburn et al., 2004)). This allows a recursive definition of truth for formulae of
any degree of complexity. However, as this is not one of our goals at the present moment,
we will follow Stalnaker in treating the valuation as implicit in the definition of a possible
world. Henceforth we shall also reserve small Greek letters for possible-world variables.
5(Stalnaker, 1984),p.120
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Neither R. Stalnaker nor D. Lewis followed C.I.Lewis’s preliminary identi-
fication of possible situations with sets of consistent sentences. They both
contended that our capacity for distinguishing between relevant alterna-
tive ways the world might be was prior to their linguistic articulation. In
this section we will therefore reverse the order of explanation and conceive
propositions, as has become customary within possible-world semantics,
as subsets of possible worlds.6 The price is that possible worlds will be
treated as unanalysed objects and propositions as their collections.7 While
this is technically convenient, it doesn’t commit us one way or other as far
as the status of possible worlds is concerned—this issue will be taken up
in Section 4.3. As a side-effect, we will also have to live with a separate
treatment of λ, which will be in the range of f , but will not appear in any
member of its domain (that is, the impossible proposition will be treated
as ∅ rather than {λ}).
In this model, each possible world α will be associated with the set of
possible worlds accessible from it by way of the relation R; in set-theoretical
notation this set is rendered as [α]R. We can think of [α]R as the outer limits
of what is imaginable or otherwise relevant for evaluations of conditionals
in α—nothing beyond this set has any bearing on their truth values, even if
the only A-worlds in K were in K− [α]R. It will therefore be useful to define
restrictions of propositions to these sets. Let us therefore define JAKα (in
〈K,R, λ〉) as JAK ∩ [α]R.
With these ingredients in hand, we can enunciate the truth conditions
of conditionals in a Stalnaker system:
TC Conditionals StalnakerJA > CKM = {α ∈ K | JAKα = ∅ ∨ f (JAK, α) ∈ JCK}
In other words, a conditional A > C is true in a possible world of M if
there are no accessible antecedent worlds or if the antecedent A forces the
selection function to switch to a world where C is true. Stalnaker’s intent
is for f to reproduce on an ontological level the procedure of adjusting the
system of one’s beliefs in view of an entertained hypothesis, envisaged by
the Ramsey test. This ontological turn is needed, according to Stalnaker, in
order to firmly anchor the semantics of conditionals (Ramsey test provides
6This will also allow us to replace truth talk with the more economical set-theoretic
notation—instead of ‘A is T in α’ we can simply write ‘α ∈ JAK’, where JAK is defined as
the set of possible worlds satisfying A, that is, as the proposition that A.
7In standard modal logic, possible worlds can even be viewed as elements of a first-
order model. That’s why we will be able to spell out the truth conditions of counterfactuals
in a first-order language.
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a decision method for evaluating the truth of A > C, but not its actual ob-
jective truth conditions).8 For this idea to work properly, we are compelled
to impose the following constraints on f :
1. For all α and A such that JAKα , ∅, f (JAK, α) ∈ JAK. If f (JAK, α) is to
represent the result of the adjustments made to a system of beliefs
corresponding to α in order to accommodate A, at the very least it has
to support A. This also guarantees conditionals of the form A > A to
be evaluated as true in any world of any model (in other words, they
will be logically true).
2. For all A and α, f (JAK, α) = λ only if JAKα = ∅, or in other words,
the selection function will output λ, the impossible world, only if A
is inconsistent from the point of view of α. This ensures that f is
defined on the whole P(K).9
These constraints on the selection function are arguably minimal. How-
ever, together with the stipulation that f has to be a function, they set
in place the machinery capable of warding off the classical paradoxes of
material conditional, while respecting some of the strongest intuitions
about what a formal theory of conditionals should aim for. Neither false
antecedents nor true consequents make Stalnaker’s conditionals trivially
true, which makes this treatment viable also for counterfactuals. Stal-
naker’s original idea was, of course, to put forward an Y-shaped account
of conditionals, explaining the difference between indicatives and subjunc-
tives by an epistemic restriction on K; this, however, proved more difficult
than expected.10
The two further constraints are devised to reflect the intuition that
the belief revision mandated by the Ramsey test should in some sense be
minimal. This implies that the resulting belief system should not devi-
ate gratuitously from the original one—the only permissible modifications
are those necessary to accommodate the hypothesis expressed in the an-
tecedent. Hence the notion of similarity or resemblance to the actual world,
8(Stalnaker, 1968), pp.44-45
9In order to be able to treat antecedents as set of possible worlds, I have had to adjust
Stalnaker’s constraints slightly. Stalnaker, who doesn’t represent impossible antecedents
as the empty set, can let Constraint 1 hold unrestrictedly, stipulating that all propositions
are true in λ, which together with Constraint 2 makes A > A logically true also for
inconsistent As. However, that would in our case lead to f (∅, α) ∈ ∅, which conceals a
contradiction. We obtain the same result by explicitly allowing for the trivial case in our
truth conditions. That entails, nonetheless, that λ only plays an inessential role in our
system.
10See Section 4.1.3.
74 CHAPTER 4. SIMILARITY
which is to inform the selection function by providing an ordering of the
possible worlds eligible as its values—given any A and α, f is set to output
the least β under α such that β ∈ JAK.
3. For all A and α, if α ∈ JAK, then f (JAK, α) = α. If a system of beliefs
already sustains a hypothesis, its addition shouldn’t affect the system
in any way. This makes α the α-least element on the whole field of
the relation.
4. For all α and antecedents A and A′, if f (JA′K, α) ∈ JAK and f (JAK, α) ∈JA′K, then f (JA′K, α) = f (JAK, α). This guarantees that the distance
of two worlds with respect to the actual one will not be antecedent-
relative. Together with the fact that f is a function, it also ensures
that the underlying relation be transitive and well-founded on K.
We can now reveal the relation on K defined by f and survey its properties.
Given any α, let us define α as follows: β α γ iff f ({β, γ}, α) = β.11 It is
easy to show that α, as defined, is a non-strict well-order.12
4.1.2. Logic
The constraints we have discussed so far are, of course, not nearly sufficient
to yield a unique s-function (how Stalnaker addresses this issue will be the
topic of the following section), but they do shape a conditional logic, which
he calls C2. The strict constraints on f (especially Constraint 4) in turn make
C2 very strong. Since C2 is the strongest system of logic that I will consider
in this dissertation, it will be convenient to spell out its axioms in full for
later reference:13
Stalnaker’s Logic C2
11Here is why this is reasonable: for any antecedent A, f is meant to select the world
most similar to α that satisfies A. So if for the antecedent {β, γ} f selects β rather than γ, it
must be because β resembles α more than γ does.
12See A.1 for details of the proof.
13In doing so, I will closely follow (Veltman, 2012) and (Veltman, 1985). Veltman’s
presentation, as opposed to Stalnaker’s, avoids the use of any defined notions apart
from the conditional connective >. The initialisms stand, respectively, for: Tautology,
Modus Ponens, Replacement of Equivalents (in the antecedent/consequent), Conditional
Identity, Conjunction of Consequents, Consequent Weakening, Antecedent strengthening
by consequent, Disjunction of Antecedents, Antecedent Strengthening with Possibility,
Modus Ponens for >, Conjunctive Sufficiency and Conditional Excluded Middle.
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(Taut) Any classical tautology is an axiom.
(MP) If A and A ⊃ B are theorems, then B is a theorem.
(RE) If A ≡ B is a theorem, then
a) A > C ≡ B > C is a theorem
c) C > A ≡ C > B is a theorem
(CI) A > A
(CC) ((A > B) ∧ (A > C)) ⊃ (A > (B ∧ C))
(CW) (A > B) ⊃ (A > (B ∨ C))
(ASC) ((A > B) ∧ (A > C)) ⊃ ((A ∧ B) > C)
(AD) ((A > C) ∧ (B > C)) ⊃ ((A ∨ B) > C)
(ASP) (¬(A > ¬B) ∧ (A > C)) ⊃ ((A ∧ B) > C)
(MP>) (A > C) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)
(CS) (A ∧ C) ⊃ (A > C)
(CEM) (A > C) ∨ (A > ¬C)
In what follows, we will examine if a case can be made for weaker systems.
The relation of comparative similarity α provides a convenient handle on
such weakening—a well-order being the strongest ordering relation at our
disposal, we can check if switching to a weaker one would do more justice
to our intuitions.
However, before doing so, we should have a look at some important
inference patterns rendered invalid by C2, and a fortiori by all weaker
similarity-based systems.14
Antecedent strengthening: A > C 0 (A ∧ B) > C
Stalnaker-Lewis systems are built up explicitly with the purpose of steering
clear of this pattern, the invalidity of which sets natural language condi-
tional reasoning apart from the monotonic conditional reasoning proper to
deductive systems. They manage to avoid it by allowing for the possibility
of the closest A∧B-world(s) being further away from the actual world than
the closest A-world(s), which opens the door to different valuations of C
in each of them.
Transitivity: A > B,B > C 0 A > C
Transitivity can be regarded as a peculiar kind of antecedent strengthening,
and as such it is equally liable to criticism. When A is far enough, it might
happen that even though B counterfactually implies C, A fails to do so.
Contraposition: A > C 0 ¬C > ¬A
14For detailed proofs, see A.1.
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Practically all counterexamples to contraposition in natural language in-
volve ‘even-if’ conditionals.15 It may so happen that in an acceptable con-
ditional ‘if A, then still C’, A is a necessary, but singly insufficient condition
for ¬C. In such case, of course, ¬C > ¬A will be unacceptable.
Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents: (A ∨ B) > C 0 (A > C) ∧ (B > C)
While all the above examples were of inference patterns that we were keen
to dismiss anyway, this case is different. In natural language, we tend to
reason along SDA’s lines both with indicatives and subjunctives. However,
it is very easy to falsify SDA on a Stalnaker frame—it suffices to guarantee
that whichever of the two disjuncts is further away from actuality doesn’t,
as opposed to the one closer by, counterfactually support the consequent.
Adding SDA to C2 is a non-starter, as the resulting system would
validate antecedent strengthening and thus convert A > B into a strict
conditional:16
1. A > C Premise
2. A ≡ (A ∨ (A ∧ B)) By Taut
3. (A ∨ (A ∧ B)) > C From 1,2 by REa)
4. (A > C) ∧ ((A ∧ B) > C) From 3 by SDA
5. (A ∧ B) > C From 4 by propositional logic a
Observe that Replacement of Equivalent Antecedents is the only poten-
tially controversial rule of inference actually used in the proof—as most
similarity-based systems accept it, we will not be able to enrich any of them
with SDA without trivialising the resulting logic. This is also the reason
why most authors keen on keeping SDA on board, similarity theorists or
otherwise, will be compelled to reject REa).
An exception is (Nute, 1975), where REa) is effectively quashed. How-
ever, this strategy leads to new difficulties—how should we keep the many
legitimate uses of REa) apart from the offending ones? And how should
the counterexamples against SDA be accounted for? In both cases, Nute
appears to draw ad hoc distinctions, either between acceptable and unac-
ceptable replacements of logical equivalents, or between allegedly different
kinds of conditionals.17
15See (Lycan, 2001),p.34
16In what follows, I shall simplify the proofs by omitting trivial uses of MP, in fact
treating most axioms as natural deduction inference rules.
17See (Nute and Cross, 2001), p.31, where he retracts his previous position for these
very reasons.
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But wait, this semantic quagmire seems to be just the perfect occasion
to use our marvellous panoply of Gricean remedies. Banishing SDA from
our semantics, while accounting for it on pragmatic grounds would do the
trick—we could eat our cake and keep it at the same time. This is the view
endorsed by Bennett18, as well as some others. However, similarity-based
approaches face serious difficulties explaining the intuitive validity of SDA
by means of conversational implicature. Granted, asserting (A ∨ B) > C
on the basis that A > C while regarding B as remote and rejecting B > C is
always misleading, if only because you could make your point both more
simply and accurately by asserting A > C. However, why the audience
should infer from your use of a disjunctive antecedent that you accept both
simplified counterfactuals never mind the remoteness of their antecedents
is by no means clear. You might rather be interpreted as signalling that you
do not know which one of the antecedents is closer to actuality, or that each
of them is as close as the other. Alonso-Ovalle has shown that these diffi-
culties are compounded with Lewis’s interpretation of might conditionals
in the absence of uniqueness assumption.19 Furthermore, as Lycan pointed
out, if SDA’s apparent validity is due to a conversational implicature, it
should be cancellable.20 Bennett says that to find a pertinent cancelling
context is a matter of a ‘five-finger exercise’ but, curiously, he doesn’t find
enough space to spell it out and check whether it is convincing.21
Another option would be to relinquish the boolean semantics of ‘or’
and, for subjunctives, slightly adapt the workings of the ‘would’ modal-
ity. This is quite a radical step that not everyone is happy to make—it
introduces an alien element into our otherwise neat and well-behaved log-
ical system. Lewis himself admitted to qualms about tinkering with it,
but despite the reluctance, he conceded that there was a strong case for a
non-boolean semantics for ‘or’, even though he did not undertake such a
project himself.22 Alonso-Ovalle also claims an independent motivation
for this treatment of SDA in his (Alonso-Ovalle, 2009), building upon the
idea that natural language ‘or’ supplies a set of semantic alternatives, the
interpretation of the whole being a simple union of the interpretations of
the operands. It is only the higher-order operator (‘would’, in our case) that
determines how these alternatives will be exploited in the global semantic
import of the proposition, forcing sometimes a disjunctive, but sometimes
a conjunctive reading of the complex. These approaches must, however,
18(Bennett, 2003),p.170
19(Alonso-Ovalle, 2009), p. 233-236
20(Lycan, 2001), p.44
21(Bennett, 2003), p.171
22(Lewis, 1977), p.361
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explain the fact that the disjunction in the antecedent in general seems
to allow de Morgan’s transformations, as Bennett made clear. And they
also have to take good care to prevent the new semantics from validating
REa)—otherwise we get stuck again with Antecedent Strengthening.
Once SDA and REa) furnish AS, we can easily show that
(Corner-to-Strict) A > C ≡ (A ⊃ C) ≡ A J C
whereA is defined as ¬A > A23, is a theorem of the augmented system.24
Again, note that the only axioms used in the derivation are fairly trivial—
they will be shared by all standard similarity-based counterfactual logics
that we shall review here. The upshot is that AS is by and large sufficient
to transform > into a strict conditional.
What is more, even in the absence of Replacement of Equivalent An-
tecedents, SDA will trivialise the modal operators of any strong-centred
system (that is, a system validating Conjunctive Sufficiency and Counter-
factual Modus Ponens) by making A ⊃ A logically valid.25
4.1.3. Indicative vs subjunctive conditionals
As I have already mentioned, Stalnaker originally intended his theory to
provide a viable general framework for both indicative and subjunctive
conditionals. Ironically, even though he first grounded his proposal on
the intuitive plausibility of the Ramsey test for evaluating indicatives (the
selection function was meant to capture on a formal level the speaker’s
belief revision policies), his theory ended up being considered primarily
as a theory of counterfactuals—similarity approaches to indicatives have
been found inadequate for a number reasons. We have already seen the
trouble in which the so-called Stalnaker’s thesis got mired down.26 In this
section we shall have a closer look at why Stalnaker wished to uphold it in
the first place, as well as on how he dealt with Lewis’s results.
At first, Stalnaker didn’t seem to attach much importance to the dis-
tinction between indicatives and subjunctives. He considered a possible
world to be an adequate ‘ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical
beliefs’ and was confident that any conflicts between intuitive truth val-
ues of conditionals could be accounted for by positing pragmatic shifts in
23The truth at α of ¬A > A, together with Stalnaker’s Constraint 1 guarantees that
A should be true across the whole [α]R, which is the standard necessary and sufficient
condition for A to be true at α.
24See A.1.
25The complete proof can be found in (Butcher, 1983), p.75.
26See Section 2.3.1.
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the selection function.27 Moreover, at no point did he address Adams’s
pair and he seems to have regarded the counterfactual form as merely
signalling that no credence is awarded to the antecedent of an otherwise
standard conditional.28 Anyway, both indicatives and subjunctives were
to behave as ordinary propositions, evaluable at each possible world.
He tried to bolster his semantics by endorsing the Equation29 as an
alternative rendering of the Ramsey Test and by contending that the prob-
abilistic and truth-functional approach could ultimately be made to con-
verge. In Stalnaker’s eyes, the fact that both of them yielded the same logic
C2 was clear evidence of the viability of his programme. Lewis’s trivial-
ity results, showing that despite appearances, the two semantic strategies
were fundamentally irreconcilable, came therefore as a cold shower.
Unfortunately, even though Stalnaker acknowledged the force of Lewis’
proofs and relinquished the Equation, he never seriously undertook the
urgent task of reviewing the underpinnings of his approach to indicatives.
Given that it initially drew inspiration from the Ramsey Test, but later was
found incompatible with a canonical tenet of the latter, an inquiry into
what had gone wrong was certainly in order. However, Stalnaker’s new
take on indicatives left this question completely unanswered.30
This time Stalnaker assumed that indicative antecedents forced the se-
lection function to pick out worlds from the closest layer of conversation-
ally live possibilities. This meant that indicative antecedents convention-
ally signalled their compatibility with the so-called context set comprised
by the worlds not ruled out at a prior point in the conversational exchange.
Subjunctives, on the other hand, were not supposed to be used unless the
speaker intended to reach beyond the shared presuppositions by means of
her antecedent.31
This admittedly goes some way towards explaining why the inference
pattern NAAC
(40) ¬A ∴ A→ C
sounds invalid for indicatives, but since Stalnaker only elaborates on how
context sets may shrink throughout a conversation, and never considers
27(Stalnaker, 1968), pp. 44-45
28Stalnaker (1970), p.120. He did believe, though, that for this very reason, counterfac-
tuals offered us an unperturbed view of the hook-up of an agent’s epistemic system.
29See Section 2.2.
30A passage in (Stalnaker, 1976), p.305 reveals that what Stalnaker most likely had
on his mind was some kind of non-epistemic conditional expressing objective causal
relations between phenomena. So far as I know, he has never developed this intuition
into a full-blown theoretical proposal.
31(Stalnaker, 1975), pp.198-202
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the possibility of their expanding, there is no explanation for the intuitive
invalidity of the related pattern CAC
(38) C ∴ A→ C,
and neither are we presented with any putative explanation of Adams’s
pair. Unfortunately, Stalnaker’s views on the semantics of indicatives
grew even more vague and non-committal with the final presentation of
his broader theoretical framework in (Stalnaker, 1984).
The seeds of this ultimate failure had probably been sown already in
the first article, with Stalnaker’s peculiar interpretation of the Ramsey
Test. He represented the addition of the antecedent to a belief system,
advocated by Ramsey, as a shift from a possible world to another satisfying
the antecedent, but otherwise as similar to the original one as it gets.
However, as many have noted, a possible world is a far cry from a natural
representation of a human belief system.32 At a possible world, not only
all logical and mathematical consequences of a particular proposition are
known, but there is no room for any uncertainty about any particular
matter of fact. Sets of possible worlds fare much better—even though they
are liable to the former idealisation, they do at least eschew the latter. But
if we take something like a context set to represent a speaker’s (partial)
belief system, there doesn’t seem to be any distinguished theoretical role
for the actual world to play any more—the whole point of the context set
is that any of its members could wind up to be the actual world as far as
the speaker is concerned.
At this point the theoretical difference between the original Ramsey’s
idea and Stalnaker’s interpretation of it can be brought out. While Ramsey
(and following him, Adams, Edgington and Bennett) would say that a
speaker will be certain about an indicative A→ C if all A-worlds from his
context set are also C-worlds, Stalnaker would say that this will happen
only if revising each and every of the worlds in the context set with A yields
a C-world from that very set. In other words, the revision of every possible
completion of the speaker’s beliefs with A must force another completion
supporting C. But this is not how we evaluate the impact of hypothetical
new evidence, and thus, given the lesson of the Ramsey Test, cannot be an
adequate account of indicative conditionals.33
In the rest of the section devoted to similarity, I shall simply assume
that Stalnaker’s attempt to extend this approach to indicative conditionals
is beyond repair and that similarity frameworks are best understood as
aimed exclusively at explaining counterfactuals.
32See in particular (Gibbard, 1981), p.215.
33See also (Lewis, 1976), p.143.
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4.2. Generalising Stalnaker
4.2.1. Uniqueness assumption
Perhaps the weakening of α that lies most at hand involves allowing
for ties between eligible possible worlds, while keeping all other proper-
ties of α intact.34 That is, we might want to relax the requirement that
there always should be a unique closest possible world supporting the
antecedent. This requirement is called the uniqueness assumption by D.
Lewis.35 Its abandonment will turn α into a well-founded weak order with
α at its very bottom.
Lewis rejects the uniqueness assumption on the grounds that it requires
an excessive degree of sharpness from our notion of similarity. To show
that this contradicts our intuitions he makes use of Quine’s pair, which we
discussed along with Rescher’s metalinguistic take on counterfactuals:
(46) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been
French.
(47) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been
Italian.
Lewis’s diagnosis is that such examples represent genuine ties—our intu-
itions about comparative similarity do not favour any of the two conflicting
counterfactuals, and they should therefore both be declared false. In our
model M, this would mean that the two closest worlds where Bizet and
Verdi are compatriots, Italians in the first one and French in the second one,
are incomparable as regards their difference from the actual world. If we
accept that there is no such unique closest antecedent world, Stalnaker’s
selection function will remain undefined for the proposition J‘Bizet and
Verdi were compatriots’K and we have to come up with another way of
specifying truth conditions of counterfactuals.
Fortunately, there is a simple way to achieve this. Informally, the
counterfactual A  C will be true in α only if there are no accessible
antecedent worlds or if the consequent is true in all the closest antecedent
worlds.36 This allows us to simulate Stalnaker’s truth conditions by first
letting f output sets of closest worlds instead of the single closest one,
and then quantifying over this set. So setting our class selection function
34Here ties should be construed intuitively—if there is a tie between β and γ, and δ is
closer (further) by than any one of them, then δ is also closer (further) by than the other.
35(Lewis, 1973b),p.426
36For a formal rendering of these truth conditions, see A.2.
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f ′ : P(K) × K → P(K), β ∈ f ′(JAK, α) iff β ∈ JAKα and (@γ ∈ JAK)(γ ≺α β), we
obtain the following simpler wording of these truth conditions:
TC Counterfactuals No Uniqueness Assumption IIJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | (∀β ∈ f ′(JAK, α))(β ∈ JCK)}37
Relinquishing the uniqueness assumption also affects the logic. With
the new similarity ordering, it is not necessary that C be false across the
whole class of the closest A-worlds for A  C to fail—a single A ∧ ¬C-
world among these worlds suffices to falsify it. So it may easily happen
that our semantics should not license either of a pair of contradictory
counterfactuals, and we must bid farewell to Conditional Excluded Middle.38
(CEM) (A  C) ∨ (A  ¬C)
The very intuitions that were at play in 46 and 47 explain why we might
want to get rid of CEM. If Verdi and Bizet had been compatriots, would
Bizet be Italian or not? Neither answer sounds convincing and we are
tempted to reject the question altogether, as there doesn’t seem to be any
way to decide one way or the other.
Stalnaker doesn’t question these intuitions, but disagrees with Lewis
about how they should be incorporated in a theoretical account of counter-
factuals.39 For Stalnaker, no semantic theory can avoid certain theoretical
idealisations that have to be relaxed in practice. His well-ordering of pos-
sible worlds purports to be exactly such an idealised ingredient, whose
neatness often sets too high a bar to clear for practical purposes. He argues
that rather than by implementing our intuitions directly into the semantic
wiring of counterfactuals, they are better explained by resorting to van
Fraassen’s supervaluation theory of vagueness. Supervaluations allow us
to evaluate linguistic items in spite of their underdeterminacy in a context,
by looking at the class of all possible resolutions of such underdeterminacy.
A long story short, the upshot is that (46) and (47) come out as neither true
nor false on this account, since different, for all we know equally plausi-
ble ways of completing the similarity well-ordering give rise to different
truth values. This, admittedly, sounds more palatable than to declare them
outright false. After all, we seem to accept
37The vacuous case is taken care of by stipulating that f (∅, α) = ∅ for all α.
38The parallel between CEM and the uniqueness assumption is not perfect, though. For
CEM to be valid, the underlying ordering must be a well-order, so if the limit assumption
fails, CEM will fail irrespective of the uniqueness assumption.
39(Stalnaker, 1981),p.89
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(56) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, then Verdi would have
been French or Bizet would have been Italian.
Lewis admits that (56), together with the negations of (46) and (47), sounds
like a genuine contradiction.40 He also acknowledges that the resort to
supervaluations by and large solves the problem of implausibly high de-
mands upon our capacity of determining the similarity ordering. However,
he still objects to Stalnaker’s theory on the grounds that it cannot account
for might-counterfactuals.
4.2.2. Interlude: Might-counterfactuals
The rejection of the uniqueness assumption presented Lewis with an op-
portunity to define the might-counterfactual as a dual operator to the
would-counterfactual. Since their relation, as construed by Lewis, is highly
reminiscent of that of simple possibility and necessity, Lewis represented
them respectively with a diamond and a box attached to an arrow: ‘If A
had been the case, then C might have been the case’ became A  C. The
might-counterfactual is defined as follows:
(M-W) (A  C) ≡de f ¬(A  ¬C)
This has powerful backing in our intuitions: we want to reject ‘If Verdi
and Bizet had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French’ precisely
because in that event, Verdi might not have been French, but rather Italian,
just as Bizet. The corresponding truth conditions (in terms of the class
selection function f ′) are as follows:
TC Might-Counterfactuals No Uniqueness AssumptionJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | (∃β ∈ f ′(JAK, α))(β ∈ JCK)}
As we have seen, Stalnaker advocates the uniqueness assumption and
CEM, which under the current definition would equate might- to would-
conditionals. Lewis retorts that we do not seem to have any other plausible
treatment of might-counterfactuals at our disposal that could do justice to
our pre-theoretical intuitions, if ‘might’ is to be construed in terms of the
standard objective possibility operator ♦:
Four candidates come to mind: ♦(φ&ψ), ♦(φ ψ), φ ♦ψ, and
φ  ♦(φ&ψ). But none will do. Take φ as ‘I looked in my pocket’
and ψ as ‘I found a penny’; suppose I did not look, suppose there was
40(Lewis, 1973a), p.80
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no penny to be found and make commonplace assumptions about
relevant matters of fact. Then ‘If I had looked, I might have found a
penny’ is false, but all four candidate symbolizations are true.
(Lewis, 1973a), p.80
This presses an important point about our use of modalities. From a
technical point of view, Lewis is of course right, but only to the extent that
♦ is a highly abstract theoretical device, which only imperfectly reflects our
ordinary use of ‘may’ and ‘might’. We don’t expect the latter to quantify
over the whole [α]R even in their alleged ‘objective’ use.41 Typically, when
I say ‘You might have got sick!’, I am not trying to convince you that it was
metaphysically possible in the broad sense—you already know that much
(even though, having opted for a more useful occupation in your life than
me, you may never have actually heard of metaphysical possibility). What
I am getting at is that it was possible in the circumstances, and that is exactly
how ‘might’ works also in counterfactual contexts.
Stalnaker correctly notes that ‘might’ plays the same semantic role in
conditional and non-conditional natural language contexts, but concludes
that it is because this role is epistemic rather than ontic, and that its scope is
the whole counterfactual, rather than just the consequent.42 Neither claim
is easy to put to the test. The first one, because we have no clear idea of
how uncertainty about a counterfactual would differ from conditionally
acknowledging a certain situationally bounded ontic possibility, as adum-
brated above. And the second one, because we have no clear idea of how
uncertainty about a counterfactual would differ from uncertainty about
a proposition under a counterfactual assumption. I will argue that these
distinctions are spurious, but in any case, the natural language ‘might’
cannot simply be the ♦ of our standard modal logic.
Stalnaker’s diagnosis is that there are two clashing readings of the
modal involved in Lewis’s example: an epistemic one, under which the
counterfactual ‘If I had looked, I might have found a penny’ is true, and a
quasi-epistemic one (expressing compatibility with speaker’s knowledge
enriched with all the relevant facts), under which it is false. I would like to
suggest that the first reading is a theoretical fiction which doesn’t capture
how modals are really used in natural language. When I utter ‘If φ, then
might ψ’, I am not simply making a report about my belief state—if that
were so, you couldn’t correct me by pointing out that there were no pennies
in my pocket (something I didn’t know). The second reading is intuitively
41I shall argue in Chapter 7 that the sharp difference between epistemic and ontic
modalities is a by-product of theorisation, without a clear counterpart in natural language.
42(Stalnaker, 1981),p.99
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more acceptable, but leaves open the question of how the set of relevant
facts should be determined. And then, could anyone ever be sure that
she knows all the relevant facts, whatever they might be? If not, then no
assertion of such a modal sentence will be warranted, making it rather
useless for a natural language user. It is clear that an altogether different
approach is needed to account for the interaction between modals and
conditionals.43
4.2.3. Strong centring
We still have the actual world α standing alone at the very bottom of our
relation α, a property called strong centring in the literature. While ad-
mittedly no other world can resemble α more than α itself does, one can
argue that there may be worlds which differ from α only in such irrelevant
respects that they should be considered for all intents and purposes indis-
tinguishable from it. This would amount to relaxing the strong centring to
a mere weak one. As far as I know, no one has ever argued against weak
centring.
This further generalisation, however, doesn’t require any change in our
new truth conditions, as it only amounts to allowing a tie also at the bottom
of the ordering. It does affect the logic, though—Conjunctive Sufficiency will
no longer be valid.
(CS) (A ∧ C) ⊃ (A  C)
As you may already have guessed, it is no particularly dramatic loss. CS
sounds awkward, because almost all counterfactuals with a true antecedent
do. However, and for the same reason, it doesn’t sound completely wrong
either. Our intuitions simply provide no reliable guide in such matters—
that’s why we may just as well let CS go. With weak centring, we shall still
retain Conditional Modus Ponens.
4.2.4. Limit assumption
Lewis also rejected the principle for which he coined the name limit as-
sumption. In a sense, it is a complementary constraint to the uniqueness
assumption—whereas the latter ensures that there will always be at most
one closest antecedent world, the former secures the existence of at least
one. Antecedents that apparently fail to deliver any closest antecedent
worlds are exemplified by counterfactuals such as
43See Section 5.2 and Chapter 7.
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(57) If I were taller than I am, I could touch the ceiling.
Is there any minimal increment in my height which one should consider
when entertaining the antecedent? Arguably not. For any hypothetical
increase d in my height, there is a smaller one, say d/2, which will make
my counterfactual height closer to the actual one, and thus preferable from
the point of view of the present theory. The upshot is that there is no set
of closest antecedent worlds. Abandoning the limit assumption opens the
possibility of α not being well-founded, or equivalently (with the Axiom
of Choice), the possibility of infinite chains of possible worlds coming ever
closer to the actual world.
It is relatively easy and even rewarding to shed uniqueness, as it makes
the system enormously more flexible and interesting, while keeping it
quite simple at the same time; however, allegiance to the limit assumption
among scholars has proved rather resilient. One of the reasons is that the
generalisation of the elegant truth conditions we have been dealing with
up to now becomes somewhat unwieldy in the new system.
Informally, the counterfactual A  C will be true in a possible world
only if there is no accessible A-world or if there is an accessible A-world
below which all accessible A-worlds are also C-worlds. And the might-
counterfactual A  C will be true in a possible world only if there are
accessible A-worlds and each of them is either also a C-world, or has such
a world below itself.44
This formulation of truth conditions makes it impossible to define any
straightforward selection function on Stalnaker’s lines, not even a class
one, simply because in general nothing guarantees the existence of the set
of closest antecedent worlds.45
But how plausible is the abandonment of the limit assumption anyway?
Let us return to (57). According to Lewis, our intuitions cannot supply any
set of closest antecedent worlds, so in a system with the limit assumption
we will either be compelled to choose one ad hoc, or regard it as the empty
set, in which case the counterfactual will be trivially true. Lewis strives
to avoid this outcome by giving up the assumption and adjusting the
semantics accordingly. With these changes, however, if in the actual world
(measuring, say, h cm) I am too short to reach the ceiling, then (57) comes
out strictly false. That’s because if h + d cm is the minimal height required
for reaching the ceiling (let us suppose that the length of my arms is a
function of my overall counterfactual height), then the world in which I
44For a formal rendering of these truth conditions, see A.2.
45See (Lewis, 1973a), pp. 57-60.
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am h + d/2 cm tall will be closer than the world in which I am h + d cm. It
might seem that we have jumped out of the frying pan right into the fire.
However, bad though this may seem, there is always the Gricean cav-
alry to save the day. It can be argued that since examples such as (57)
all convey literal falsehoods, which is common knowledge between the
speaker and her audience, the latter is invited to pragmatically firm up the
antecedent with a non-articulated item, such as:
(58) If I were a little taller than I am, I could touch the ceiling.
Now, ‘a little’ is still fairly context-dependent for its interpretation, but
from the point of view of the limit assumption, it is a game-changer. What-
ever may be considered as ‘a little’ under the circumstances, there is no
longer an infinite descending chain of antecedent worlds ever more closely
resembling reality.46 We are back in the calmer waters where a set of closest
possible worlds can be identified.
This seems to be a general pattern among counterfactual examples
put forward to illustrate the need for jettisoning the limit assumption—
arguably, if the antecedent worlds get closer and closer to the actual world,
at certain point it will be no longer in our power to appreciate the difference
between a counterfactual scenario which still supports the antecedent and
one that already ceases to do so. While trivial counterfactuals such as
(59) If I were taller than I am, I would measure more than h cm.
(where h, as before, is my actual height) will still count as true, any similar
counterfactual exploiting a non-trivial consequence of my height will in
all likelihood turn out to be unacceptable on this semantics. This is further
illustrated by the fact that
(60) If I were taller than I am, I would measure less than h + d cm.
will be true for all d > 0, so d will approach 0 in the limit. Now, if you
combine the consequent of (59) with all the instances of the consequent
of (60), it is intuitively clear that you will obtain an unsatisfiable set of
sentences.47 So if you are uncomfortable with the idea that a consistent
proposition may yield an inconsistent set of counterfactual consequences,
you will certainly want to get the limit assumption on board.
In view of these examples, it is to be expected that the antecedents of
most counterfactuals for which the presence of infinite descending chains
46By the way, it may be worth pointing out that it usually cannot simply be interpreted
as ‘d, whatever it might be’, as not all the likes of (57) strike us as trivially true.
47See (Herzberger, 1979) for details of the proof.
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of antecedent worlds makes any difference will eventually have to be
strengthened by the audience to a form where a set of closest antecedent
worlds can be found. The literal import of such counterfactuals will cor-
respond only to a intermediate stage of their processing, triggering an
implicature reflecting the real intended meaning of speaker’s utterance.
Pragmatic enrichment is a tricky phenomenon, which can occur for a
number of reasons. It may prove difficult to chalk it up to one particular
aspect of an utterance. For instance, one may argue that some kind of
pragmatic reinforcement arises by default in many typical comparative
assertions: if I say that Juan is taller than Marı´a in an informal setting, I
am usually expected to disregard height differences below a certain level.
You may therefore be able to argue that the requisite enrichment takes
place already before the semantic mechanism of counterfactuals kicks in.48
Alternatively, you can admit that the enrichment sometimes is triggered
by the absence of an eligible set of closest antecedent worlds, but declare
yourself interested in modelling exclusively the final result of this process.
Either way, you will have a strong case for retaining the limit assumption.
Another reason for maintaining the limit assumption is that its logical
cost is very subtle, if what you are interested in is the study of counterfac-
tual reasoning in natural language. The limit assumption is necessary for
the validity of CEM, but once the uniqueness assumption is relinquished,
it doesn’t go hand in hand with any other axiom of C2—its addition to
the system only makes a difference for certain arguments with infinite
premises. To stick with it, you will have to sacrifice compactness.49 While
this severely compromises the completeness of your logic, as you never
really use such arguments in real life (do we ever use more than two or
three premises in our daily counterfactual reasoning?), you may well find
the bargain worth your money.
4.2.5. Almost-connectedness
Let us take stock. Our similarity ordering α is now a mere partial order,
with α as one of the minimal elements, and there can be ties between
possible worlds for closeness to α. But how did we construe the ties? Any
48This is roughly the view taken in (Warmbro¯d, 1982). Warmbro¯d also argues that
in the special case when the speaker forces an interpretation at odds with the limit
assumption, he will end up trivialising his counterfactual, as the antecedent will turn out
to be unsatisfiable. Stalnaker, for his part, contends that the use of counterfactuals with
such antecedents is inappropriate and the selection function will be undefined for them:
(Stalnaker, 1981), p.97.
49(Veltman, 2012), p.4
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worlds incomparable by means of α were considered to be equally close
to the actual one, so if any world was closer (further away) than any of
those incomparable worlds, it was closer (further away) than all of them.
This allows us to partition the universe in equivalence classes of equally
close worlds and regard (by means of an induced ordering, of course, but
let us be a little sloppy for simplicity’s sake) α as a linear order on this
partition.50 Accepting the limit assumption turns this linear order into a
well-order.
Should we want to reduce α to a mere partial order, without any ad-
ditional properties, we would have to give up both weak centring and the
possibility of performing the aforementioned partition.51 The latter modi-
fication amounts to taking back the requirement that the relation of being
‘equally’ close to actuality should be an equivalence relation. As shed-
ding reflexivity or symmetry would stop α from being a partial order, it is
transitivity that must be relinquished. One can interpret this move, follow-
ing (Lewis, 1981), as an admission of genuine incomparabilities alongside
mere ties.52
Requiring α only to be a partial order means sticking exclusively with
the axioms CI,CC, CW, ASC, AD and RE, together with all propositional
tautologies and the rule of Modus Ponens; that is, with the table on page
75 up to AD. This reduced system gives us the simplest logic for similarity
counterfactuals, sometimes called P after Pollock.53
4.3. Possible worlds
After mastering the two preceding sections, the reader probably can guess
why Stalnaker-Lewis’s systems immediately proved so successful among
logicians and formal linguists—the formal framework is mathematically
beautiful, but perspicuous enough for a layman to follow. Earlier theo-
ries, even if they sometimes took a stance on a point of logic, were in no
condition to provide anything similar.
However, time has come to subject the theory to detailed scrutiny. You
have been promised testability on the basis of the logic brought forth by
the semantics, but the purpose of the last section was to bring home to
you the extent to which this logic is malleable—little amendments to the
50These equivalence classes correspond exactly to the layers of Lewis’s spheres in his
original formulation of the theory in (Lewis, 1973a).
51This is the system favoured in (Pollock, 1976).
52See A.2 for details on how this will affect truth conditions and logic.
53(Veltman, 2012), p.3.
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system can give you just the axioms you ask for. Reasoning in natural
language is anything but systematic, and any logical system that purports
to capture its structure will be compelled to resort to idealisations. Often
there is simply no conclusive linguistic evidence in favour of or against
implementing a rule of inference. The distinction between semantic and
pragmatic phenomena is always drawn against a fairly theoretical back-
ground.
We have, therefore, to look at the underpinnings of the similarity theory
in order to see how it fares not only on the structure, but also on the
content of counterfactual reasoning. There are two basic elements to the
evaluation of particular counterfactuals—the universe of possible worlds
and the relation of resemblance between them. We’ll start with the first one
and discuss several different construals of their role in formal semantics.
I shall argue that despite appearances to the contrary, Lewis’s realism
has cast a long shadow. Most scholars were so eager to reject it that they
didn’t realise it was put forth as an answer to a genuine question, to wit:
What is the purport of modal talk? Having marshalled a few arguments
against realism and conceiving possible worlds as a convenient fiction
rather than ‘real chunks of rock’, they went on doing basically the same
kind of semantics as Lewis, mostly unaware of the fact that they still owed
us an important explanation. Even worse, having rejected Lewis’s eccen-
tric metaphysics, they tacitly embraced the erroneous picture of language
which had given rise to it. The upshot is that despite all the sophistication
of present-day possible world semantics, its achievement mainly resides
in providing a perspicuous framework for rephrasing modal talk, rather
than in helping us understand the role modal expressions play in natural
language. In my view, here lies one of the sources of the scholasticism and
intellectual constipation that hold sway in large areas of modern linguistics
and philosophy of language.
4.3.1. Realism
Realism about possible worlds is just what it sounds like—the thesis that
when we use modal vocabulary, we are talking about huge concrete objects,
among which our actual world takes no pride of place. Modal expressions,
on this account, work similarly to the adverbs of place: their absence sug-
gests that the speaker is talking about the place of utterance, while their
presence switches the circumstance of evaluation to the location thus indi-
cated (albeit often only through a quantificational phrase). Analogously,
non-modal utterances are interpreted as being about the actual world,
4.3. POSSIBLE WORLDS 91
while the addition of a modal operator results in the same affirmation be-
ing made of some possible world(s) that may not coincide with the actual
one.
Philosophers are usually not the kind of folk that shies away from
wacky theories, but realism is apparently such a bizarre position that it
has become firmly identified with D. Lewis, its original and almost sole
advocate.54 Were it not for Lewis’s philosophical eminence as well as
his witty and engaging writing, realism might well have remained at the
fringes of the philosophical debate. In what follows, I shall not take great
pains to argue exhaustively against realism. I submit that if we are ever
justified in cutting any corners, it is here; I shall by and large take the
untenability of realism for granted. Realism itself is not a difficult target
(I surmise Lewis may have been prodded into its adoption by the very
challenge of defending it)—it is rather the common alternative practice
of treating possible worlds as an unexplained explainer that needs to be
analysed with care. I will be more interested in why realism emerges in
the first place and I’ll try to find out whether alternatives to realism can
allay these original preoccupations.
Let us briefly review what pretty much everyone seems to take to be the
decisive argument against modal realism—the epistemological objection.
It goes roughly as follows: we get to know real objects by entering into
causal relations with them. But this is by definition ruled out in the case
of possible worlds—it is their very causal disconnection from the actual
world which makes them merely ‘possible’. So how could we ever learn
54The only other realist reported in (Bennett, 2003) is R.B. Miller. He advocates what
in (Miller, 2001) is called ‘moderate modal realism’, but the ‘moderateness’ only concerns
the range of entities inhabiting possible worlds, not the actual ontological status of the
latter. Another scholar defending a position close to Lewis’s realism is J. Divers. In his
(Divers, 2002), he distinguishes ‘genuine realism’ from ‘actualist realism’, which endorses
the existence of possible worlds, but identifies them with some other (possibly abstract)
actually existing entities. After evaluating both against a number of criteria, he concludes
that preference should be given to the former (without prejudice to a possible ‘antirealist’
victory, out of the monograph’s compass). I find Divers’s evaluation criteria too technical
and little related to the task of explaining modal discourse. What is more, I don’t see
the dilemma in either Miller’s or Divers’s terms—rejecting possible worlds as existing
concrete objects, while granting them a seal of approval as abstract entities, doesn’t
require identifying them with some other, prima facie more respectable objects. A. Kratzer
vows allegiance to Lewis’s construal of possible worlds in a few terse remarks (see for
instance (Kratzer, 1977), p.10), but to my knowledge never really presses the point, leaving
foundational issues for all intents and purposes outside the scope of her theorising. For
F. Veltman, possible worlds are just unanalysed set-theoretical objects that represent or
model situations conceived of by a speaker: (Veltman, 1976), p.251.
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anything about them?55
Lewis replies that the epistemological premise must be rejected anyway,
not only for the sake of retaining his modal ontology, but also in order to
account for mathematical knowledge. We do not have causal transactions
with numbers or sets, but we do accept their existence, on pain of radically
changing the subject matter of mathematics.56
This reply, in my view, falls prey to a singular confusion. Lewis strives
to brush off the difference between abstract and concrete objects, which
others rely on in order to explain the peculiar behaviour of numbers. But
the distinction is intuitively clear enough—a cat or a hammer can, just as
the empty set or a schedule cannot, startle you by unexpectedly falling
on your head and cause you severe injuries.57 As biological creatures, we
have to find our way in a physical world full of concrete objects, but so
as to keep track of their properties, we can enrich our conceptual domain
with abstract ones at our discretion, as long as they serve the purpose for
which they were introduced.58 The case of the foundations of mathematics
is especially instructive: how much choice should we be allowed to use?
Does Ω of the non-well-founded set theory, as opposed to, say, the more
familiar ∅, really exist?59 And is there any principled way of answering
such questions?
The so-called ontological questions have, of course, bedevilled philoso-
phy from its very beginnings and platonism survives in one form or other
to this day. However, platonism cannot simply amount to the thesis that
abstract objects exist—if this were so, everybody would become a platon-
ist immediately upon momentarily abandoning the conceptual rigours of
their philosophical system in order to attend to more mundane issues. In
addition to believing in the existence of abstract objects, a real platonist
must construe them along the lines of concrete objects—as if they were
55In the same vein, D. Sanford convincingly argues that even if concrete objects analo-
gous to possible worlds really existed, they could not have any bearing on our language
practice: (Sanford, 1989), pp.156-172.
56(Lewis, 1986a),p.109
57G. Ryle made this point more brilliantly than I could ever do throughout his (Ryle,
1949). The fact that a mere quarter of century later platonism was again in the centre of
philosophical debate reflects poorly on analytic philosophy’s capacity to learn from the
great thinkers of its own past.
58This invites the following empirical speculation: could it be that the more advanced
cognitive processes associated with abstract thinking simply made use of the pre-existing
module used for handling concrete objects?
59Remember that in the non-well-founded set theory, Ω is the set whose only element
is itself. Also, before you dismiss such set theory as nonsense, note that it has important
computational applications.
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hovering in a distinctive realm (as ‘raisins in a pudding’60) accessible only
to human reason through some kind of intellectual apprehension, mod-
elled upon ordinary empirical inspection. A real platonist, such as Go¨del,
believes that there is only one correct answer to the continuum hypothesis,
because if only you could clearly inspect the objects corresponding to ℵ1
and i1, you would know what it is.
This is, by the way, also why in my view attributions of platonism to
Frege either seriously miss the point or border on triviality. Frege, of course,
accepts the existence of abstract objects and is very explicit about how we
can use them to our advantage in the construction of a mathematical and
semantic theory, but as far as I have seen, he never indulges in the kind of
intellectual daydreaming characteristic of real platonists.
Platonism is mostly innocuous as far as mathematical practice is con-
cerned, and in some cases it may even provide a boost to a mathematician’s
imagination. It fails, though, as an account of such practice. Mathemati-
cal, and in general abstract objects are to a large degree constructed, not
discovered, by us. Of course, there are constraints to what we reasonably
can postulate, but they are imposed by the purpose for which the abstrac-
tion is deployed in the first place. If your arithmetic gives you ‘3=4’ as a
theorem, you won’t be able to use it in a marketplace, as four apples are
more valuable than three. How much choice you choose to use may have
interesting consequences in advanced set theory, but as long as it lets the
calculus go through, engineers will not bother to object.
The same holds for possible worlds—Lewis’s realism doesn’t preclude
him from using and analysing modal vocabulary just as his fellow seman-
ticists do and may even be one of the secrets behind the virtuosity of his
analyses. However, it falls short as an attempt to explain what we are
really up to when using modal operators in natural language. To borrow
a felicitous phrase by Brandom:
The trouble with taking it that there is something that is successfully
represented by each purported representing is not just that it involves
commitment to a luxuriant ontology; ontological self-indulgence is a
comparatively harmless vice. But it can be symptomatic of a failure
to shoulder an explanatory burden.
(Brandom, 1994), p.71
Brandom addresses a different issue here, but the point is completely
general (one can even argue that for a platonist, possible worlds play
precisely the role of designata of hedged representings). Accepting all
60The fortunate simile is due to Larry Powers, quoted in (Stalnaker, 1984), p.43.
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kinds of new suspicious concrete entities is a common strategy in order
to bypass a request for an explanation of the import of a problematic
piece of discourse. A flamboyant ontology is often a price for keeping
the underlying theory of meaning simple—after expanding the domain of
existent concrete objects, any such discourse can be simply brushed aside
as unproblematically descriptive.
However, the fact that such an explanation is unavailable or at least
highly unsatisfactory in the case of abstract objects is just one of their
hallmarks, and by now we know why that should be so—their properties
are to a large extent determined by us and not by the world. That’s why I
find the price for an unfettered descriptivism to be too high, and especially
so in the case of possible-world realism—it prevents us from making sense
of modal discourse within a picture of language as a biological feature of
the human animal. There is no place for possible worlds as concrete objects
in such a picture and thus no use for the language game of describing them.
4.3.2. Possible worlds in semantic analysis
Once we have put possible worlds in their place, dissolving any remaining
doubts as to their ontological status as abstract objects, the question arises
about the language game they hail from. What I have in mind is the origin
of the identity criteria which enable the introduction of abstract objects as
objects in the first place. In familiar cases of abstract objects we can at least
gesture towards the language practice that is fostered by outsourcing one
of its elements to the abstract realm. The example of mathematics will,
once again, prove instructive.
In unstudied natural language numbers function exclusively as deter-
miners: there are no ‘ones’ or ‘twos’ by themselves, but only ‘one goat’ or
‘two microwave ovens’. And this is just as well when there is not much
more around than a mere bunch of things of any given kind. However,
when trade carts eventually get trundling between villages and, much
to our chagrin, taxes become collected, processing figures starts exact-
ing too high a toll on our mental resources. The solution is to separate
them from anything that doesn’t play any substantial role in the requisite
calculations—and this is how mathematics and with it, the number as an
abstract object, is born.61
61However, when platonist tendencies succeed in making the abstraction self-serving
by severing all its ties with the original practice, the abstraction may eventually become
unsustainable and implode. I suspect this is one of the reasons behind the spectacular
failure of the ‘New Math’ programme.
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As with numbers, so with voices, predilections, institutions, intentions
and itineraries. In each case we can readily think of a down-to-earth
rational activity involving exclusively concrete objects, upon which the
abstract talk indirectly supervenes. Note that the direction of explanation
is invariably from the abstract talk to the concrete one. Thus a parent faced
with the question ‘What is “bias”, mum?’ will probably answer something
like ‘That’s when you treat someone unfairly, darling.’ Observe as well
that such an explanation, while being perfectly adequate on its own merits,
doesn’t provide a reduction of the sort that would satisfy a Vienna Circle
member. For a number of reasons, I think we should probably withstand
the temptation of a general project of reducing abstract objects to some
better-behaved entities.
First, I am perfectly happy with abstract objects as they stand (and so
are most people, I should dare to suggest, as long as the word ‘ontology’
doesn’t make its entrance. Apparently, it is capable of scaring a person into
denial about her most innocuous habits.). Second, the spectacular failure
of reductionist programmes in the 20th century philosophy should make
us wary of such an undertaking’s chances of success. I think we had better
acknowledge the lesson—the posteriority of one language game to another
doesn’t necessarily imply mutual interdefinability of their vocabularies.
Despite these caveats, there is no denying that sometimes a convenient
paraphrase is readily available—the extreme case being theoretical notions
constructed by explicit definitions.62 This is also the case with Lewis and
Stalnaker, both of whom introduce a possible world as ‘a way the world
might have been’.63 The difference between them boils down to the fact that
while Lewis conceived of these ways as concrete giant objects, Stalnaker
explicitly rejected any attempts to recast this turn of words in more tangible
terms. For him, as for us, possible worlds are ‘abstract objects, whose
existence is inferred or abstracted from the activities of rational agents’64.
Only when the role that entertaining such possibilities plays in rational
agency has been specified will the analysis of modal notions in terms of
possible worlds really succeed in its explanatory task. In the meantime,
our comprehension of possible worlds will piggyback on our previous
modal intuitions, conjured up by the phrase ‘the way the world/things
might have been’. Something similar must have been on van Fraassen’s
mind when he characterised his stance on possible worlds semantics:
62For instance, the notion of a cardinal number sometimes is defined before introducing
ordinals by stipulating that card A = card B iff A and B are equipollent.
63See (Lewis, 1986a), p.2 and (Stalnaker, 1984), p.45.
64(Stalnaker, 1984),p.50
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I see the possible worlds machinery just as Duhem saw the rope-
and-pulley models of the English physicists: such fictions are useful
when giving an account of the surface phenomena—and there is, in
reality, nothing below the surface. In our case the phenomena are
the inferential relations among statements, attested in the inferential
behaviour of those engaged in such discourse.
(van Fraassen, 1976), pp.266-7
It is worth pointing out that an explanation of possible worlds (and thus
of our rudimentary modal operators) based on rational human activities
exceeds the scope of traditional semantic analysis. Rather than a specifica-
tion of truth conditions, it supplies a description of a practice which makes
clear why and how modal vocabulary is actually developed.
Both Lewis’s extreme realism and the shoulder-shrugging attitude typ-
ical of contemporary formal semantics plead for an exemption from the
obligation of providing an account of possibilities along Stalnaker’s lines.
And there is strictly speaking nothing wrong with such an approach, as
long as their proponents acknowledge its essential incompleteness. How-
ever, such candidness is not very common in the literature. Lewis, of
course, regarded modal talk simply as descriptive, so he felt no urge to
supplement his account; but most semanticists, without having recourse
to Lewis’s excuse, follow him in their unworried treatment of possible
worlds as the fundamental building blocks of their theories. Hence the
most they can aspire to is to define some more complex modal vocabulary
in terms of bare possibility. Of course, such analyses are not always with-
out merit (provided that their other semantic ingredients are non-trivial).
On the downside, however, they keep us in the dark about the ultimate
purport of modal talk, while coming to grips with it might well supply
the understanding necessary for linking the analysed expression with the
analysandum. This is how it can happen that after successfully slogging
through many a virtuosic semantic analysis, we have no clue as to what
function the analysed expression might possibly play in our linguistic lives.
Furthermore, it is usually assumed that modal logic models are theo-
retically neutral with respect to the study of modalities, perhaps because
of the very triviality of the definition of a possible world. However, in
Chapter 7 I shall argue that this might not be so. Just as any other scientific
model, Kripke frames are constructed upon theoretic pillars which to a
certain degree pre-shape the analyses carried out within the framework.
This is most notoriously reflected by the problems besetting their treatment
of mathematical knowledge as well as the implementation of quantified
modal logic. To pin down the limitations of this apparatus in modelling
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natural language, I think our attention must go beyond philosophical uses
of modal statements, which are technical and comparatively rare and so
can easily lead us to error about what we normally use such statements
for.
4.4. Similarity
Time has come to shed some light on what can be properly regarded as
the linchpin of Stalnaker-Lewis analysis—the notion of similarity under-
lying our ordering α. Up to now, we have only examined its structural
properties and showed how tinkering with some of them translated into
modifications in our conditional logic. These structural properties, of
course, only fix the truth values of a very reduced number of mostly trivial
counterfactuals, such as A  A or (A ∧ B)  B. To evaluate any really
interesting counterfactuals, we shall have to flesh out the details of our
ordering.
The relevant notion of similarity is meant to guide and inform this pro-
cess. It is not necessary for us to have clearer intuitions about the requisite
kind of similarity than about actual truth values of counterfactuals—it may
be one of those notions that are best explained by putting them to work.
Nonetheless, I do think that it should be possible to get some independent
grip on this concept if the theory purports to provide an explanation of
our use of counterfactuals. The notion of similarity being central in de-
termining truth values of counterfactuals, a coherent picture of the former
should enable us to understand what we are up to when entertaining and
asserting the latter.
For all what has been said, there is a wide consensus in the literature that
Stalnaker-Lewis theory, as it stands, fails to supply an adequate criterion
of similarity, which leaves it toothless when it comes to explanatory or
predictive tasks. In this section I shall explain how this came about and
what the consequences are for our search for theoretical alternatives.
4.4.1. A pragmatic question?
We have seen that Stalnaker introduced the notion of minimal difference
from the actual world in order to simulate on the ontological level the min-
imal belief revision mandated by the Ramsey test for evaluating indicative
conditionals.65 However, the guidelines for this minimal revision turn out
65(Stalnaker, 1968),p.45
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to be at least as elusive as those for the pertinent similarity comparisons.
Seldom are we told more than a few truism about ‘accommodating the
antecedent’ or not making ‘gratuitous changes to our belief system’. For
the account to really serve as an explanation of natural language condi-
tionals (Stalnaker’s self-confessed goal), the notion of ‘resemblance’ must
be made clearer.
Instead of doing that, though, Stalnaker resorted to a classical move
in language analysis handwaving—he banished the phenomenon to the
realm of pragmatics. The specification of the selection function f for condi-
tionals, the argument goes, is akin to the domain restriction for quantified
sentences. It varies from one context to another and is usually tacitly
shared among the participants in a conversation. According to Stalnaker,
the actual value of f will depend upon (presumably among other things)
‘the context of utterance, the purpose of the assertion and the beliefs of the
speaker or his community’66.
This is redolent of the strategy pursued by the liberal wing of coten-
ability theoreticians67 and it won’t do for exactly the same reasons. Our
room for manoeuvre when interpreting conditionals is not as wide as the
pragmatic picture seems to suggest. I am afraid that the analogy with
quantifier domain restriction cannot withstand closer scrutiny.
First of all, in the event of a communication failure due to diverging
domain assignments by participants in a linguistic exchange, there is al-
ways the option of making the domain explicit. Yet it is by no means clear
how such a clarification would look like in the corresponding case of a
conditional.
Second, settling on the domain only fixes the truth conditions of a quan-
tified sentence, not its truth value. It still remains to be checked whether
the truth conditions really obtain. However, specifying f is enough for
evaluating a conditional. To preserve the analogy, the context should not
contribute the entire f , but only some rule for ascertaining it.
And third, even in the absence of the above problems, the main point
made about the metalinguistic liberal wing applies also here—placing a
language phenomenon on the pragmatic side of the divide doesn’t exempt
us from the duty to come up with an account of the phenomenon. Ad-
mittedly, to say that the quantification domain is in each case restricted to
the set of contextually salient or otherwise relevant objects is not to say
very much, but we can still make much better sense of what it means to be
contextually relevant for an object than for a similarity ordering of possible
66(Stalnaker, 1968), p.51
67See page 51.
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worlds. I suspect that the latter notion is incomprehensible without further
elucidation.
4.4.2. Lewis’s take on similarity
From his remarks in (Lewis, 1973a) it clearly transpires that, as opposed
to Stalnaker, Lewis had something very close to the everyday notion of
similarity on his mind when he first advanced his theory of counterfactuals:
[...] any problems posed by my use of comparative similarity dif-
fer only in degree, not in kind, from problems about similarity that
we would be stuck with no matter what we did about counterfactu-
als. Somehow, we do have a familiar notion of comparative overall
similarity, even of comparative similarity of big, complicated, varie-
gated things like whole people, whole cities, or even—I think—whole
possible worlds.
(Lewis, 1973a), p.92
Even though Stalnaker wasn’t able to spell out the notion of similarity he
relied on in any detail, he acknowledged its technical character by linking it
with the ‘methodological policies’ for modifying our beliefs in the presence
of new evidence, required for the Ramsey test. Lewis, on the other hand,
took ‘resemblance’ quite literally—as he conceived possible worlds along
the lines of concrete objects, the option of making use of our unstudied
intuitions about similarity between such objects was open for him.
More than the question as to whether our everyday notion of similarity
was germane to counterfactual reasoning at all, it was its vagueness that
most occupied Lewis. Against those who might be inclined to reject his
account on the grounds of the high context-dependency of the concept of
similarity, Lewis argued that given the widely acknowledged vagueness of
counterfactuals, it was only desirable to analyse them in terms of another
vague notion and make them ‘sway together’68. Take another example of
Quine’s, this time about the Korean war:
(61) If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom
bomb.
(62) If Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults.
68(Lewis, 1973a), p.92
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That each of this pair of clashing counterfactuals can separately be deemed
reasonable is, according to Lewis, due to a switch in the vagueness resolu-
tion of our notion of similarity69—we are inclined to accept (61) focusing
exclusively on Caesar’s temperament, while with (62) the relevant compar-
ison criteria are extended to cover also other traits of Caesar’s personality,
such as the actual limits on his knowledge of the art of war. We are not
obliged to stick with any one resolution of such vagueness, of course, as
long as we measure up to the reasonable expectations of our interlocutors.
Nevertheless, most attacks came from a thoroughly different angle.
Some of them complained that Lewis’s theory couldn’t account for coun-
terfactuals stating that a tiny alteration of a certain condition would have
brought about a significant change in the unfolding of the events. They
typically follow the pattern of Kit Fine’s nuclear holocaust argument:
(63) If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear
holocaust.70
Suppose there is, fortunately, never going to be a nuclear holocaust as
things stand. Then Lewis’s theory predicts (63) to be false, despite our
intuitions to the contrary, because a world β where, say, the wiring of the
button fails and the Earth as we know it is preserved, will on any account
be considered more similar to the actual one than any other world γwhere
the holocaust does occur (here it is essential that the incident that restores
the normal course of events at β be of marginal importance as regards
similarity comparisons with γ). But sometimes we definitely do want to
say that certain events would have seriously derailed the progression of
the world history.
A related criticism also concerned the weight of actual matters of fact
in similarity assessments. This time, however, the inclusion of the offend-
ing fact in the counterfactual scenario was deemed gratuitous rather than
outright illicit. The example is by P. Tichy´:
[...] consider a man —call him Jones— who is possessed of the follow-
ing dispositions as regards wearing his hat. Bad weather invariably
induces him to wear his hat. Fine weather, on the other hand, affects
him neither way: on fine days he puts his hat on or leaves it on the
peg, completely at random. Suppose, moreover, that actually the
weather is bad, so Jones is wearing his hat.
(Tichy´, 1976), p.271
69(Lewis, 1979), p.457
70(Fine, 1975), p.452
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We would probably like to say that
(64) If the weather were good, Jones might not be wearing his hat.
is to be regarded as true in the proposed scenario. Yet if Jones’s actual
wearing of the hat should be counted as a relevant respect of similarity,
then the tie between good-weather worlds with Jones wearing and not
wearing his hat will be broken in favour of the former, contrary to our
intuitions.71
Lewis rose to the challenge. He answered his critics by acknowledging
the intuitions but denying that they posed a real difficulty for his theory,
as the flexibility built in the notion of similarity was able to accommodate
them. Such a reply was, of course, slightly disingenuous. We have seen
that when selling his theory, Lewis at least intimated that no outlandish
similarity relation would be needed to make it work. However, Fine’s and
Tichy´’s examples showed that the resemblance criteria standardly govern-
ing counterfactuals differed radically from those used in comparisons of
everyday objects.
Aware of this fact, Lewis set out to specify the criteria yielding what he
called ‘the standard resolution of vagueness’. After a thorough analysis
of Fine’s example, he came up with the following four constraints on our
choice of the closest antecedent world:
1. It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse
violations of law.
2. It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal
region throughout which perfect match of particular fact pre-
vails.
3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple
violations of law.
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity
of particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.
(Lewis, 1979), p.472
The basic difficulty anyone can see with this account is its blithely ad hoc
character. It is reminiscent of F. Bacon’s haphazard inquiry into the nature
of heat in Novum Organum. In the absence of any organising principle,
Bacon ended up with an unmanageable list of all possible phenomena
71The famous zoo escape example discussed in (Kratzer, 1989), p.126, has approxi-
mately the same structure. See also the criticism in (Jackson, 1977).
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bearing some relation to it, ranging from burning candles to fresh manure.
The bottom line is that proceeding in this manner doesn’t bring us any
closer to a proper understanding of heat or, for that matter, counterfactuals.
Despite the vagueness of our everyday similarity criteria, we can more
often than not easily pin down its source. Sometimes we judge two objects
similar, because they can be used interchangeably for a given purpose.
Sometimes it is because they share some perceptual marks that are oth-
erwise relevant—for instance, two faces resemble each other if they have
traits in common that are crucial in human recognition of other people.
Sometimes similarity judgements are meant as warnings about the possi-
bility of confusion of two different things. However, what kind of practical
purpose might serve the similarity criteria set forth by Lewis? You might
try to argue, following cotenability theoreticians, that they underscore the
special status of laws, but it is by no means clear why they should do so in
such a convoluted manner.72
Moreover, of course, not a few eyebrows were raised at Lewis’s refer-
ence to miracles. Certainly you don’t have to accept unfathomable natural
events in order to evaluate counterfactuals? Lewis was perhaps trying to
dispel such fears when he observed that the events in question came across
as miracles only from the vantage point of the actual world—of course they
did conform to the laws of the world in which they took place.73 However,
I for one do not feel reassured by these remarks. We only inhabit the actual
world and we evaluate counterfactuals with respect to it—there is no other
viewpoint for us to take. I fear that having to postulate zany contexts for
consequent evaluation in order to make sense of counterfactuals brings us
dangerously close to the bygone attitude that dismissed them as mere ex-
ercise in irrelevant fantasising. Lewis’s theory once again fails to identify
the role counterfactuals play in our intellectual and/or linguistic life.74
Lewis, none the less, didn’t really seem to mind about this kind of
objections, as long as the similarity relation thus calibrated should give the
right results. Which, unfortunately, it didn’t.
72As we have seen (page 63), Lewis roughly shared Ramsey’s 1928 conception of laws,
under which they amounted to axioms/theorems in the best true deductive systems in
a world. Leaving aside the plausibility of such a construal, it cannot straightforwardly
explain the constraints 1-4 in terms of some more intuitive respect of similarity, such
as match of particular matter of fact, and neither does Lewis attempt an exhaustive
explanation along these lines.
73(Lewis, 1979), p.468
74Similar criticism is voiced in (Woods, 1997), pp.57 and 92.
4.4. SIMILARITY 103
Take for instance Tichy´’s example and modify it as follows:75 upon
waking up every morning and before checking the actual weather, Jones
flips a coin. If it’s bad weather, he puts on his hat as before, but if the
weather is good, he only puts on the hat if the coin has come up heads.
Today, the coin came up heads, it is bad weather and Jones is wearing
the hat. But this time we would like to say that if the weather had been
good, Jones would still be wearing the hat. Particular facts (the outcome
of flipping the coin) are, all of a sudden, highly relevant for evaluating
counterfactuals.
There is a whole host of examples of this kind. They show the impor-
tance of causal interconnections between events, which Lewis’s theory of
similarity fails to bring out.76 In general, any particular matter of fact not
causally dependent on the falsity of the antecedent can become relevant in
evaluating a counterfactual:
(65) Even if we had left on time, we would still have missed the train
(as there was a spectacular traffic jam in front of the station).
These and related concerns led Stalnaker to admit that the theoretical
notion of similarity was to a great extent devoid of content77. Lewis, as we
have seen, seemed to have favoured an ad hoc approach—any constraints
whatsoever yielding the correct truth values could be identified with the
relevant respects of similarity. The upshot is, again in Stalnaker’s words,
that
[...] a formal semantic analysis, by itself, is intended as neither a
solution to nor a dismissal of the problem of counterfactual condi-
tionals. [...] It is intended to provide a framework for the formulation
of the substantive problems, and for precise statements of alternative
solutions to them.
(Stalnaker, 1984), p.122
This is exactly what Stalnaker-Lewis theory has become in modern formal
semantics—a scaffolding on an empty construction site. However, it is
difficult to put such scaffolding in place before even knowing how the
final edifice should look like. It might very well so happen that the pre-
installed framework should obstruct rather than aid attempts to come up
with novel solutions to the problem of counterfactuals.
75This modified example is due to F. Veltman and F. Mulkens, see (Veltman, 2005),
p.164.
76Actually, Lewis hoped to analyse causality in terms of counterfactual dependence,
as yielded by the above constraints on the similarity relation: (Lewis, 1973c).
77(Stalnaker, 1984), p.129
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4.5. Conclusion: cotenability vs. similarity
To close our analysis of Stalnaker-Lewis account of counterfactuals, I will
briefly compare it to a standard cotenability theory. Lewis put forward a
definition of cotenability in terms of comparative similarity as follows:78
Cotenability from similarityJBK is cotenable with the counterfactual assumption JAK at α iffJBKα = [α]R ∨ (∃β ∈ JAKα)∀γ(γ α β ⊃ γ ∈ JBK)79
In other words, JBK is cotenable with JAK at α if B is true in all worlds
accessible from α or if some A-world is closer to α than any ¬B-world.
It is a consequence of this definition that A  C is true at α iff there is
a collateral premise ∆ ∈ P(K) cotenable with JAK at α such that JAK ∩ ∆
logically implies JCK. Also, if JBK is cotenable with JAK, then A  B
is true, but not vice versa. The role of laws, an essential ingredient in
metalinguistic theories of counterfactuals, is not explicitly distinguished
from that of ordinary matters of fact, but of course it is doing its work at
the level of the similarity ordering of worlds.
Furthermore, given this definition, we can in turn easily define the
similarity ordering from cotenability as follows:
Similarity from cotenability
β ≺α γ iff all propositions cotenable at αwith {γ} are also coten-
able with {β}, but not vice versa.80
Of course, given the conclusions of the previous section, these results,
despite their formal beauty, do not really constitute any progress towards
the solution of Goodman’s puzzle. In Stalnaker’s words, quoted above,
similarity only provides a framework for rephrasing this problem, but
doesn’t offer any help as to how to tackle it. We would first have to refine
the relation of similarity in order to get a grip on cotenability.
While Stalnaker-Lewis analysis provided a well-behaved and beautiful
logic (probably the main reason behind its success), cotenability theories
78(Lewis, 1973a), p.57
79This definition assumes almost-connectedness of α. For a generalisation of this
definition, see A.2.
80This broadly anticipates the strategy that A. Kratzer will use to provide a more
adequate grounding for the similarity relation: see Section 5.2.1.
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are in a better position to explain why we would want to use counterfactu-
als in the first place.81 However, the question as to why the tacit premises
in the arguments hinted at by our counterfactuals are so ineffable remains
as baﬄing as ever.
81Hence the great success of Kratzer’s theory subjunctives, which combines the best
part of each of these two approaches (see Section 5.2). Kratzer’s theory is also one of the
reasons why I think that the arguments in (Fine, 1975) in favour of a principled difference
between cotenability and similarity theories are not conclusive.

Chapter 5
Beyond similarity
Despite its self-confessed lack of content, Stalnaker-Lewis’s theory cast a
long shadow. Most theories of conditionals, and especially subjunctives,
that came afterwards had to measure themselves against what became a
benchmark in the field. They either tried to glean an analysis of the notion
of similarity from independent considerations (Kratzer, Lycan, Gauker)
or pin down in a non-trivial way how the context for consequent evalua-
tion is determined (Veltman’s update semantics as well as causal network
theories: Tichy´, Schultz, Higgs and others). We shall examine to what
extent these analyses can escape the charge of vacuity brought against
similarity semantics. Unfortunately, we shall be forced to conclude that
the improvement has not been very impressive.
5.1. Ad hoc selection: Lycan and Gauker
We shall now have a look at two particularly egregious examples of philo-
sophical theorising, which not only do not attempt to shed any light on how
the ingredients necessary for the evaluation of a conditional are retrieved
from a context of utterance, but also effectively trivialise the analysis by
letting these ingredients fluctuate wildly across contexts. In other words,
the selection of relevant alternatives, among which conditionals are called
to distinguish and which up to now have been represented by possible
worlds, will no longer be guided by unfathomable respects of similarity—
even worse, it will be almost completely at the utterer’s discretion. More-
over, originally devised with indicatives in mind, these theories do not
devote enough attention to their complicated relation with subjunctives,
failing to give an acceptable account of the distinction.
107
108 CHAPTER 5. BEYOND SIMILARITY
5.1.1. Selection by envisaging events: Lycan
Lycan made much of the fact that he replaced possible worlds with events
as the cornerstone of his semantic theory, but all in all, this is quite an
insignificant change with respect to Stalnaker-Lewis. Events, as Lycan
conceives them, are not punctual temporal occurrences, but simply ‘cir-
cumstances’ or partial states of affairs. Any theoretical achievement of
such an event theory can thus be effortlessly emulated by possible-world
semantics, by effectively treating events as equivalence classes of possible
worlds (either explicitly or implicitly within a truth condition clause).1
Let us state the truth conditions Lycan attributes to a simple conditional
‘If A, C’:
Truth conditions conditionals Lycan
C if A iff (∀e ∈ R)(In(e,A) ⊃ In(e,C))2
Here e ranges over events, In(e,P) means that the proposition P is true of
(or in) the event e and R is the ‘reference-class’ restricting the universal
quantifier domain to a specific set of events ‘envisaged by the utterer’. The
truth condition says that a conditional is true if its consequent is true in all
the events envisaged by the speaker in which the antecedent is true.
R functions, in view of the above, just as the smallest antecedent-permit-
ting sphere (making the limit assumption) in Lewis’s original formulation
of his system3. The difference is only that, events being partial states of
affairs, there might be envisaged events in which neither the antecedent nor
its negation is true, and thus we cannot simply stipulate that a conditional
‘If A, C’ is true if ‘A ⊃ C’ is true throughout R.4 However, Lycan’s truth
condition is the natural generalisation of the latter idea.
Just as Lewis’s antecedent-permitting spheres, R can shift considerably
between and even within contexts, thus avoiding a strict interpretation
of the conditional under evaluation. However, on Lewis’s account, these
1Nine years before the publication of the first version of Lycan’s account in (Lycan,
1984), D. Lewis had already splendidly explained the syntactic phenomena upon which
Lycan constructed his theory, showing that they constitute only a marginal fragment in a
much broader pattern, in his (Lewis, 1975). However, although (Lycan, 2001) references
Lewis’s paper, it never addresses the challenge it poses to the event theory. More on
adverbs of quantification in section 5.2.
2(Lycan, 2001),p.18
3See (Lewis, 1973a), p.19. A sphere is simply a set of all possible worlds up to a certain
degree of similarity to the actual one.
4That is, unless we accept what Lycan calls ‘the Strict Relevance Restriction’, in which
case the conditions coincide completely. Lycan is loath to reject this restriction outright,
admitting that it is sometimes triggered in natural language.
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shifts are systematically regimented by an underlying system of spheres
(or, equivalently, by a similarity ordering) construed as a representation of
certain objective criteria of comparison. No such objective foundations are
relied upon by Lycan, who allows R to vary literally at the utterer’s whim,
despite affirming that ‘the delineation of the reference class is a matter
that must be settled fairly crisply before any truly serious adjudication of
the theory can be achieved.’5 Surprisingly, though, he doesn’t make any
systematic attempt at such a delineation in the whole monograph. The
most specific thing he gets to say about R is that it perhaps should include
all events ‘a reasonable person would have envisaged’. Vague though this
is, it still doesn’t manage to solve the problem, as any reasonable analysis
of ‘reasonableness’ will admit of margins within which reasonable people
may envisage different events. We are never told what drives people to
envisage one event rather than another. Worse still, we are never told what
drives people to envisage events at all.
On Lycan’s theory, indicative and subjunctive conditionals differ in
that an utterer of the former ‘holds fixed a certain contextually determined
salient fact’, while an utterer of the latter signals that he envisages events
beyond such a fact. So, in case of Adams’s pair:
(66) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did.
(67) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, no one else would have.
someone asserting (66) envisages only events in which Kennedy is assas-
sinated (the salient fact in this context). When uttering (67), on the other
hand, you are making it explicit that you want to consider other events
as well. However, considering such new events has the magical effect of
rubbing all of the former ones out from R, as they would render (67) false.
Lycan is silent on how this effect comes about.
And, of course, ‘conversationally determined salient fact’ is as vague
as it possibly could be. Take an example by Mackie6: imagine you are in a
room with a few people who have had to take a thorough English language
test in order to be present. Then you can say both
(68) If Khrushchev were here, not everybody in the room would speak
English.
and
(69) If Khrushchev is here, then he speaks English after all.
5(Lycan, 2001),p.24.
6(Mackie, 1962),p.71
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Following Lycan, a person uttering (69) perseveres in her belief that every-
body in the room has passed the test and that the test was reliable. But
why should this fact be deemed more salient than the fact that Khrushchev
doesn’t speak any English, as (68) takes for granted?
All this is not meant to deny that there are valid intuitions behind
Lycan’s position—it serves rather to point out that his theory boils down
to little more than a few casual hunches. The utterly ad hoc character of the
parameters used for conditional evaluation prevents it from being a real
account of subjunctives or, for that matter, conditionals in general. I shall
conclude with Lycan’s criticism of Adams’s explanation of the Kennedy
examples:
But the qualification raises questions about how we are to determine
what background information we are allowed to and/or forced to
count, and a theory of the straight/boxarrow distinction is supposed
to answer such questions rather than raising them.
(Lycan, 2001), p.149
I couldn’t have put it better myself.
5.1.2. Selection by abstract contexts: Gauker
While Lycan remains blithe about the lack of content of his fundamental
definitions and entertainingly triumphant when his impromptu criteria
score points against more solid proposals, Gauker doesn’t even mind his
theory going seriously awry. While most philosophers of language try first
to carefully induce their conjectures from linguistic data and subsequently
iron out any outstanding wrinkles, for Gauker the predictions of his coarse
semantic theory seem to trump most conflicting evidence.
The central theoretical notion in Gauker’s definitive theory of condi-
tionals as exposed in (Gauker, 2005) is that of context. Here context, in
opposition to common practice in semantics, shouldn’t be understood as
the actual environment of a conversational exchange7, but rather the formal
value of a variable used by the semantic theory to evaluate assertions. In its
simplest form, Gauker’s context is simply a consistent set of literals. These
so-called ‘primitive’ contexts can also become collected in sets and form
7Such environment is rather termed ‘situation’ or ‘circumstance’ and seems to corre-
spond roughly to the ‘situational elements of the context’ from (Gauker, 1998). Situations
only partly determine contexts proper.
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1st-level multicontexts, the latter can in turn form 2nd-level multicontexts,
and so on and so forth.8
Unlike Lycan, Gauker severs the context pertinent to a conversation
from the particular belief states or envisagings of the participants in it,
making it an objective feature of a conversation. The context is somehow
jointly determined by both the actual circumstances of the conversation and
the shared conversational goals of the participants. An interlocutor’s ideas
about what the actual context is are represented by his take on the latter,
which may or may not coincide with or, for that matter, include the context
really pertaining to the conversation. However, the price for this separation
between the objective context and a subjective take on it is that the former
notion becomes pretty elusive, especially since there is no straightforward
way of gleaning it from the circumstances and conversational goals.
The function of an assertion is similar to what a possible-world seman-
tics along Stalnaker’s lines might posit: to narrow down each interlocutor’s
take on the context. Gauker also replaces truth simpliciter with assertibility
in context as the linchpin of his semantic analysis. A literal is assertible in
a primitive context only if it is a member of such context, and it is deniable
if its negation is assertible. A literal is assertible in a multicontext only if
it’s assertible in each of the lower-level contexts that comprise it. Logically
compound sentences follow, for the most part, the expected evaluation
rules.
Let us now turn to conditionals. Here are Gauker’s definitions:
Indicative conditionals
A→ C is assertible in a context Γ if in all contexts ∆ ∈ Γ or ∆ = Γ
such that A is assertible in ∆, C is also assertible in ∆.
Subjunctive conditionals
A > C is assertible in context Γ0 with respect to a structure
Θ, where Θ contains the context immediately relevant to the
conversation Γ0 as well as its less relevant expansions, if A→ C
is assertible in all least expansions of Γ0 that include at least one
lower-level context in which A is assertible.
In case of indicatives with non-conditional operands (I will address
nested conditionals later), contexts thus conceived serve a purpose by and
large akin to Lycan’s reference-classes built out of partial states of affairs
8(Gauker, 2005), pp.12-24. A higher-lever context can also contain elements corre-
sponding to different levels.
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and as such can be roughly adequately rendered in possible-word seman-
tics (despite Gauker’s objections). We can again represent a primitive
context as a partial world (defined, say, as an equivalence class of possible
worlds). Then a 1st-level multicontext will amount to a set of such partial
worlds, just as Lycan’s reference-class. In this particular case, Lycan’s and
Gauker’s evaluation conditions coincide exactly.9 And while this time the
set of relevant possibilities is defined independently from the mind of the
utterer (which is undeniable progress with respect to Lycan), we still have
no independent grip on how this set is constructed.
One difference between the proposals is that for Lycan the utterance
of a conditional forces the speaker to envisage at least one event in which
the antecedent is true. Gauker doesn’t accept this constraint, as his defi-
nition of validity in terms of assertibility-preservation requires contexts to
remain unchanged from premises to conclusion, whatever form they may
have. This leads him to accept that indicative conditionals are vacuously
assertible in a context whenever the antecedent is not assertible in any of
the subcontexts, with all the difficulties that such a position brings in its
wake.
Gauker’s assertibility condition for subjunctives is perhaps less intu-
itively clear. The basic idea is that when an indicative conditional is only
vacuously assertible in a context, we can sometimes find larger contexts,
‘less relevant’ to our present purposes, which do contain a subcontext sus-
taining the antecedent. A subjunctive is assertible in the original context if
the corresponding indicative is assertible in all the minimally augmented
ones.
We have seen that Lycan’s explanation of the indicative/subjunctive
distinction also involved expansion of the reference class beyond a certain
salient fact to which an utterer of the indicative held firmly; the problem
being that this relaxation led to an inexplicable erasure of certain events
from the originally envisaged R. Gauker doesn’t have this problem—
in case of a difference in truth values, such as with the Adams’s pair
(66) and (67), the original context is by hypothesis devoid of antecedent-
subcontexts, so there are no annoying subcontexts to shed. However, this
comes at a price. For Gauker, when (67) is assertible, then not only (66) is,
but also
(66*) If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, then no one else did.
as both (66) and (66*) will be vacuously true.
9This may serve as a reminder that simply substituting ‘assertibility’ for ‘truth’ or vice
versa alone doesn’t necessarily make for much difference in a semantic theory.
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By now it will have dawned on a keen reader that the difference between
Gauker and Lycan (again, leaving embedded conditionals aside) is merely
superficial. Gauker will not, of course, deny that we tend to regard (66) as
non-vacuously true, but he will posit a context shift between the utterances
of (66) and (67). Just as with Lycan, context-shifts are going to occur
whenever Gauker needs them to vindicate his theory.
Surprisingly enough, this brings Gauker’s theory closer to classical sim-
ilarity semantics than he might be willing to concede. Everybody acknowl-
edges the presence of some kind of contextual shifts in non-monotonic con-
ditional reasoning; the really interesting question is to explain why they
take place and, if possible, spell out the rules that govern them. Similarity
semantics is founded on the presumption that the shifts are triggered by
antecedents and regimented by a contrived similarity relation. This is ad-
mittedly not to say much, but it is still more interesting than what Gauker
has to say about the shifts (virtually nothing). For instance, if there is a
shift between (67) and (66), why don’t we switch to one of those minimally
expanded antecedent-permitting contexts in the alleged Θ?
This way of looking at Gauker’s theory also takes the edge off the logic
ensuing from his definitions, which sets his conditional apart as a pecu-
liar blend of the material and strict conditional. Gauker’s account vali-
dates most traditional inference patterns that Stalnaker-Lewis theory was
specifically designed to avoid. However, this is only because of Gauker’s
insistent prohibition of contextual shifts. If we took them into account, the
difference in logic would arguably be much less strident. Again, logical
questions frequently depend on the phenomena we aim to model, which
gives us quite some room for manoeuvre. Postulation of divergent logics
thus doesn’t necessarily imply any profound contrast in the underlying
theoretical approach.
This is borne out by the disparity between indicative and subjunctive
logic embraced by Gauker. It is due to the fact that Θ provides a model for
contextual shifts and, as a result, a basis for a standard similarity ordering
(however, the notion of a ‘smallest expansion’ would first need to be made
more precise). The analogous indicative shifts are, none the less, simply
left unaccounted for by the theory—thence the diverging logic. All in all,
there are good reasons to think that conditionals are conventional devices
whose task is to accomplish shifts of our take on the context, however they
may further be construed, so banishing them as a matter of principle from
the realm of conditional logic may be unfortunate.
Of course, Gauker would undoubtedly object to such an oversimplified
rendering of his theory, and he would probably be right. In particular,
his theory can elegantly handle conditionals embedded to any degree of
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depth by means of a nested system of contexts. This complicates the logic
and sometimes gives rise to doubts whether the results accord with our
intuitions10, but on the whole Gauker’s system is on this point much more
flexible than competing semantic theories.
However, this flexibility is obtained only thanks to the fact that the
contexts are always and on every stage perfectly geared for the particular
sentence under evaluation. Let us begin with primitive contexts: as we do
not know how they are generated, they do not offer an independent handle
on the notion of assertibility—literals are not assertible because they are in
the context set, but they are in the context set, because they are assertible.
According to Gauker, multicontexts make their entrance for example
when indecision, unpredictability, didactic considerations or even fairness
is involved. It is by no means clear how this can be accommodated with
the purported mind-independence of the contexts. But more importantly,
we still do not have any grip on the constraints on the generation of such
complex contexts. Very likely it is our intuitions about assertibility of
conditionals that guide this process. Moreover, these allegedly objective
contexts can sometimes split for different people.11
When we want to assert embedded conditionals, nested contexts again
appear out of the blue, giving us just what we need to evaluate them. And
the same casual approach also characterises the introduction of the system
of contexts Θ that governs the evaluation of subjunctives. The system is ad
hoc all the way up.
5.1.3. Instead of a conclusion
Lycan and Gauker’s theories are only illustrations of a broader trend in
some of the literature on conditionals. Unfortunately, you can go a long
way without saying anything substantial or at least verifiable about the
topic. And once you’re done, you can always start comparing the formal
properties of different nearly-vacuous theories. This is a huge boon for
many a scholar desperate to get another paper published; for the rest of
mortals it boils down to an enormous waste of time, effort and, more often
than not, public resources.
10My reservations concern above all the interpretation of ‘weak validity’, redo-
lent of Lycan’s various restrictions that were triggered ad hoc in conversational set-
tings. Moreover, some intuitively acceptable inference patterns come out invalid on
Gauker’s semantics. An example is And-If, called ‘exportation’ in (Gauker, 2005), p.121:
(A∧ B)→ C |= A→ (B→ C). Gauker labels it as valid, but I think that’s due to oversight.
11See Gauker’s treatment of Gibbard’s puzzle: (Gauker, 2005), p.103.
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5.2. Premise Semantics
In his (Lewis, 1975), D. Lewis pioneered a stunningly new approach to
conditional sentences. According to this theory, certain if-clauses function
exclusively as domain restrictors of (possibly implicit) natural language
quantifiers. Thus in a sentence such as
(70) Always, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it now and then.
we have an adverb ‘always’ quantifying over cases (conceived as ordered
pairs of objects) and an if-clause restricting the domain of quantification
to the relation of donkey owners and donkeys. Lewis argued that such
ifs couldn’t be plausibly equated to any binary sentence operator, barring
a considerable overhaul of their standard logic. He concluded that such
if-clauses didn’t have any meaning apart from their task in restricting the
adverb.
Lewis preferred to embrace polysemy rather than bite the bullet and
explore the theoretical opportunities his novel insight offered for the study
of conditionals. He seems to have overestimated the concomitant danger
for the role classical logic and its material conditional played in the seman-
tics of indicatives, to which he was firmly wedded. It was thus only one
of Lewis’s most talented students, Angelika Kratzer, who rose to the chal-
lenge of extending the promising restrictor approach to all conditionals.
Even though I will raise some objections to this approach in what follows,
Kratzer’s work proved impressively fruitful and set a new paradigm in
natural language semantics.
5.2.1. Kratzer on modals
Kratzer’s theory of conditionals is an application of Lewis’s insight about
restrictive if-clauses to her own theory of modals as peculiar quantifiers
over possible worlds. The main theoretical goals of Kratzer’s approach to
modals comprised an explanation12
i) of the perceived polysemy between their epistemic, deontic, and other
uses
ii) of our ability to reason non-trivially from inconsistent sets of premises.
The first problem was addressed by putting forward a relational theory
of modals. According to Kratzer, each modal expresses a certain relation
12(Kratzer, 1977), pp.9-16
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between the modal scope (that is, the proposition filling in its explicit ar-
gument place) and a pragmatically determined (and often implicit) modal
restriction or premise set (a set of propositions against which the modal
scope is evaluated).13 So the perceived difference in meaning between
(71) He must finish the work by one o’clock, or he gets fired.
and
(72) He must (have) finish(ed) the work by one o’clock, it’s pretty easy.
is due to a different value (epistemic and deontic, respectively) the modal
restriction takes in each case, rather than to a plurality of core meanings of
‘must’. Resorting to pragmatics is quite plausible here, as Kratzer points
out that the posited elliptic element can usually be brought to the fore by
an explicit phrase beginning with ‘in view of’.14
In the most simple cases, ‘musts’ will be deemed true if the modal scope
logically follows from the premise set provided by the modal restriction,
and ‘cans’ (or, for that matter, ‘mays’) will be true if the modal scope is
compatible with it. From the point of view of the classical modal logic, a
consistent premise set therefore yields the set of worlds accessible from the
actual one by the relation R that is used to interpret the standard modal
operators.
Formally, Kratzer defines a function f : K → P(P(K)), called conversa-
tional background, which assigns a premise set to each possible world.15 We
now obtain the following formal rendering of the above truth condition:
TC musts Kratzer formalJMust AK f = {k ∈ K | (⋂ f (k) ⊆ JAK)}
and for can/may
TC cans Kratzer formalJCan AK f = {k ∈ K | ⋂( f (k) ∪ {JAK}) , ∅)}.
13Hence the term ‘premise semantics’, actually coined by Lewis in (Lewis, 1981).
14(Kratzer, 1977), p.6
15This is only to mean that premise sets can vary across different situations—a con-
versational background should be viewed as assigning one such set to each conversation
within which the modalised statement is asserted. By setting K as the domain of f ,
Kratzer can make modals and conditionals work within sentences expressing traditional
propositions. However, we will presently see that there are good reasons to require a
more fine-grained domain for f .
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These truth conditions can be further complicated in order to account
for graded possibility. Sometimes, one wants to order the different alterna-
tives compatible with a given premise set according to a certain criterion,
such as likelihood or closeness to some ideal. That’s why you can say
things like
(73) The cook as well as the maid may have murdered the postman.
However, the maid is more likely to be the murderer, as she had
had a long-standing feud with him.
Another, less obvious application of graded modality is provided by de-
ontic interpretations:
(74) You must return the stolen toothbrush to the store.
is true if returning the toothbrush is the course of action most compatible
with a certain moral ideal (the fact that graded modality is needed here
follows from the fact that none of the live possibilities is compatible with
the ideal as a whole—the toothbrush cannot simply get unstolen.)
Kratzer treats such cases by resorting to two different conversational
backgrounds:16
1. Modal base f : as before, it delimits the entire range of relevant possi-
bilities in a given context of evaluation.
2. Ordering source g: imposes an ordering upon the set of possible worlds
admitted by the modal base.
I will sometimes refer to the set of worlds not ruled out by the premise
set f (k) as f -accessible worlds for k. An ordering source g(k) being a
premise set, that is, a set of propositions, the intended ordering is defined
by positing that a world i is ‘at least as possible as’ j with respect to g(k) if
it supports all propositions from g(k) that j supports and possibly more.
Ordering induced by g(k)
For i, j, k ∈ K, i ≤g(k) j ≡de f {p | p ∈ g(k) ∧ j ∈ p} ⊆ {p | p ∈ g(k) ∧ i ∈ p}
This ordering will in general permit both ties and incomparabilities, so
it might look like a partial order, but the failure of antisymmetry means
that it is only guaranteed to be a preorder. However, a partial order can
of course be defined in terms of it so as to match the most general type of
16(Kratzer, 1981b)
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similarity ordering.17 Kratzer’s self-acknowledged goal was to reconstruct
the similarity logic for counterfactuals with theoretical building blocks
better-suited for the task.18
According to Kratzer, for the deontic necessity from the example (74)
to be true it suffices that you wind up returning the toothbrush in all the
worlds closest to the ideal. For sheer possibility the ordering may just as
well be ignored; for likelihood some intermediate criterion can be devised.
The truth condition for each modal will vary accordingly. Kratzer takes it
upon herself to show how the semantic import of different natural language
modalities can be rendered in this framework.
5.2.2. The restrictor approach: indicatives
To combine the above account of modals with Lewis’s treatment of re-
strictive if-clauses, two preparatory steps are called for. First, we have to
realise that Kratzer’s approach enables us to conceive modals along the
lines of Lewis’s adverbs of quantification, as quantifying over the set of
possibilities not ruled out by an often tacit premise set supplied by a modal
base. And second, we have to posit an elliptic modal in the consequent
of many conditionals with apparently non-restrictive if-clauses, even if on
the face of it, such conditionals don’t contain any modal vocabulary. This
is not utterly implausible, because most of these cases will be of universal
quantification, which is often left implicit in non-modal discourse as well.
Once these two steps are carried out, everything falls into place.
Let us begin with the more simple case of indicatives. Kratzer contends
that any bare conditional such as
(75) If the lights in his study are on, Roger is home.
should be regarded as implicitly modalised:
(75m) If the lights in his study are on, Roger must be at home.19
Now you can apply Lewis’s insight in a straightforward way. Your
premise set (consisting, say, of propositions like ‘Nobody but Roger uses
the study’, ‘Lights are on only if there are people in the house’, etc.) carves
out a subset of K that serves as a domain of quantification for the tacit
modal. Supposing for the sake of the example that there is no need for
17See Section 4.2.5
18(Kratzer, 1989), p.126
19(Kratzer, 1991), p.98
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grading the modal force and thus for an ordering source, the intended re-
striction can then be accomplished by simply enriching the above premise
set with the proposition expressed by the antecedent:
TC if-must KratzerJIf A, must CK f ,g = {k ∈ K | f (k) ∪ JAK ⊆ JCK}.
In general, a modal statement with a conditional restriction will be
true whenever the consequent comes out true with respect to the pertinent
premise set enriched with the proposition corresponding to the antecedent.
General TC ifs KratzerJIf A, CK f ,g = JCK f ∗,g,
where f ∗(k) = f (k) ∪ JAK f ,g for all k ∈ K.20
But can this account really provide a general treatment for all indicative
conditionals? I will argue that there are a few difficulties that must be
addressed in order to make it work.
First, I am yet to be convinced that all bare indicatives are implicitly
modalised, unless we stretch our notion of modality beyond recognition.
Admittedly, many conditionals sound equivalent to their modalised coun-
terparts, but it is by far not always the case. None of the following examples
admit of a modal in their consequent:
(76) If that was a police siren, we’re in trouble.
(77) If he thinks anybody cares about his PhD, he is in for a surprise.
(78) If she finally broke up with him, she did the right thing.
A special case are conditionals conveying promises, pledges, threats,
etc., whose consequent usually contains the first-person future form of the
main verb.
(79) If you do not want your tripe soup, I will be glad to have it.
(80) If he doesn’t stop whistling immediately, I will have him thrown
out of here.
The above conditionals and their kin do not admit of modalising with a
‘must’, but one can convincingly argue that ‘will’ should be viewed as a
modal in its own right. However, this leaves open the question about what
kind of modal it is. And the fact that many languages (such as Romance
20(Kratzer, 1981b), p.65
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languages and most Slavic ones) feature simple future tense casts a shadow
of doubt on the plausibility of this way out of the difficulty.
Kratzer claims that when bare conditionals are preferred to their moda-
lised counterparts, it is because they are asserted ‘without relying on any
particular piece of evidence at all’, which makes a bet on them into a bet
on the corresponding material conditional.21. This doesn’t sound right—
intuitively, a conditional bet doesn’t win when the antecedent comes out
false. Moreover, if a bet on C winds up losing, so must a bet on must C,
regardless of the evidence one might have had for the latter at some earlier
point.
Be it as it may, there is further evidence against implicit modals in the
consequent, such as conditional advice, exhortations or orders, which lack
truth conditions anyway:
(81) Should you experience any difficulties, don’t bother to call the help
desk—they’re useless.
And, finally, some antecedents seem to place a condition on the act of
utterance rather than on the content of the consequent:22
(82) If I may interrupt, there is no such thing as the greatest ordinal.
My second reservation about Kratzer’s treatment of indicatives has to
do with the fact that it bestows traditional truth conditions on indicatives.
Does it mean that we have found a way to circumvent Edgington’s argu-
ments after all? What about the Equation, does it still hold in Kratzer’s
framework? And does that make the theory liable to Lewis-like triviality?
The short answer to the first question is no. Recall how we determined
the truth value of a simple necessity conditional in a possible world k:
we first applied f in order to obtain the premise set f (k) corresponding
to the modal base, we enriched the latter with the proposition expressed
by the antecedent, and we checked whether the thus restricted domain
implied the consequent. The modal base for any k is usually realistic,
that is, all its propositions are true in k, but it doesn’t have to be totally
realistic, that is, it needn’t identify k uniquely. So we end up with small
fixed spheres of uncertainty associated with each world—and that’s why
we can non-trivially evaluate an indicative across the whole K.
But how plausible is it to attach one (or two, in case an ordering source
is needed) particular premise set to a world as a whole? Not very, I submit.
Intuitively, particular premise sets characterise individual exchanges, or
21(Kratzer, 1991), p.99
22See also (Bach, 1999), pp.356-358.
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perhaps only fragments of them, myriads of which inhabit each possible
world. If, on the other hand, we take a probability space to represent the
accessible possibilities at a given point of a conversation, then it will also
represent the relevant premise set for simple necessity conditionals—we
do not have to posit one for each crisp possibility the speaker recognises.
We are compelled to conclude that there is less to the distance between
Kratzer and Edgington than meets the eye. Viewed from this perspective,
Kratzer’s proof of the contention that indicatives degenerate to material
conditionals if evaluated against totally realistic modal bases23 is essen-
tially a variant on Edgington’s own argument against truth conditions for
indicatives.24 It suggests that if all actual facts are taken into account, there
is no way to escape the material interpretation of indicatives. The upshot
is that for both authors, not possible worlds but premise sets determining
speaker’s live possibilities are the correct points for evaluating indicative
conditionals. Assigning one such set to each world just to safeguard the
traditional semantic framework has an artificial whiff to it while being
theoretically ineffectual.25
In view of the foregoing, it should be clear that strictly speaking, there is
no guarantee for Kratzer’s indicatives to satisfy the Equation.26 Unless you
somehow constrain the choice of the modal base for the worlds in K, the
truth value of an indicative at each world will for all intents and purposes
be independent of those of its operands. Therefore, its absolute probability
can diverge wildly from the conditional probability of the consequent given
the antecedent.
The situation of course becomes different at the level of individual
worlds with fixed associated premise sets. We can conceive of the set of
worlds f -accessible from k (that is,
⋂
f (k)) as themselves defining a prob-
ability space. Egre´ and Cozic have convincingly argued if you interpret
probability assignments as proportional quantifiers, then such assignments
to conditional sentences should, given the restrictor approach, match the
ratio formula.27
23(Kratzer, 1981b), pp.65-66
24See Section 2.3.2.
25To be fair, Kratzer eventually concurred ((Kratzer, 1991), p.99), admitting that cir-
cumstances of evaluation must be more fine-grained than possible worlds. This brings her
even further apart from traditional truth-conditional semantics. The question remains,
though, as to how these circumstances are individuated and by which mechanism they
determine the correct premise sets. The frequent indeterminacy of truth conditions for
modals on this account may have to do more with this theoretical loophole than with
genuine modal underspecification.
26See Section 2.2.
27(Egre´ and Cozic, 2011), pp.20-21
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This, however, clashes a little with Kratzer’s own treatment of bare
conditionals of the form ‘if A, C’, according to which C expresses an im-
plicit necessity, and thus the conditional must be assigned zero probability
whenever p(C/A) < 1. This is another reason to be suspicious of freely
positing implicit necessities. One way out would consist in plugging in
an ordering source, but this doesn’t seem to be compatible with the as-
sumption (which Egre´ and Cozic make) of equiprobability of all worlds
in
⋂
f (k). The best option would arguably be to switch from ‘must’ to
‘highly probably’ as the posited implicit modal (you can, but don’t have
to, subsequently resort to an ordering source). But then, couldn’t ‘highly
probably’ accompany most of our non-conditional assertions as well? In
order to responsibly assert a proposition, you should be pretty sure that
it is true, even though everybody knows that complete certainty is hard
to come by. If the same happens with conditionals, there doesn’t seem to
be any need, apart from sheer theoretical convenience, for postulating any
tacit modals in the consequent.
There is another related difficulty with Kratzer’s employment of or-
dering sources for indicatives coupled with the default necessity reading
of bare conditionals. Kratzer needs non-empty ordering sources in order
to account for the frequent failure of inference patterns such as AS, CP,
or HS, valid on the material and strict interpretation.28 But limiting the
f−accessible worlds relevant for the interpretation of a ‘must’ to the g-
closest ones yields counterintuitive results. If you have A → must C and
(A ∧ B) → may ¬C (note, by the way, that these two alone already sound
contradictory) you will in general also have A→ must ¬B. This combina-
tion sounds all right both for bare indicatives and for counterfactuals, but
arguably leaves a strange aftertaste with must and may in the consequent.
Be it as it may, we are essentially back to Adams-Edgington’s position,
according to which indicatives are not evaluated at each point of
⋂
f (k),
wherefore they fail to divide it into two disjoint regions, as one would
expect from a ‘genuine proposition’. That’s why standard probability
laws do not apply to conditional sentences, undercutting Lewis’s triviality
proofs. In particular, Egre´ and Cozic maintain that it is the law of expansion
by cases (EbC)29 that should be viewed with suspicion when applied to
conditionals. If if-clauses’ semantic contribution consists exclusively in
restricting quantifier domains, thus in particular equating probabilities
of conditionals with conditional probabilities, the following principle, on
which (EbC) fundamentally depends, must fail:
28(Kratzer, 1981b), p.68
29See page 40.
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(EbC∧) p(A→ C) = p((A→ C) ∧ B) + p((A→ C) ∧ ¬B),
since there is no principled way to assign probabilities to compound for-
mulas such as (A→ C) ∧ B, exactly as was the case in Adams’s system.30
All in all, I do not think Kratzer’s treatment of indicatives enjoys much
edge over Edgington’s and Adams’s approach. Modal restriction by con-
ditional clauses is a genuine phenomenon and Kratzer deserves all the
credit for having drawn theoretical attention to it. I doubt, however, that
it should be the last word on indicatives. In particular, I hope to have
shown that there are good reasons to be sceptical about the magnitude of
modal ellipse which the theory requires. I suggest that we should regard
modal restriction as just one of many important tasks that conditionals are
capable of performing in virtue of their more general meaning. However,
before jumping to conclusions, let us see how Kratzer’s theory fares when
applied to subjunctives.
5.2.3. The restrictor approach: subjunctives
The general theory of modals, employing both modal bases and order-
ing sources, was devised by Kratzer to account among other things for
reasoning from inconsistent sets of premises. And this is, of course, just
what we need for the purpose of evaluating counterfactuals, which make
assertions under assumptions contradicting what is really the case. In this
way, Kratzer managed to integrate the intuitions behind both cotenability
and similarity approaches to counterfactuals.
Kratzer’s basic recipe for evaluating counterfactuals, inspired by coten-
ability theorists, is to combine the antecedent with some actually true ad-
ditional premises and check whether the consequent follows. However, by
now we know that there are usually several different ways to accommo-
date the antecedent to reality while preserving consistency—according to
Kratzer, we must pay equal heed to all of them. Thus, informally, A  C
will be true if all consistent ways of supplementing A with actually true
premises will yield C.
Within Kratzer’s framework, this result can be accomplished by con-
struing ‘would’ and ‘might’ respectively as a necessity and a possibility
modal, and interpreting them with respect to an empty modal base and
a realistic ordering source. The ordering source will provide a set of true
premises which will induce a relation on A-worlds that could justifiably be
regarded as a typical similarity ordering—if i ≤g(k) j, then i supports more
30(Egre´ and Cozic, 2011), p.25. For comparison, see (Adams, 1975), p.35.
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premises from g(k) than j, and therefore should intuitively be deemed
closer to actuality. Here, it is the reality that plays a role analogous to the
‘moral ideal’ used to interpret example (74).31
A would-counterfactual A  C will come out true on this semantics
if JCK follows from all the maximal consistent sets containing JAK together
with propositions from the premise set supplied by the ordering source.
However, even if under normal circumstances we can rely on the exis-
tence of such maximal sets, Kratzer wishes to allow for the possibility that
you could go on enriching JAK with propositions supplied by the ordering
source indefinitely without eventually arriving at an inconsistent set. Tak-
ing this into account, let us define XΓ as the set of consistent subsets of Γ.32
Then A  C will come out true if for any consistent way of combining
true premises with the antecedent, you just have to add some more so that
the whole imply the consequent.
For Kratzer, as for Lewis, might-counterfactuals are dual to the would-
ones. In other words, a might-counterfactual A  C is true if there is
a consistent subset of the enriched conversational background containingJAK, all of whose supersets are compatible with JCK, or simply if there is a
maximally consistent subset of g(k)∪ {JAK} containing JAK and compatible
with JCK.33
Those who have carefully read the chapter on cotenability theories
know that this cannot be the last word on the subject. Goodman was
also on the lookout for the right antecedent-compatible subset of all facts,
entailing the consequent if and only if the counterfactual was true. His take
on counterfactuals failed precisely because there usually were antecedent-
compatible subsets of facts that produced wrong results.34 If Kratzer let
them in, they would wreak havoc on her analysis, so g cannot in general be
a totally realistic conversational background. This compels us to specify
how the premise set g(k) is selected for each k. The very same difficulties
that beset Goodman’s account haunt a naı¨ve version of premise semantics
as well.
To her credit, Kratzer never subscribed to a naı¨ve version of premise
semantics for counterfactuals, with totally realistic ordering sources. From
the beginning, she was aware that the relevant premise set had to be
conveniently restricted and structured so as to yield the right outcome.35
31See page 117.
32A set of propositions Θ is consistent iff
⋂
Θ , ∅.
33For a precise formal rendering of Kratzer’s truth conditions for would- and might-
counterfactuals, see A.3.
34See page 58.
35See for instance (Kratzer, 1977), pp.16-20 and (Kratzer, 1979), p.123.
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The challenge was to supply an adequate theoretical treatment of such
restrictions.
5.2.4. Enter lumping
To be sure, in order to avoid the difficulties of the naı¨ve version of premise
semantics, one can simply calibrate the relative weights of different facts
by plugging in an ordering source as codified by a Lewis’s system of
spheres.36 This is also what Kratzer originally proposed in (Kratzer, 1979).
However, seeking both more generality and an independent rationale for
the similarity ordering, she eventually addressed the issue by bringing into
play the notion of lumping.37
Let us see what happens if we let everything that is the case in the
ordering premise set, so that g(k) = {p ∈ P(K) | k ∈ p} for all k. Let A be
an assumption counterfactual in the world α and C any sentence logically
compatible with A. Then α ∈ J¬A ∨ CK. Since C is compatible with A,
{J¬A ∨ CK, JAK} will be consistent and hence eligible for membership in
Xg(α)∪{JAK}. Moreover, it implies C, and so do of course all its consistent
supersets. The conclusion is that whenever A is consistent with C, A  C
will be true in any ¬A-world. The upshot for would-counterfactuals is
that unless A strictly implies C, A  C will come out false in all ¬A-
worlds, because of A’s compatibility with ¬C and the ensuing truth of
A  ¬C (incompatible, in turn, with that of A  C).38 As we typically
use subjunctives as counterfactuals, this would be a devastating problem
for the analysis.
Kratzer’s solution will consist in banning¬A∨C and like ‘artificial facts’
from g(α). The intuition guiding the search for a more suitable treatment
suggests that facts do not come and go alone, but rather in clusters, or
‘lumps’. Thus in the above example, the truth of ¬A ∨ C in α depends
crucially on the fact that ¬A, so they should stand or fall together. In
Kratzer’s idiom, ‘¬A ∨ C lumps in α the fact that ¬A’. If the former always
brings the latter in its wake, there is no longer any way of constructing a
consistent premise set eligible for membership in Xg(α)∪{JAK} containing both
36See footnote 3. As each sphere is nothing more than a set of possible worlds, that is,
a proposition, a system of spheres is a suitable candidate for a premise set.
37See (Kratzer, 1981a).
38This is exactly the objection Parry addressed to Goodman’s truth condition in (Parry,
1957), p.86. Although Goodman didn’t consider might-counterfactuals, his negative
clause has exactly the same effect on woulds as Kratzer’s universal quantification over
premise sets, (almost) consigning them to the status of the strict implication. See also
Kratzer’s slightly different proof in (Kratzer, 1981a), p.202.
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¬A ∨ C and A.
So the task of an ordering source will consist in selecting the right
set of non-trivial facts for a world k. It may still contain propositions
that determine k uniquely, but it will no longer have to encompass all
propositions true of it.39 In the case we have been considering, one of
the propositions will be J¬A ∨ CK ∩ J¬AK = J¬AK. It might of course yet
turn out that ¬A itself lumps other propositions and thus cannot act as an
independent fact, but this degree of granularity is sufficient to ward off the
difficulties we have observed.
Lewis has shown that if the only constraint imposed on the partition
function f assigning a conversational background to each world is that it
must determine the world uniquely (a requirement equivalent to strong
centring), then Kratzer’s semantics are formally equivalent to the infinite
generalisation of Pollock’s similarity semantics admitting both ties and
incomparabilities in the similarity ordering—that is, to the most general
similarity semantics we have presented here.40
So Kratzer offers us a viable alternative to similarity semantics, which
emulates its logical strength, but rests upon independent theoretical un-
derpinnings. And lumping is a real phenomenon upon which we have
a sound intuitive grip—in Kratzer’s example, to paint a still life involves
painting all the flowers or fruits that make it up.41 Analogously, to return
to a difficulty with Goodman’s analysis, my not being in North Korea is
part and parcel of my not being in Korea, which in turn is lumped by me
actually being in the south of Spain. Therefore, adding the counterfactual
hypothesis ‘I am in Korea now’ to the ordering premise set has the effect of
eliminating all the above propositions in one fell swoop on pain of incon-
sistency. By admitting lumping as a cornerstone of our analysis, we can
thus prevent many problems besetting Goodman.
However, we must take care not to overreach ourselves. First, the
intuitions behind lumping, though strong, are still in need of pinning
down. Does my breathing lump my heart’s beating? And what about the
growth of my hair? Kratzer is willing to cut us some slack in how we can
carve up our world, accounting conveniently for the perceived vagueness
of counterfactuals42, but I hope that we have by now grown wary of this
kind of hand-waving. We need at least a rough and ready idea of how the
context impinges on the criteria governing lumping in order to understand
the role lumping plays in our cognitive and linguistic lives. Lumping, just
39(Kratzer, 1981a), p.211
40(Lewis, 1981), p.232
41(Kratzer, 1989), p.112.
42(Kratzer, 1981a), p.211
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as ordering worlds according to some similarity criteria, shouldn’t be just
‘something we do’—as we presumably take it to be a rational practice, we
should be able to gesture towards some purpose that it serves.
Second, for partition semantics to work, lumping has to be more perva-
sive than its informal presentation might suggest. To see this, let us have
a look at how it handles Goodman’s problem. Recall that it consisted in
explaining why (42) is so clearly preferable to (42*):
(42) If the match had been struck, it would have lighted.
(42*) If the match had been struck, it wouldn’t have been dry.
On Kratzer’s simple partition semantics, this result is obtained by positing
that the match’s not lighting lumps its not being scratched. So after adding
the antecedent of (42) to the set of facts supplied by the ordering source,
the fact that the match actually didn’t light is no longer available for any
premise set, while the fact that it was dry stands unscathed. However, in
the absence of a more solid theoretical underpinning, the tenet that ‘not-
lighting’ lumps ‘not-being-scratched’ sounds more than a little ad hoc. In
general, for this semantics to work for counterfactuals, a fact will have to
lump its causal antecedents at least up to the negation of the antecedent.
Moreover, in counterfactuals that are not obviously strictly causal, lumping
will produce quite strange bedfellows:
(83) If you had dropped by yesterday, I wouldn’t have made dill sauce.
That your not visiting your friend yesterday should be linked with your
having stayed instead at your place watching football sounds quite rea-
sonable, but lumping it with the dill sauce dish seems to be motivated
exclusively by the desired outcome for the counterfactual at hand.43
Kratzer was well aware of these difficulties and she endeavoured to
address them in her subsequent work. Incidentally, this brought her even
closer to classical cotenability theories, as she was forced to award a special
role to lawlike generalisations. In the simple version of lumping seman-
tics, non-accidental generalisations were assumed to implicitly guide the
way the world is partitioned into facts, which left an undesirable ad hoc
aftertaste. For this reason, more light had to be shed on their lumping
behaviour.
43See also the criticism in (Tichy´, 1984), pp.162-3.
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5.2.5. Premises and laws
I do not think Kratzer’s later work is correctly interpreted as superseding
partition semantics, as some have suggested.44 It is much more likely
that subsequent developments were aimed at fleshing out the sketchy
framework of (Kratzer, 1981a) and delving deeper into the central notion
of lumping.
Situation semantics put forward in (Kratzer, 1989) constitutes an at-
tempt to formally define the lumping relations that ultimately determine
the partition function f . Without going into details, a proposition p lumps
the proposition q in the world k if and only if k ∈ p and all situations
(construed as fragments) of k that support p also support q. However, this
amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the original idea that lumped
facts are somehow inseverable from lumpers. The real merit of situation
semantics lies in their ability to bring out the special role non-accidental
generalisations play in counterfactual reasoning.
For Kratzer, an accidental and non-accidental interpretation of a gen-
eralisation are logically equivalent, but their difference is semantically
represented at the level of their lumping properties. While accidental
generalisations are relatively strong lumpers and therefore can easily get
knocked out of a premise set, lawlike propositions, if true in a world, are
true in all its situations and therefore are lumped by all the other true
propositions. Note, incidentally, that this is not an account of why some
generalisations are assigned an accidental interpretation and others not,
and which ones it should be at that. That we can successfully make the
difference is presupposed all the way—the theory only endeavours to pro-
vide an adequate semantic representation of this difference that would
44See (Kanazawa et al., 2005), p.135. The authors argue that Lewis’s equivalence
result showed that Kratzer’s theory was open to objections to similarity semantics along
the lines of Tichy´’s Jones example and that this brought Kratzer to revise the theory.
However, this can’t be—lumping was in one or other form present in Kratzer’s theory
from the start, and Lewis’s equivalence proofs depend crucially on this fact. In presenting
lumping semantics as an improvement on partition semantics, Kanazawa et al. even fail
to mention that the notion of lumping was explicitly introduced together with the latter.
What is more, Kratzer’s variant of Tichy´’s example featuring a zebra escaping from a zoo
is devised to show that lumping is up to the job of correctly calibrating the similarity
ordering (this turns out to be much less clear with Tichy´’s original example). Tichy´’s
problem does not affect the formal structure of Stalnaker-Lewis-Kratzer theory, but rather
draws attention to our lack of intuitive grip on the core notions of similarity or, for that
matter, lumping. (I won’t discuss here the purported triviality results Kanazawa et al.
claim to have obtained in this article—they affect only some technical developments of
the theory and partly for this reason Kratzer seems to have rather effortlessly managed
to take the edge off them. See (Kratzer, 2005) and the footnote in (Kratzer, 1989), p.134.)
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correctly predict the behaviour of such generalisations in counterfactual
reasoning.
But a mere difference in lumping properties cannot bring about all the
effects we have come to expect from a counterfactually relevant lawlike
proposition. This is a complete list of the special properties Kratzer has
finally associated with non-accidental generalisations:
1. Weak lumping: NAGs are true in all situations of at least some
worlds.
2. Premise sets: Premise sets that contain only accidental propositions
and no NAGs must be discarded.
3. Confirmation: NAGs codify information about their confirmation
instances.
4. Confirming Proposition Constraint: Premise sets that imply confir-
mation instances for the NAGs they contain should be preferred.
5. CPC for Base Sets: The last point holds also for conversational back-
grounds.
6. Hierarchy: Some NAGs are more natural than their equivalent refor-
mulations.
The second point ensures that breaking a law for the sake of consistency of
a premise set is a non-option.45 The point about confirmation being hard-
wired in the semantic import of non-accidental generalisations is intended
to account for our intuitions about Hempel’s paradox and Wason’s selec-
tion task. The last two constraints constitute Kratzer’s attempt to explain
Goodman’s puzzle and Tichy´’s problem in terms of the privileged position
that instances confirming a law play in our mind’s life. This solution is cho-
sen explicitly to avoid the recourse to causal direction—Kratzer attempts
to show that ‘directionality’ is a feature shared by non-causal conditionals
as well, and stems from the difficulties humans come up against in making
inferences about non-confirmatory scenarios for a given generalisation.
Here is Kratzer’s King Ludwig of Bavaria example that is devised to prove
this point:
King Ludwig of Bavaria likes to spend his weekends at Leoni Castle.
Whenever the Royal Bavarian flag is up, and the lights in the castle are
45Compare the debate between Chisholm and Rescher on (43) and (44), p.51.
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on, the King is home. As a matter of fact, the lights are on right now,
the flag is down, and the King is away. Suppose now counterfactually
that the flag were up. Well, then the King would be home and the
lights would still be on. But why wouldn’t the lights be out with the
King still being away?
(Kratzer, 1989), p.140
I for one have mixed intuitions about this example, however. It is not at all
obvious to me that the rival counterfactual is as unacceptable as the second
one from Goodman’s pair. The framing of the example may admittedly
give us a gentle nudge towards the option Kratzer regards as clearly more
salient, but the preference is much less pronounced than she would have
us expect. Moreover, it turns out that the directionality of a regularity is
not as amenable to equivalent reformulations of a generalisation as the
above considerations might suggest. If the answer to Goodman’s puzzle
only had to do with confirmation sets for the law used in the counterfactual
inference, then rephrasing the law should occasion a shift in our intuitions
about the counterfactual. Recall Goodman’s pair:
(42) If this match had been struck, it would have lighted.
(42*) If that match had been struck, it would not have been dry.
According to Kratzer, our preference for (42) is due to the fact that in
making the counterfactual inference we are leaning on the non-accidental
generalisation
(84) Whenever a dry match is struck in the presence of oxygen, it lights.
This generalisation is confirmed (in the relevant sense) in a scenario with
oxygen and a dry match that is struck and lights, but not in a scenario
with oxygen and a wet match that doesn’t light upon being struck. Kratzer
argues that confirmation bias drives us towards building precisely such a
scenario when assessing the counterfactual hypothesis in (42).
However, this doesn’t explain why rephrasing (84) to
(84*) Whenever a match is struck in the presence of oxygen and doesn’t
light, it is wet.
doesn’t bring the expected result of improving the credentials of (42*).
This is why Kratzer is forced to add the sixth qualification to the list—she
explains the asymmetry by suggesting that (84*) and its kin are not as
natural as their alternatives. However, we are only offered tentative hints
as to the source of this ‘naturalness’.
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It seems to me that at this point Kratzer becomes tangled in epicycles.
There are simply too many ingenious but ad-hoc tweaks necessary to keep
the theory afloat, blurring the overall picture of counterfactual reasoning.
Bias towards confirmatory scenarios is, even if we eschew orthodox logical
moralising, a by-product of the limits on our inferential processing power.
If we place it at the core of counterfactual reasoning, we might slip back
to treating the latter as a practice that is fundamentally irrational, unless
we explain this bias in terms of a more interesting feature of our cognitive
powers.
Besides, the approach finally chosen by Kratzer can of course only with
difficulty be reconciled with examples such as (55) and (83), which bring
home the fact that a handy non-accidental generalisation is not always
ready at hand when people engage in counterfactual reasoning. This
difficulty is shared by another early proponent of premise semantics, F.
Veltman.
The distinction between laws and matters of fact loomed large already
in Veltman’s original take on premise semantics for counterfactuals.46 On
this approach, as opposed to Stalnaker-Lewis and Kratzer, counterfactuals
weren’t evaluated against an objective pool of fact, but rather against the
‘opinions’ of a given speaker, making them eminently subjective (roughly
along the lines of the standard construal of epistemic modals). Opinions
come in two sorts. Veltman called the non-accidental generalisations en-
dorsed by a speaker her ‘prejudices’ (in order to stress the fact that they
are not necessarily reasonable) and the matter of facts also believed by the
speaker, but more likely to be given up if need be, her ‘assumptions’. Into
these foundations Veltman plugged the standard generator of counterfac-
tual premise sets, with the proviso that each premise set had to contain at
least all the prejudices of the speaker. The truth condition (relativised to a
particular speaker) was then equivalent to Kratzer’s general truth condi-
tion on page 124, with all its attendant problems. Therefore a revamped
theory was put forward in (Veltman, 2005), which attempted to improve
on the previous results while casting the key ideas in the framework of
Veltman’s later update semantics.
The new theory still draws upon the difference between laws and mat-
ters of fact supported by a speaker’s cognitive state; however, Veltman no
longer makes such a strong point of the subjectivity of counterfactuals—
their status can be rationally adjudicated by subjecting the facts and laws
that sustain them to public scrutiny. The key idea behind the new ap-
46(Veltman, 1976), p.254
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proach has to do with Tichy´’s Jones examples.47 Remember that Kratzer’s
answer to the puzzle consisted in lumping Jones’s wearing the hat with the
bad weather, using the Confirming Proposition Constraint for Base Sets.
Veltman aimed at the same result, but he wished to obtain it in a more
principled manner.
Jones’s hat was to be knocked off together with the bad weather, be-
cause the latter constituted the very reason why Jones wore the hat in the
first place. Veltman’s seminal insight was that when devising counterfac-
tual scenarios, we need to be aware of how facts actually hang together.
From a technical point of view, he implemented this insight at the level of
individual worlds, but the real difference with respect to rival versions of
premise semantics lies elsewhere. In order to get rid of facts dependent on
others, only the situations called bases, construed as the minimal fragments
from which complete worlds could be reconstructed with the help of laws,
were to be subjected to the by now familiar revision.
First, maximal antecedent-permitting subsets of all bases are pinned
down. Then they are enriched with the antecedent. Subsequently, com-
plete worlds are reconstructed from these new situations in compliance
with the accepted laws (again, more than one such reconstruction may
be possible). The speaker’s cognitive state will be deemed to support the
would-counterfactual if the consequent winds up true in all of the latter
worlds.
Veltman avoids the problems besetting naı¨ve premise semantics by im-
posing the required degree of granularity on the revision process through
atomic sentences. Neither does he fall in any of the other pitfalls with
which Kratzer has had to struggle. However, in addition relying heavily
on explicit laws, Veltman has self-acknowledged difficulties with Good-
man’s puzzle. While he manages to cast doubt upon Kratzer’s treatment
of the King Ludwig example48, let us recall that the latter was introduced
by Kratzer as a controversial attempt to show that directionality was not
exclusive to causal scenarios. While you can plausibly deny that the intu-
itions about King Ludwig are clear enough, it is much more difficult to say
the same about the original Goodman’s example.
5.2.6. Conclusion
Premise semantics blew a new life into the cotenability-based approach to
counterfactuals. By recasting the problem in the possible worlds frame-
47See page 100.
48See page 129
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work, it has been able to answer the pesky question about the nature of
the propositions that were to make up the premise sets. The new scholars
have produced in-depth analyses of the notion of cotenability and have
been able to shed light on counterfactual reasoning by linking it to other
linguistic phenomena.
However, far too many issues still need to be addressed. Goodman’s
puzzle has proved particularly impervious to attempts at a satisfactory
explanation. The special relationship between laws and counterfactuals
has yet to be more thoroughly looked into. And last but not least, many
elements of the extant theories remain in need of an independent motiva-
tion.
5.3. Causal networks
The causal approach to counterfactuals characterises a wide array of di-
verse semantic theories. While they can use very different formal scaffold-
ings, their common denominator is the assumption that at least a broad
group of counterfactuals cannot be successfully analysed unless we posit
that the propositions playing a role in counterfactuals reasoning are some-
how structured in directed causal graphs that guide the process of such
revision. As a result, especially the more formally-minded causal theories
tend to outsource questions about the nature of causality to other branches
of philosophy (i.e. philosophy of science or mind) and reap only the fruits
in order to plug them into their semantic machinery. A passage by Pavel
Tichy´ illustrates the spirit of this approach:
[...] causation is a primitive, contingent relation, one which is not
only not excogitable a priori, but also not reducible to any other, more
basic notions. We shall assume that there simply exist brute causal
facts, such as that event c is possessed of the causal power to bring
another event e; and that to state this fact is by no means tantamount
to saying that any event like c is invariably followed by an event like
e, or that if c occurred [...], e would [...] occur.
(Tichy´, 1978), p.434
Ironically, this attitude is the source of both the enthusiasm and frus-
tration that causal theories have engendered. The logical strength of fine-
tuned causal networks enables them to effortlessly avoid the most resilient
problems in the field, yielding the right results for, among others, Good-
man’s and Tichy´’s puzzle. However, just because of the power of the
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tools of which these theories avail themselves, many fret that they fail to
shoulder much explanatory burden. Most rival theories try to explain the
behaviour of counterfactuals by showing how it arises from a few prima
facie inconspicuous constraints—that is, for some, the whole point of se-
mantic theorising. The worry is that most causal theories only manage to
dump this responsibility on others.
I wish to argue that even where recourse to causal networks is not ac-
companied by further reflection on causality, there are real benefits to be
obtained from exploring this possibility. To begin with, if we, as seems
reasonable, use information about causal relationships in our daily predic-
tive and pragmatic reasoning, counterfactuals may be plausibly construed
as the very conventional devices developed for the purpose of conveying
such information. The suspicion of irrationality, all too often raised by
rival semantic theories, simply disappears. The possibility of connecting
counterfactual reasoning with more mundane human activities lies now
wide open.
Moreover, from the point of view of logic, not only does the causal
approach allow us to formulate a logic that roughly agrees with our in-
tuitions, but it also explains why we use these rules of inference and not
others. This has to do with the first point—once we understand the reason
for engaging in counterfactual reasoning in the first place, we can easily
explain the shape this reasoning actually takes. Let us therefore have a
look at how causal networks formally handle counterfactual inference.
5.3.1. Formal implementation
Any formal theory of counterfactuals that makes use of causal networks
has to accomplish three basic tasks:
1. Represent existent causal relations in a formal structure.
2. Give an adequate account of counterfactual revision within this struc-
ture.
3. Show how the consequent’s truth is ascertained in the revised struc-
ture.
We’ll discuss each of this points in turn.
1. Causal representations
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First of all, in order to apply counterfactual revision, causal links between
actual facts must be adequately brought out. We have seen that mere
general laws are ill-equipped for this purpose—a law such as Goodman’s
(84) Whenever a dry match is struck in the presence of oxygen, it lights.
only expresses the incompatibility between four propositions about a given
match (let us call them D, S, O, L). If in our match-scenario D, ¬S, O, ¬L
are true and we entertain the counterfactual hypothesis S, there are exactly
three conservative ways of restoring consistency with the covering law.
However, we must ensure that our analysis yields only the scenario with
all the four propositions true as a viable candidate. In other words, we must
implement asymmetry of dependence into our covering law—lighting de-
pends, whereas dryness and oxygen don’t, on striking the match.
There is no limit to the possible ways of achieving this result formally, so
many causal theorists satisfy themselves with an informal presentation and
draw on our intuitive grasp of causal laws.49 On the other hand, on Tichy´’s
quite formal theory50, causality is explicitly codified as a relation between
‘unfixed propositional clusters’, that is, between conjunctions of (possibly
temporally shifted) basic propositions that do not fix a specific time point.
This relation is expressible by special connective propositions that cannot
stand in causal relations themselves, but of course play a central role in
determining the truth values of counterfactuals and can even feature in
antecedents (most rival theories have been reluctant to go to such lengths,
as the overwhelming majority of subjunctives we utter are composed of
non-connective propositions).
Other theorists have leant towards a model-theoretical approach, per-
haps because it strikes one as more perspicuous than Tichy´’s. Among
the proposals in this category stand out the generalised causal models,
in which each of the endogenous variables is associated with a function
that determines its value based on the values of its parental variables in
the causal hook-up of the system. On a practical level, given an assign-
ment to the exogenous variables, the value of the endogenous variables is
worked out after solving the system of equations that define the relevant
functions.51
49See, for instance, (Parry, 1957), (Jackson, 1977) and (Sanford, 1989). Both Parry and
Jackson set much store by the temporal asymmetries supposedly implied by causal laws,
but this is expressly rejected by Sanford, for whom causal dependence is just one of many
different kinds of dependence present in the world (temporal dependencies being one of
them).
50(Tichy´, 1978)
51This is the approach developed and explored, among others, in (Galles and Pearl,
1998) and (Pearl, 2000). R. Briggs follows a similar, if a slightly modified method in
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A model-theoretical module can also form part of broader theories.
K. Schulz has made use of Pearl’s generalised causal models within the
revision framework championed by F. Veltman, in order to remedy its
failure to account for Goodman’s puzzle.52 S. Kaufmann implements a
similar causal representation in a generalised premise semantics frame-
work (where the conversational background splits into a modal base and
an ordering source).53
2. Counterfactual revision
Once a representation is in place which brings out the causal dependencies
between the facts pertaining to the situation under scrutiny, the next step
consists in erasing everything that cannot be taken for granted in this
picture in view of the counterfactual hypothesis. Note that this is nothing
less than the problem of relevant conditions, that led to so much vexation
among cotenability theorists and classical premise semanticists.
With causal theories, the answer to the pesky question of revision is
actually fairly anticlimactic. Indeed, the purpose of the prior step of laying
out the causal structure of the envisaged scenario resides in rendering
the revision as trivial as this: from the initial stock, all propositions that
causally depend (directly or indirectly) on the counterfactual hypothesis
being false must be eliminated. Incidentally, one of the virtues of this
account is a plausible explanation of the fact that subjunctives are ordinarily
used as counterfactuals—there is not much point to revising with a true
hypothesis.
Revision along these lines can of course be formally achieved in a
number of ways. Parry and Jackson relied on temporal revision, that is,
they assumed that by rolling the developments back to the antecedent
time and throwing out the negation of the antecedent, the revision would
take care of itself. But whoever believes, as one very well might, that
temporal asymmetry is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
the presence of a causal link, will find this solution unsatisfactory.54
Again, this is the reason why most causal theorists feel compelled to de-
ploy complete causal networks in the first place. Once you have described
the network, the revision is conceptually straightforward. In generalised
causal models, the desired result is achieved by simply generating a sub-
model where the relevant variable is set to the value specified by the
(Briggs, 2012).
52(Schulz, 2011)
53(Kaufmann, 2013)
54This was one of the points of Goodman’s reply to Parry in (Goodman, 1957).
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antecedent and its links with its parents in the model are severed.55 This
move ensures that the values of the causal progeny of the relevant vari-
able are in turn reset. Schulz, Briggs and Kaufmann followed, each one
in their own way, analogous strategies. On the other hand, Tichy´ didn’t
content himself with stopping at the negation of the antecedent and chose
to eliminate also the values of its ancestry and the progeny of its ancestry.
However, this may well be a case of overkill, as this account takes the
side of the backtracking resolution of counterfactual dependence, which is
non-standard by almost anyone’s lights.56
3. Value of the consequent
Once the revision is finished, causal dependencies are again brought into
play in order to reconstruct the counterfactual scenario. The new value
of the variable corresponding to the consequent will determine the truth
value of the whole counterfactual. In case it remains undetermined, only
a might-counterfactual can be declared true.
Here, differences between the approaches we have reviewed come
down to mere technicalities, as there are no conceptual grounds to pre-
fer one over the other. Tichy´ was compelled to devise the notion of a
connective closure (as opposed to a mere conjunction) of the antecedent
together with the cotenable facts in order not to fall prey to Goodman’s
problem57, but on other accounts the third step is very straightforward. For
generalised causal models, it amounts to solving the system of equations
that describes the submodel yielded by the revision. Schulz accomplished
the same result by defining an operator on situations, each application of
which determines the value of the variables whose all parents are fixed
by the input. Kaufmann, in turn, resorts to an ordering source adequately
reflecting causal dependencies for the purpose of enriching the revised
modal base.
5.3.2. Causal logics
The counterfactual logics associated with causal networks bear more re-
semblance to that of the Lewis-Stalnaker conditional than to the logic of
55(Galles and Pearl, 1998), p.155
56See (Lewis, 1979) for the classical discussion. An exception to the rule is Sanford,
who sees nothing amiss with the set of counterfactual consequences of an assumption
being inconsistent, as long as they exploit different patterns of dependence. See (Sanford,
1989), p.200.
57(Tichy´, 1978), p.442
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any stricter or even material conditional. The fragment of the logic yielded
by generalised causal models where antecedents are restricted to conjunc-
tions of literals has been shown to be for all intents and purposes equivalent
to Lewis’s logic C1 (that is, Stalnaker’s C2 without CEM but with SC).58
Alternative approaches agree on the logic up to this point.
In particular, AC winds up invalid on all causal theories as expected.
However, in addition to acknowledging the brute fact of AC’s lack of
intuitive support and perhaps appealing to the abstract possibility of A∧B
being somehow ‘further away’ than mere A, we can now state precisely
when and why the truth values of A  C and (A ∧ B)  C can differ: it
occurs only when ¬B is part of the ‘situational background’ left untouched
by the revision with the counterfactual hypothesis A. The fact that the
background, together with the antecedent, plays a vital role in determining
the value of the consequent in the new model is the very reason why
counterfactuals, on their causal construal, are variably strict conditionals.
This might suggest a neat theoretical possibility of merging Stalnaker-
Lewis and causal approaches by casting the similarity relation in terms
of the minimal causal revision. Such a result would entitle us to the best
of both worlds—the beautiful and well-behaved logic of the similarity re-
lation and the sound theoretical grip on the meaning of counterfactuals
provided by causal analysis. Nonetheless, things turn out to be more
complicated once arbitrary Boolean compounds are allowed into the an-
tecedents.
Apart from its intuitive appeal, SDA is an attractive choice for causal
theorists also for independent reasons. There are three possible causal
revisions associated with every disjunction (first disjunct, second disjunct
and both of them) and there is no prima facie reason to exclude any one of
them from our considerations.59 The price, of course, is REa).60 We are
now in position, though, to appreciate why revision with A can, on these
assumptions, be very different from that with the classically equivalent
(A∧ B)∨ (A∧¬B)—there is only one minimal revision associated with the
former, while there are two more complex ones associated with the latter.
Thus ‘logically equivalent’ might surprisingly not mean ‘countefactually
equivalent’.
On the other hand, this paradoxically also suggests a way back to
Lewis’s logic without sacrificing the requirement that causal networks
58(Galles and Pearl, 1998), p.169 and (Briggs, 2012), p.12.
59See (Briggs, 2012), p.18. Schulz makes SDA valid by fiat, by forcing any antecedent
into a disjunctive normal form and stipulating that each disjunct must causally imply the
consequent for the counterfactual to come out true.
60See discussion on page 76.
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should codify all the information relevant to evaluating counterfactuals.
We could posit that only those minimal revisions which are also the most
conservative with respect to the situational background should be taken
into account. That would make the revision with A identical to revision
with (A∧B)∨(A∧¬B), while keeping SDA in place for ‘genuine’, irreducible
disjunctions (where there is no one most conservative revision).61 The
question still remains, of course, if this would be enough to accommodate
linguistic intuitions. Without relinquishing SDA, however, there can be no
settlement between causality and similarity.62
5.3.3. Philosophical import of causal theories
There must be something unsettling about formal semantics explicitly
based on causal networks—the very thing that made authors such as Good-
man, Kratzer or Veltman so suspicious about direct reference to causality
that they were prepared to go to great lengths or even to let their theories
founder rather than embrace it. And it can’t only be the fact that causality
is itself in need of philosophical clarification—most of the authors wary
of it have employed concepts (such as that of natural law, similarity of
possible worlds or lumping) that are not much more transparent than that
of causal dependency. Where does the squeamishness about causality hail
from, then?
I suspect the answer has to do with the limits of formal semantics. If
causality is indeed the basic, irreducible linchpin of counterfactual reason-
ing Tichy´ would have it be, then it seems to me that the formal tradition in
semantics is bound to forfeit its central role in elucidating the meaning of
subjunctives.
We can get a clearer view of the problem if we first try to answer
the question as to why (mostly first-order) set theory or lambda-calculus
should be expected to provide the universal language for elucidating lin-
guistic meaning. Put like this, it surely does not sound as self-evident as
it might given the overwhelming tacit consensus in the field. Yet there
is a good reason—both set theory and lambda calculus are mathematical
tools perfectly suited to creating complex structures out of the meagrest of
61This is admittedly very impressionistic and still unsatisfactory as an attempt at a
convergence of the two logics. While this suggestion would causally validate (A∨ B) 
C ` (A  C) ∧ (B  C) for atomic A,B, on Lewis’s semantics this would fail whenever
we had a D such that A  D and (A ∧ B)  ¬D come out true in the model.
62Some even argue there is no principled way of achieving this and that closeness of
possible worlds, despite all its vagueness, is an inappropriate notion for the analysis of
counterfactuals anyway. See (Fine, 2012), p.38.
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resources. They are therefore well-equipped to spell out the contribution
of a sophisticated language device in terms of its systematic effect on sev-
eral more easily fathomable variables. That’s how formal semantics can be
useful in elucidating meaning.
However, I suspect it would do a lot of good to the current mainstream
in philosophical logic and formal semantics if the limits of this approach
were more systematically explored. A semanticist is often tempted to use
variables whose workings are by no means as transparent as they would
have to be for the analysis to be in any way enlightening—we have seen
quite a few examples ourselves. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that all
our interesting vocabulary will be susceptible of analysis in terms of a few
unproblematic magnitudes.
In the case of causal theories of counterfactuals, the actual formal imple-
mentation, virtuosic though it may be, doesn’t provide much new semantic
insight. No exciting new theorems are in the offing and any theoretical
surprises will most likely cast doubt on the aptness of a particular imple-
mentation rather than give pause to our intuitions about counterfactuals.
The issue of backtracking is a case in point. We saw in Tichy´, and
especially in Kaufmann, that whether or not the system will support back-
tracking is a conscious modelling choice that is made by a theorist in
accordance with his prior views on the subject. We can no longer expect
the formal system to give us an enlightening answer to the problem—the
presence or not of backtracking will not in general be a consequence of any
more basic assumptions. With causal accounts, all important decisions
about the notion of causality must be taken before the very construction of
the formal system—this time round it is the chief pillar and not the whole
structure which commands most of our interest. However, the investiga-
tion of an ingredient in a formal analysis must perforce take a different
shape from that of the entire architectonic complex.
Chapter 7 is supposed to provide a first stab at such an analysis. Once
we have acknowledged the edge the causal account enjoys over its rivals, I
submit that it behoves us to take a closer look at how causal patterns are put
into play in real life scenarios, how they relate to indicative conditionals
and other linguistic expressions, and to check whether they are capable
of explaining away at least some of the puzzles (other than Goodman’s
one) we have encountered along the way. What is more, while causality
does play an overwhelmingly important role in counterfactual reasoning,
some counterfactuals do not easily fit this mould and some are plainly not
causal.63 If we really aim to get a sound grip on counterfactuals, we have
63As an example of the former, think for instance of the dill sauce example in (83). With
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to face up to these outstanding issues.
In its entirety, of course, this would be a gigantic undertaking which I
am not in a position to carry out. However, I would like at least to defend
the viability of such a project by showing some early theoretical fruit it can
bear and by paving the way for other scholars tempted to venture away
from the formal orthodoxy.
regard to the latter, as even D. Lewis had to admit (see (Lewis, 1973a), p.24), mathematical
reductio is often set forth in counterfactual terms.

Part II
Conditionals in natural language
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Chapter 6
Conditional speech acts
We have seen a plethora of very heterogeneous theories of conditionals.
It is high time to take stock and try to answer at least some of the many
questions we have encountered along the way. I think the best way to do
it is to start from the very beginning and ask ourselves what we should
actually be aiming at when putting forward an ‘account’ or a ‘theory’ of
conditionals.
Admittedly, the question may sound a little outlandish. This may not be
because there is anything inherently awry about it, though, but rather for
the simple reason that very few writers stop to give it a minute’s thought
before getting on with their own ‘proposals’. We are expected to have a
tacit understanding of the nature and goals of the undertaken endeavour,
so it seems redundant to state them in full.
But observe that terms such as ‘account’ or ‘approach’ are, on their
own, far from self-explanatory. What would you expect from ‘a theory
of’ or (even worse) ‘an approach to’, say, the motor vehicle or tropical
rainforests? There are myriads of angles from which you can inspect ei-
ther of these phenomena. For instance, you might focus on their physical
structure, dynamics, history, or wider social, economic or environmental
implications. Each of these aspects in turn requires a particular theoretical
approach, a choice of relevant variables and an adequate level of abstrac-
tion. That’s why you don’t tend to encounter ‘theories of X’, unless it is
quite clear what the ultimate aim of such a theory would be in a given
context.
Is this the case with philosophical theories of conditionals? I have my
doubts. Just as cars or jungles, language phenomena can be analysed in a
number of different connections. I shall argue that it is by no means clear
which ones are actually intended by most theoreticians, and that this in
turn leads to quite some philosophical confusion. By throwing some light
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upon this question, I hope to show that the current impasse in philosophical
semantics may be due to an inadequate methodological attitude.
6.1. Meaning of conditionals
You may have found the preceding remarks disingenuous. It is surely no
secret what most theories of conditionals are after? The default assumption
in the literature seems to imply that the ultimate goal of our theorising is
a correct rendering of the meaning of conditionals. However, there are
reasons to think that it may as well be one of those cases when people fail
to characterise a task that they otherwise carry out proficiently.
That there is something amiss with our understanding of the aims of the
philosophical inquiry into conditionals is witnessed by the recurrence of
one surprising claim. The proliferation of different theories and the failure
to reach a reasonable theoretical consensus on quite a few resilient puzzles
is sometimes interpreted as a sign of our ignorance about the meaning of
conditionals.1
I find this to be a particularly infelicitous way of putting things, chiefly
because under its literal interpretation the claim is blatantly false. Of
course, in order to know what a certain expression means you do not have
to be able to explain its meaning by means of a non-circular paraphrase—it
will suffice if you can successfully use it in communication. Most of us
would be in a quandary if asked to explain the exact meaning of ‘cynical’,
but our skill in applying this label to different human actions is all that is
needed to know what it stands for. Knowledge of meaning is thus basically
a kind of knowing-how rather than of knowing-that.
This also applies to conditionals—there can be no doubt that competent
speakers do know what they mean, even if they are not ever in a position
to convey this knowledge explicitly. The situation is, thus, not as bleak as it
might look at first sight, and the scaremongers responsible for the confusion
are of course perfectly aware of this. What they really seem to be up to is
to draw the attention to our lack of explicit theoretical understanding of
the meaning of conditionals. And in order to achieve this, they choose a
striking, if slightly misleading, formulation.
The failure to provide such an account needn’t be a big deal from a prac-
tical point of view. We can live without a conclusive specification of what
makes us label an action cynical or an utterance ironic. And as far as I now,
1For explicit avowals, see for instance (Mackie, 1973), p.64; (Kratzer, 2012), p.85; or
(Bennett, 2003), p.2
6.1. MEANING OF CONDITIONALS 147
no philosopher has been involved in the project of clarifying the meaning
of ‘tawdry’ or ‘underpants’ (although in view of the current splurge in
public funding for philosophical research, I may easily be wrong). And
sometimes there is simply nothing of relevance to be said about the mean-
ing of a particular expression—though apples themselves may constitute
quite an interesting object of study, ‘apple’ means what it means and that’s
about it. And sometimes what little there is to say about such a meaning
is clearly a job better suited for a linguist rather than for a philosopher.
Why should the case of conditionals be any different from these exam-
ples? What makes their meaning deserve a properly philosophical analy-
sis? A part of the answer is historical—questions concerning meaning of
conditionals were present at the outset of Frege’s new logic and as such
have secured a pride of place within the analytical tradition.2 Yet more
importantly, it is often felt that the use of conditionals is linked to some of
our most fundamental cognitive processes. That’s why it is surmised that
their study might lead to new profound insights into human reason.
Let us provisionally grant, for the sake of the argument, that the mission
of such study is to elucidate the meaning of conditional sentences. We can
then ask what kind of entity meaning is and how we usually go about the
task of explaining it. Such a reflection will help us understand why so
many of the theories we have inspected show ad hoc features.
6.1.1. Truth-conditional semantics
Semantic reductionism
There is a default answer to the question about the proper way of pro-
ceeding in semantics. According to the received view, the correct form for
presenting the meaning of an expression is by pinning down its contri-
bution to the truth conditions of typical utterances of sentences in which
it appears. And if the expression, as in the case of a conditional, is a
sentence-forming operator, we can simply speak about its own truth con-
ditions. The idea is, of course, that the meaning of an expression defines
(and is defined by) a function from the semantic values of the rest of the
sentential ingredients into truth values. Formally
Truth conditions of a binary sentential operatorJΦ(A,C)K = fΦ(JAK, JCK), where fΦ : P(K) × P(K)→ {0, 1}
2Although, as we have seen in Section 1.2.1, this tradition largely distorted Frege’s
and Russell’s original thoughts on the subject.
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But is this really the best way of explaining linguistic meaning? Re-
member that when translated into a little less mathematical language, the
above truth condition takes a form resembling that of a Tarski’s T-sentence:
Truth conditions of a binary sentential operator
Φ(A,C) is true iff p.
Here, p is a sentence of the metalanguage identical in meaning with the
sentence Φ(A,C) of the object language (it can, and probably will, contain
the metalanguage analogues of A and C as parts). In Tarski’s case, the
former was a direct translation of the latter. This was all that was needed for
the purposes of Tarski’s project, which did not aim to analyse the meaning
of the left-hand sides of T-Convention instances, but rather to provide an
adequate formal definition of the truth predicate.
If you however try to get something like a T-sentence to display the
meaning of a natural language sentence, you had better be aware of a few
difficulties. First of all, your metalanguage will in general be identical to
your object language. There is no prima facie reason to privilege any subset
of our vocabulary as particularly suited for the task of explaining meaning;
in any case, this would require an independent argument. In the absence
of a clear distinction between object and metalanguage, the statement of a
truth condition amounts to little more than a mere paraphrase.
Another related point is that for the analysis to work, you must avoid
trivial paraphrases. A direct translation won’t do any more as the fact
that it is used as opposed to mentioned doesn’t confer any added value
on the analysis. The proposed equivalence should somehow be informa-
tive. Yet it is not at all easy to pin down what this informativeness is
supposed to consist in. Natural contexts for explanations of meaning all
include an interlocutor who does not understand the expression at issue.
Then it is obvious that the analysans must conform to his or her limited
linguistic knowledge—an explanation that works in one context might fail
to do so in another. But how to concoct an interesting and informative
semantic analysis for the general public, conversant with the meaning of
the analysandum, is by no means clear.3
3Heim and Kratzer try to assuage these worries by pointing out that formal seman-
tics doesn’t really purport to explain the meaning of our vocabulary, but only model its
compositional properties: (Heim and Kratzer, 1998), p.2. However, as regards condition-
als, this seems to contradict not only the widely shared desiderata in the field, but also
Kratzer’s own complaint to the effect that the absence of a successful account implies
lack of grip on the meaning of conditionals. The purpose of the theoretical part of this
dissertation was to show that the triviality of Tarski’s T-schema didn’t necessarily vanish
on the level of sentence-forming operators—it was often only disguised by the complexity
of the analysis.
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And last but not least, there is absolutely no guarantee that there exists
an adequate non-trivial paraphrase in the language for the piece of vocab-
ulary you are interested in. Actually, it seems that the more interesting
expression you choose, the less likely you are to find one.4 In particular,
most scholars try to avoid the problem of triviality by constraining the
analysans to a proper subset of vocabulary deemed conceptually more ba-
sic than the analysed expression—but there is no a priori reason to expect
that the latter is thus reducible.
Why have we been so keen to accept truth-conditional approaches to
meaning, then? The answer resides in the enduring allure of what I have
taken to calling ‘the Switzerland conception of language’—it transports us
into a magical land, where all activity is subject to strict rules and even
the wilderness is organised in neatly designated and strictly regulated
areas. This conception assumes that you can oversee and control the whole
process of belief creation, along with the way how beliefs are translated
into language. Such a conception, for a part, arises naturally (we like order
anyway, because it gives us grip on things, and indeed, many linguistic
neighbourhoods are well-behaved); however, it has been given a great boost
by the rise of logical positivism. Its champions claimed that we had access
to utterly unquestionable facts (which ironically were conveyed by the
most subjective of experiences) and all our meaningful utterances directly
or indirectly made assertions about them. In other words, they posited
a linguistic level (that of direct observation reports) in which language
directly connected with the world and was thus the source of all meaning.
All higher linguistic levels were constructed logically from the basic one
and derived all their meaning from it.5
Logical positivism is no more in vogue nowadays, but I think many of
our theoretical tics can be traced back to this source. Semantic reductivism
seems to be inspired by the very idea that your analysis can eventually
reach an unproblematic linguistic level, where the truth or falsity of your
4This is the point that T. Williamson very convincingly makes against the tradi-
tional epistemological programme of truth-conditional analysis of the verb ‘to know’ in
(Williamson, 2000), p.31. It seems to clash, though, with what D. Blakemore has to say
in (Blakemore, 2002), pp.82-83—I don’t think we should be able to provide paraphrases
for all conceptual words in our language, nor that paraphrases for procedural words are
a priori impossible. I do agree, though, as will presently become clear, that a description
of the actual use of a word goes in general a longer way towards explaining its meaning
than a paraphrase.
5This is meant as a rough general description that abstracts from the particularities of
the philosophical systems comprising the movement. For an excellent exposition of the
epistemological and semantic ideas that constitute the backbone of logical positivism, see
(Williams, 2001), chapters 7 and 8, and especially p.91.
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assertion can be read directly off the world. So a truth-conditional analysis
of an expression can lead you back to this linguistic eden, where life is
tranquil and devoid of worries. Language, on this construal, is essentially
and unproblematically descriptive.
We shall see plenty of evidence in the following chapter suggesting that
even what we regard as simple descriptions of the world are often defeasi-
ble and theory-infused mental constructions, only partially underwritten
by sensory experience. In the meantime, though, we can inspect some of
the unpalatable results semantic Switzerlandism has brought in its wake.
Just think of the mind-brain identity theory (not to be confused with
the identity theory about indicative and material conditionals), so popular
in the 1950s. I submit that nobody would ever have found it a good idea to
identify the talk about emotions, personality traits and intentions with the
talk about particular brain states, if we did not subscribe to a conception of
language according to which all statements that are not directly evaluable
as to their truth must be reducible to such statements.
Or take the meaning of normative vocabulary, such as that of ‘interest-
ing’. If in your semantic analysis you only are permitted to avail yourself
of unproblematically descriptive vocabulary, the meaning of ‘interesting’
all of a sudden appears shrouded in mystery. A request to fill in the gap in
‘X is interesting iff ...’ prompts one to look for features that make things de-
serving of our attention—and given the range of X, this will necessarily be
a next-to-impossible endeavour, which can all too easily lead to semantic
nihilism. That’s why logical positivists took the other horn of the dilemma,
declaring normative vocabulary to be merely expressive of speaker’s atti-
tudes and emotions and as such unfit for serious debate about truth and
falsity. But this is unnecessarily restrictive—a better solution would be
to make a sharp distinction between theoretical accounts of the meaning
of a sentence such as ‘X is interesting’ and theoretical accounts of when
the utterance of such a sentence is warranted. The point is that naı¨ve
descriptivism conflates these two endeavours.
Simplistic descriptive conceptions of language were subjected to sear-
ing criticism throughout the 20th century. Nowadays, the study of argu-
ments advanced by Wittgenstein, Quine and Searle is part and parcel of any
analytic philosopher’s training. However, model-theoretical methodology,
as applied to natural language, has been very successful in inadvertently
promoting return tickets to Swiss Alps. This is because regardless of the
nature and complexity of your models, the methodology guarantees that
there is vocabulary for directly describing them. You only have to provide
translation rules (truth conditions) for the expressions you have set out to
study, and will have succeeded in analysing their meaning.
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However, what we said above implies that the application of this
methodology to natural language should be viewed with a great deal
of suspicion. The concept of ‘natural language semantics’ is much less
innocent than it might appear at first sight.
Truth conditions of conditionals
The foregoing can help us put Lewis’s and Ha´jek’s triviality results and
Edgington’s arguments against truth conditionality of indicatives in proper
perspective. The bottom line is not that we have to deny indicatives truth
conditions if we want to preserve the intuition behind the Equation—for
any expression whatsoever one can of course put forward trivial truth
conditions:
Indicatives trivial truth conditions
A→ C is true iff C if A,
or some more sophisticated variant featuring, say, ‘on condition’, ‘pro-
vided that’ or ‘should’ with inversion.6 Note, though, that the triviality
of these more involved paraphrases does not ensue automatically, that is,
you couldn’t for instance read it off the syntax of the analysans. It is only
because we regard it as uninteresting that the analysis ‘fails’. This suggests
that what we are really (though perhaps only unconsciously) after in this
kind of semantics is some kind of reduction after all.
The correct conclusion to be drawn from triviality proofs, it appears to
me, is that of Egre´ and Cozic.7 They interpret Lewis’s and Ha´jek’s proofs as
inexpressibility results. In other words, according to Egre´ and Cozic, these
proofs show that a non-trivial language containing conditional probability
operators has strictly more expressive power than its fragment that only
contains unary probability operators. Thus if conditional probability really
plays a crucial role in the assertibility of indicatives, they are not in general
reducible to common non-conditional propositions. So at least a wide
range of possible paraphrases turns out to be inadequate. On the other
hand, we have seen that many of the adequate paraphrases are too close to
the meaning of indicatives to be any useful for our purposes. This should
made one at the very least wary about the possibilities of a successful truth
conditional analysis of indicatives.
6Pace (Edgington, 2007), p.162.
7(Egre´ and Cozic, 2011). A similar interpretation is also suggested in (Milne, 1997),
p.196. See Section 2.3.1.
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Is the situation that different with subjunctives? Most scholars have
answered affirmatively. According to this way of seeing things, while
indicatives lack truth conditions because they are basically devices for
expressing subjective conditional probabilities, subjunctives are regular
propositions through and through and definite truth conditions can be
stated for them. In what follows, I will argue that this distinction, though
based on a few sound intuitions, sows more confusion than it provides
insight.
Of course, just as with indicatives, you can also formulate trivial truth
conditions for subjunctives.
Subjunctives trivial truth conditions
A  C is true iff C would have been the case, if A had been the case.
And, as before, we can find almost-trivial reformulations, formed for in-
stance by inversion, ‘but for’, as well as with ‘provided’ or ‘on condition
that’. These sound even more superficial than their indicative analogues,
though, as most of them must use the same grammatical tenses that are
peculiar to the core cases of subjunctives.
How about non-trivial truth conditions for subjunctives? There are in
any case no triviality results that would a priori preclude such a possibil-
ity. And such a project surely must seem viable in view of the extensive
literature on the subject. Or does it?
One of the aims of the preceding chapters was to make the reader aware
of how badly the most celebrated theories of subjunctives fare on that score.
Once we manage to filter out all the noise about logic, nature of possible
worlds and all kinds of syntactic quirks, we usually end up with a semantic
analysis that makes a heavy use of some suspiciously intangible variable
that is doing most of the dirty work. Cotenability relations, similarity
orderings, lumping properties, envisaged contexts, and (admittedly to
a much lesser degree) causal networks—these are often little more than
clever ways of obscuring the fact that we are essentially back to the trivial
truth condition stated above.8
Of course, our lack of success in the quest for interesting truth con-
ditions for subjunctives by no means implies that such an endeavour is
doomed to failure from the start. However, I think that it at least should
make us question the default assumption that such a reduction should be
possible or even desirable.
But why do most theorists then make such a stringent distinction
between the allegedly non-propositional indicatives and the apparently
8I’ll have more to say about causality in what follows.
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much more conventional subjunctives? The answer, that underlies all triv-
iality proofs, is that the belief in A → C cannot be severed from the belief
in A and C—uncertainty about the former does not go beyond uncertainty
about the latter, as is the case with, say, ‘because’. Fully determined states
of affairs, like those that we use in semantics for our logics, therefore end
up trivialising indicatives. A subjunctive ‘A  C’, on the other hand, is
largely independent of whether A or C is the case (except when A ∧ ¬C
happens to be true), so it usually can be added to the welter of propositions
supported by a state description without causing unwelcome interferences.
This means that counterfactuals can be made to work within our semantic
framework in a conventional way.
This is all very well. However, we should guard ourselves from over-
stating the explanatory power of the classical possible world semantics—it
is useful for modelling certain linguistic phenomena mainly because of the
many simplifications it is subject to. It surely should not be construed as
having the last word in inquiries into meaning. In particular, it does not
imply much about the question whether a successful statement of non-
circular truth conditions is possible in practice. It can be of use in proving
the negative result, as we have seen, but it is not sufficient to guarantee a
positive one. To be sure, if we had linguistic resources to single out each
and every possible world, we could use a mere disjunction—but atomic
possibilities are just a convenient fiction without clear real-life counter-
parts. And even if we had such resources, nothing guarantees that they
wouldn’t include subjunctives or their trivial variants.
Be it as it may, in view of the rather disappointing results of the tradi-
tional analyses of conditionals, I think it is high time to approach the study
of their meaning from a different angle. In order to do so, we first have
to become clear about what we actually understand by meaning and what
the standard procedures for explaining it are.
6.1.2. Meaning and truth
In traditional semantics, the meaning of a sentence is equated with the
function that allows us to determine its truth value in any given state
of affairs.9 The meaning of a subsentential item is then defined as the
function obtained from the original one by λ-abstraction on the variables
corresponding to the other items that have to complement it in order to
yield a propositionally evaluable content.
We have already seen one problem with this strategy—when trying to
9Witness the offhand first sentence in (Heim and Kratzer, 1998).
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specify the function that constitutes the meaning of an expression, it is
all too tempting to smuggle in vocabulary trivially synonymous with the
analysed item. This objection, though, does not get to the core of the above
way of looking at meaning—in endorsing the traditional way of doing
semantics, you don’t have to posit that we always have an interesting way
of spelling out the function in question (as a reductionist would require).
A more direct way of attacking this conception of meaning is to argue
that it accords a disproportionally central role to the notion of truth. This,
of course, is not to say that truth is irrelevant in semantics—far from it. Dis-
crepancy in truth value of two different sentences in certain circumstances
of evaluation is an infallible sign of a divergence in meaning; however, not
all differences in meaning can be isolated in this way. This is the case with
Grice’s conventional implicature: you can replace an ‘and’ in a compound
sentence with a ‘but’ and the result is guaranteed to share the truth value
with the original sentence. However, this will of course be at the cost of
some awkwardness due to the different meanings of the two conjunctions.
The upshot is that mere truth is not fine-grained enough to reflect all the
semantic shades our vocabulary can and does adopt. Putting forward
truths may be a central, or even the ultimate function of natural language,
but it is by no means the only one.
Escaping from truth as the main tool of an inquiry into meaning re-
quires broadening our view of language. The conception of meaning as
a function that takes sentences and circumstances of evaluation into truth
values completely abstracts from people who use the language and their
reasons for doing so. This comes extremely handy in logical calculi, which
are intentionally divested of non-truth-conditional elements, but is too
schematic to suffice for a serious study of natural language. In order to
explain the meaning of a whole host of expressions, one must take into
account at least some of the quirks of human communication.10
Take ‘but’, for instance. Both for Grice and Bach, an utterance of ‘A but
B’ conveys two propositions: on the one hand, A ∧ B, and on the other,
the idea that there is some contrast between A and B.11 For Grice, the
second proposition is a conventional implicature and doesn’t form part
of the truth conditions of the utterance, whereas for Bach it does, despite
being less focalised than Grice’s minimal proposition. I find neither of the
two positions very convincing, and I think the reason is that they cling too
heavily to truth as the ultimate semantic explainer. If there is a difference
10For a brief overview of non-truth-conditional vocabulary, see (Blakemore, 2002),
pp.32-38.
11(Grice, 1975) and (Bach, 1999). A similar view is defended in (Rieber, 1997).
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between ‘and’ and ‘but’, the reasoning goes, it must show at the level of
truth or falsity of some proposition, whichever status it may enjoy.
But I submit that this approach to ‘but’ is implausible. If you say
(85) She is poor, but honest,
you are not in general trying to imply, let alone assert, that there is a
contrast between the two predicates. What use could anyone have for such
a vague and, frankly, dull piece of information? If your audience perceives
the contrast, mere A ∧ B will be enough. And if it doesn’t, you are not
likely to achieve much by simply saying that there is one. A much better
explanation is that you use ‘but B’ when you somehow want to restrict the
range of conclusions your audience might reasonably be expected to draw
from A or an assumption made manifest by A.12
Note that an account along these lines makes an explicit reference to
speakers, audiences and the interaction between the two. It conceives
speakers as agents trying to produce certain effects in the audience, who,
in order to succeed, must carefully calibrate their words. Language is
an instrument that enables speakers to achieve some of these goals—and
if there is a particular effect that is frequently intended, it is only to be
expected that language will provide conventional means of accomplishing
it.
What is more, this approach is useful even for vocabulary with truth-
conditional meaning, because it urges us to assess the contribution of
scrutinised expressions on its own merits, thus discouraging reductivism.
Take the example of normative vocabulary discussed in the previous
section. As I have already suggested, I think that the right way out of
the quagmire with normative vocabulary such as ‘interesting’ is to make a
distinction between the meaning of ‘interesting’ and a theory of interesting
things. This meaning is rather straightforward if you are allowed to ex-
plain it by appealing to the function ‘interesting’ standardly performs in a
conversational exchange. Roughly, by labelling something as interesting,
the speaker puts it forward as worth engaging with or intellectually stim-
ulating. An investigation into our motives for finding something worth
engaging with can be a respectable occupation for, say, a neuroscientist
12This is intended as a reference to the procedural theory of the meaning of ‘but’
by D. Blakemore in (Blakemore, 1987) and (Blakemore, 2002), pp.98-115, but there are
many variants that also fit the somewhat crude formulation I have given here. Actually,
traditional linguists have for a long time been aware of the range of pragmatic variables
that must be taken into account when explaining linguistic meaning—see (Ducrot et al.,
1980), pp.93-130.
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or an anthropologist, but has little to do with semantics.13 You may even
conclude that given the wide array of human interests and their high con-
textual sensitivity, no interesting theory of interesting things is as much as
possible. However, this would not make the meaning of ‘interesting’ any
more cryptic or ineffable.
I think that a story along these lines can also be told about conditionals.
Their meaning is one thing; how we come to believe them, when we
are disposed to abandon them and how we justify them, are related, but
different issues.14 In formal languages, these are two sides of the same coin.
However, inferences we legitimately draw in natural languages depend
on much more than the meaning of the expressions involved. One of the
central theses of this dissertation will therefore be that in natural language,
meaning alone does not determine logic. And I’ll also argue that there is
nothing like ‘the genuine logic’ of conditionals, as each formal system has
to make a pragmatic choice between the inferential features it sets out to
model and others that must be left out. As always with abstraction, the
one involved in logical modelling increases the precision of our inquiry by
reducing its focus.
Meaning, on this view, is an abstract notion that points towards the
standard function that a piece of vocabulary performs in a conversational
exchange. Remember bias? It was also an abstract concept devised to
facilitate talk about cases of unfair treatment. You could not touch it,
point your finger towards it, and what you really did not need was an
unorthodox metaphysics to warrant talking about it. I suggest a similar
picture is roughly applicable to meaning as well—it is a notion designed
to streamline exchanges about the correct use of vocabulary. And there
is no default way to explain how a particular expression should properly
be used.15 With a speaker of another language, you may provide a direct
13This is the very reason why explaining attributions of mental states as making an
implicit statement about brain properties, as in some crude versions of the identity theory
in epistemology, fails as an account of the meaning of such attributions; this, of course,
without prejudice to the obvious fact that brain states are vital for having the mental states
in question.
14Fortunately, I am not alone. The following passage is by T. Honderich: ‘[...] there
are two questions, one of them that of specifying the meaning of conditionals, the other
the general analysis of their grounds or premises. It is in fact this latter problem to which
philosophers have addressed themselves, despite their misdescription of it, and they have
had arguable things to say about it. Their efforts must be seen in a proper light, not the
one they supply.’ (Honderich, 1982), p.300.
15I admit that the extensive literature on the problem of normativity (very few issues
fail nowadays to spawn extensive literatures) takes me out of my depth and my ideas on
the topic are probably too blunt. Anyway, by ‘properly’ I simply mean something like
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translation (if there is one), otherwise you can try to find a paraphrase using
vocabulary she does understand, or a stab at a second-order explanation
of the linguistic function of the expression at issue. But gestures, especially
pointing towards relevant objects, and grimaces can turn out to be just as
effective.
An important point is that such explanations are not meant to be ex-
haustive. Just as you won’t learn to swim only by listening to your coach’s
instructions, helpful as they may be, you are usually not expected to be
able to use an expression perfectly just by understanding someone’s clar-
ification. Several rounds of trial and error might be needed before you
become proficient—we infer the meaning of most expressions, certainly in
our native language, without need for explicit explanations anyway. We
are so good at grasping meanings of words because the conversational
functions they serve strike us as natural. They are, as it were, cut out to
satisfy human communicative needs.16
For all the above reasons, I think that a more promising way of ap-
proaching the meaning of conditionals is by taking a look at the function
they are designed to carry out in real life communication. A review of such
a function need not suffice to provide a semantic reduction, but this is no
longer our aim anyway.
6.1.3. Conditional Speech Acts
John Austin famously reminded philosophers who still observed natural
language through the prism of formal calculi that we can do a lot more
with words than just assert descriptive contents. We can, for instance, also
ask for information, issue orders, give advice, make pledges, threats and
pronouncements, offer excuses, take oaths and undertake commitments.
We say that such utterances differ in their illocutive force. While with mere
assertions it makes sense to ask whether they are true or false, utterances
with other illocutive forces cannot always be felicitously characterised in
this way. Questions can at most be pertinent, advice useful, orders fulfilled
and promises kept. But truth can be useful in analysing such acts: questions
can be answered affirmatively if their propositional content is true, advice
is useful if it is true that following it leads to the intended outcome, a
‘effectively with respect to your audience’. I am inclined to chalk the difficulties with this
idea up to the need for broader linguistic coordination within a community.
16That’s why I have never fully understood the interest of Davidson’s project. What use
do we have for an abstract theory of meaning that has nothing to do with the way people
learn meanings in the real world? Doesn’t it necessarily lead to a skewed conception of
language?
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promise is kept if its content becomes, or rather is caused to be true at
an explicitly or implicitly specified later point. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that the standard function of a piece of vocabulary should not
wary wildly across utterances with different illocutive force. I would like
to make use of this intuition in the analysis of conditionals.
Indicative conditional clauses can appear in almost any kind of speech
act. Let us see a few examples:
Conditional advice and orders
(86) If you see the gabby professor approaching, run for your life!
(87) If you come under artillery fire, retreat immediately.
Conditional promises
(88) If you can spare a penny for my campaign, you will very soon see
some juicy tenders coming your way.
(89) I’ll pay you back this very week, provided he buys the stash.
Conditional excuses and pronouncements
(90) If the late-night karaoke party at my place caused you any trouble,
I am very sorry.
(91) If there are no objections by those present, I pronounce you man
and wife.
And there are even speech acts that are by their nature almost always
conditional, such as threats:
Conditional threats
(92) If you don’t cough up the cash, something nasty will happen to
your little rubber duck.
I believe we can distinguish the function the conditional clause per-
forms in most of the above examples very clearly—it seems to constrain
the scope of the speech act carried out by the utterance of the main clause.
The advice to run for your life is meant to be heeded only upon seeing the
talkative faculty member, the order to retreat only becomes binding in the
event of enemy bombardment, and of course your company may have to
wave the public contracts goodbye if you do not chip in any cash into the
party chest. Was the advice followed, the order fulfilled or the promise
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kept if the professor and the enemy gave you a break, and if the campaign
had to do without your contribution? The question sounds strange—we
feel that in such circumstances there was no advice, order or promise to
begin with.
The almost ridiculously trivial suggestion I would like to make here
is that the standard function of if-clauses is exactly the same in assertive
utterances as in utterances with other illocutionary forces. On this view,
if-clauses limit the scope of the assertion corresponding to the main clause
of the sentence, so that it only enters into force once the condition specified
in the antecedent is satisfied.
Of course, I would not dare to make any claim to originality with this
simple theory. Actually, it was given a much neater presentation more
than half a century ago:
Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise
this question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation
of the form ‘if p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a
conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent. If,
after we have made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out
true, then we consider ourselves committed to the consequent, and
are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If on the other
hand the antecedent turns out to have been false, our conditional
affirmation is as if it never had been made.
(Quine, 1966), p.12
We witness once again that classical authors had a much clearer idea what
they were up to than many of their contemporary peers.17
The anticlimactic contention that I also want to advance is that Quine’s
intuition is a basic fact about the meaning of indicative conditionals, which
is not to be explained by any deeper semantic insight. We have seen that it
is not necessarily the case that the inquiry into the meaning of an expression
must lead to surprising discoveries—you don’t expect them in the case of
‘apple’, so why should you in the case of ‘if’? Moreover, I think that even
on such a meagre basis, we can explain at least some of the more enigmatic
features of the behaviour of indicatives, such as the different logics to which
they give rise and their interaction with quantifiers.18
17See (Sanford, 1989), p.63, where Quine is interpreted as adopting a position on the
material conditional akin to the one we have attributed to Frege and Russell.
18Given the simplicity of this view and its copious theoretical advantages (to be pre-
sented in what follows), it is baﬄing how little following it has attracted—this attests to
the powerful grip of the traditional way of doing semantics. Among the authors who
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Conditional questions
But before moving on to those points, a few remarks are in order. For a start,
are there conditional questions? I have been conspicuously silent on this
issue, and for a reason—it seems to me that most examples of conditionals
embedded within questions we can come up with correspond to questions
about conditionals rather than genuine conditional questions:
Conditional questions?
(93) What will happen if I press this red button?
The question here is not subject to the antecedent obtaining—the very
answer to this question may prevent you from pressing the button in the
first place. You seem rather to be asking your audience to make an assertion
about what will happen, conditional on the assumption that you will press
the button.
We don’t seem to have much use for genuine conditional questions in
our language. We ask questions typically when we are in need of particular
information that our interlocutor can be expected to provide; if we subject
our questions to a condition, our interlocutor may simply no longer be
around to answer it when the condition becomes (known to be) fulfilled.
But this does not mean that they don’t or even can’t, strictly speaking,
exist. We get somewhat closer to conditional questions with a construction
such as:
(94) If he went to music school, how can his singing be this bad?
This is a peculiar (though proper) use of a conditional clause whose pur-
pose is to signal incredulity. Compare the following assertion:
(95) If he can work as an official interpreter, then so can my pet parrot.
have explicitly defended this view, D. Edgington stands out—however, she subscribes to
a rather traditional conception of truth, which detracts a little from the punch of what
may otherwise be the most enlightening theory of indicative conditionals on the market:
(Edgington, 2007). M. Woods has also defended it in (Woods, 1997), but he excluded
predictions from the scope of his theory, classifying will-indicatives, following Dudman,
together with subjunctives. DeRose and Grandy have applied it to the analysis of biscuit
conditionals (see Section 6.3.2), citing Quine as precursor: (DeRose and Grandy, 1999),
p.408. There is a useful historical review of analogous positions, although concerned
primarily with their mathematical implications, in (Milne, 1997), pp.197-212. All in all,
many theories of indicatives are not put forward as strict alternatives to the conditional-
assertion thesis, but rather as its elaborations, probably because such a meagre account is
deemed insufficient for the task of explaining meaning (see for instance (Jackson, 1987),
p.13). This is the assumption I am trying to question in this dissertation.
6.1. MEANING OF CONDITIONALS 161
Here you condition your question and your assertion on the antecedent
obtaining, pretending that you still do not know for sure whether it re-
ally does. The above-mentioned problems with conditional questions are
naturally circumvented, since assuming the antecedent does hold, your
question is for all effects and purposes immediate.
A completely genuine example of a conditional question might go as
follows: suppose your boss entrusts you with interviewing a sales repre-
sentative from another company you do not know much about and you
are to fill him in afterwards. He gives you the following note:
(96) If they sell rubber gum, what density is it? And if they sell chewing
gum, what flavour is it?
Of course, you are only expected to answer either question if the corre-
sponding antecedent is true.19
Subjunctives
Another point concerns subjunctive conditionals. In English, they are
usually distinguished from indicatives on a syntactic level by the presence
of a past modal in the main clause and a tense shift in the subordinate
clause. When such a modal has an independent non-conditional use, it
can of course be used indicatively, as in
(97) If he is as good as they say, he might give a boost to our team.
or
(98) If he discovered the truth about the President’s dirty secrets, he
would be dead in a week’s time.20
However, in genuine subjunctive cases the main clause is not autonomous
and requires at least a tacit subjunctive antecedent.21 That’s why plug-
ging an indicative conditional clause to a subjunctive main clause doesn’t
usually produce a meaningful sentence:
(I-S*) If he knows how to solve this exercise, he would not flunk the test.*
The upshot is that subjunctives really make up a distinct category, and
are not just ‘woulds restricted by a conditional clause’.
19For a similar stance on conditional questions, see (Woods, 1997), pp.76-77.
20The example is adapted from (Bennett, 2003), pp.10-11.
21Compare (Woods, 1997), p.9 and (Veltman, 2005), pp.160-161.
162 CHAPTER 6. CONDITIONAL SPEECH ACTS
The job of the main clause of a conditional sentence is to specify the
illocutionary force of the utterance. Therefore, a genuinely subjunctive
‘would’ seems to rule out such speech acts as orders and direct advice
(which require the imperative mood), promises (typically expressed by
means of ‘will’), pronouncements, excuses and commitments (which don’t
seem to work properly without the directness of the indicative).22 Admit-
tedly, one could quite plausibly argue that you can express a promise by
means of a subjunctive, as in
(99) If you washed the dishes, I would do the laundry/would be very
grateful,
but I have mixed intuitions about these examples. At most, I think they
may amount to indirect speech acts, in which the conventional illocution-
ary force of a sentence is used to make a different, but related contribution.
Telling you what would happen if you did certain things entitles you to
expect a certain behaviour from me, whereby I indirectly become condi-
tionally committed to such a course of action.
My hypothesis is, then, that subjunctive conditionals are convention-
ally used to perform simple and not conditional assertions. Subjunctive
consequents are inseparable from their antecedents, and can thus intro-
duce no independent speech-act which in turn could be restricted by the
subordinate clause. I shall take up the topic of subjunctives and their rela-
tion to indicatives in the following chapter—I shall argue that subjunctives
are used to make claims about the world that are directly related to the
acceptability of genuine conditional predictions.
Returning to our exploration of the functions of subjunctives, it is be-
yond doubt that there are meaningful questions featuring a subjunctive
conditional clause:
(100) What would have happened if Nixon had pressed the red button?
22This phenomenon is quite stable across a range of different Indo-European languages.
Regardless of the tense used in the antecedent of a subjunctive, most Romance, Germanic
and Slavic languages use a special structure in the main clause, which has severely
restricted uses beyond subjunctive conditional contexts. An exception would be Dutch,
which can use simple past both in antecedent and consequent to express subjunctives
(this us is sometimes found in old-fashioned English as well); however, there is also
another option more akin to the structure used in English and note that neither can
simple past accomplish many of the non-assertive tasks available to conditionals with
indicative antecedents. I’ve also been told that Chinese doesn’t mark the distinction
between subjunctives and indicatives syntactically at all, and the intended interpretation
must be worked out pragmatically. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to comment on
this.
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This, together with the fact that subjunctive antecedents cannot in general
be used to restrict the scope of otherwise autonomous speech acts, further
reinforces my suspicion that most of what might appear as conditional
questions are simply questions about conditional assertions.
6.2. Restriction through indicatives
In the following two sections I will try to explain why we are better off
keeping a thin meaning for indicative conditionals, disappointing though
such a choice may be from the point of view of explanatory power. My
suggestion is not that such a modest theory of meaning can account for
all the puzzles indicatives face us with, nor is my intention to shrug off
as irrelevant the puzzles others have worked so hard to solve. On the
contrary, I would like to reinterpret the insights of Adams’s and Kratzer’s
theory as pertaining not to the meaning of conditionals itself, but rather to
the way we put this meaning into work in different contexts. I will show
that this approach has several non-negligible advantages.
I wish I had more to say about the function of conditionals in restricting
natural language quantifiers. I think it is an important topic that can shed
a lot of light on how indicative conditionals work in natural language.
And I have to admit that I do not have a seamless account of how their
function in restricting complete speech acts, which I deem basic, makes
them also apt for restricting some quantifiers within assertions themselves.
However, I will take advantage of this opportunity to make some half-
baked speculations.
6.2.1. Modals
We have seen that Kratzer’s construal of bare indicative conditionals as
implicitly modalised faces several difficulties.23 The examples we have
inspected suggest that modals perform the very same job in conditional
consequents as in non-conditional sentences. It is therefore not necessary to
modify the above minimal theory of indicatives to account for modalised
consequents, as long as the modals involved admit of non-conditional
uses. What is more, the theory has no difficulty explaining those bare
conditionals that resist explicit modalising. It also allows us to give a
straightforward account of the so-called biscuit conditionals, as we shall
23See page 119.
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see in the following section. It is not clear how Kratzer’s theory can rise to
this challenge.
I for one do not think it is necessary or particularly enlightening to
conceive of modals as quantifiers. It can be illustrative in some respects,
as when ‘it is possible that ψ’ is rendered as ‘there exists a possibility
involving ψ’, but I submit that it is rather an abstract reconstruction than a
precise account of the message these modals convey. If you disagree, just
think of how often you have as much as a hazy idea of the relevant range of
possibilities when you utter a modal. Or think of the fact that usually, for
you to utter ‘may ψ’ properly, ψmust be a distinct and relevant possibility
in the context—this requires the corresponding range of possibilities to
vary constantly and we seem to have no sound and independent grip on
these variations. Last but not least, some uses of modals (like that of ‘can’
in ‘he can swim’) are rather difficult to reconstruct in this manner.24
The question remains as to how we should treat subjunctives—this will
be the topic of the next chapter. ‘Would’ is a special expression, which
requires at least an indirectly mentioned subjunctive conditional clause in
order to work properly. Unlike with other modals, a consequent featuring
‘would’ cannot usually be used to perform an independent speech act and
thus cannot normally be constrained by an indicative antecedent.25
Again, I don’t think that treating ‘would’ as a quantifier is more than a
matter of technical convenience. Its alleged duality with ‘might’ may give
some independent plausibility to such a move26, but I remain sceptical
about this possibility in view of Stalnaker’s observation that
(101) A  C
is usually felt as equivalent to
(102) It might be that A  C.27
24I have become wary of semantic analyses placing a lot of weight on modals—the
latter accomplish too many different tasks in natural language to allow a straightforward
uniform treatment. I have come to surmise that our notion of a ‘modal’ is primarily
syntactic in nature. However, as my background in linguistics is sorely lacking, these are
little more than unstudied hunches.
25There are of course exceptions, such as ‘If you have a glass of juice at hand, I would
appreciate it.’ However, I think here the consequent is used to perform an indirect speech
act, and as such, it doesn’t amount to a counterexample to the above contention.
26See Section 4.2.2.
27(Stalnaker, 1981), p.99. However, I don’t think this shows that the scope of ‘might’ is
actually the whole conditional, as Stalnaker contends. I am only interested in arguing that
‘might’ performs by and large the same function in counterfactuals as in non-conditional
statements, and that the fact that you can sometimes do without ‘would’ when you use
‘might’ is a mere quirk peculiar to English.
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Moreover, in many Slavic languages, such as Russian, Serbocroat or Slo-
vak, but also, for instance, in Dutch) this is the default and only way of
expressing might-counterfactuals—you must use an adverb such as ‘per-
haps’. In Spanish, you can use a form of ‘poder’ (may) analogous to ‘might
have + participle’, but in a tense that is used to translate ‘would+verb’
constructions in English (‘podrı´a haber + participio’).
6.2.2. Lewis’s quantifier restriction
Once we have taken care of modals (basically by noting that we do not
have to take care of them), it remains to explain Lewis’s original insight
about the role of conditionals in restricting quantifier domains. Recall that
it concerned examples such as
(70) Always, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it now and then.28
This is what Lewis had to say about the use of conditionals in proposi-
tions such as (70):
What is the price for the restriction-marking if to be a sentential con-
nective after all? Exorbitant: it can be done if (1) we use a third truth
value, (2) we adopt a far-fetched interpretation of the connective if,
and (3) we impose an additional permanent restriction on the admis-
sible cases. Let If Ψ,Φ have the same truth value as Φ if Ψ is true,
and let it be third-valued if Ψ is false or third-valued. Let a case be
admissible only if it makes the modified sentence either true or false,
rather than third-valued. Then (39) is equivalent to (38) for all our
adverbs, as desired [...].
(Lewis, 1975), p.15
Lewis does his best to make these three requirements seem overly dramatic,
but a closer look reveals that they follow quite naturally from Quine’s
interpretation of indicatives as conditional assertions. The ‘far-fetched
interpretation of the connective if ’ is simply the one we have opted for in
this chapter.
I think this entitles us to surmise that in cases of quantifier restriction
by conditionals, the scope of the quantifier is simply the whole conditional.
An adverb of universal quantification, such as ‘always’, applied to a con-
ditional, guarantees that anything that satisfies the antecedent will also
satisfy the consequent. ‘Sometimes’, on the other hand, is used to make
28See page 115.
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known that some of the things that satisfy the antecedent also satisfy the
consequent.
As for vacuous cases, I wouldn’t worry too much about them. They
are very important in logic and mathematics, but much less so in real
life. Our intuitions about them are not clear—and they can’t be, since a
vacuous quantified conditional, despite its syntactic complexity, makes no
evaluable assertion to begin with. There is thus no point in using it and as
a result, we don’t. This is exactly the reason why most competent speakers
of English unacquainted with first-order logic will be amazed to learn that
‘All As are Bs’ doesn’t ‘really’ imply ‘Some As are Bs’. Actually, the fact
that our theory predicts the awkwardness of vacuous uses of quantified
indicatives should count as a virtue rather than a drawback.
All this is admittedly very tentative and needs to be complemented by
a deeper understanding of natural language quantifiers, which I unfortu-
nately lack. Still, in view of the results I have briefly sketched here, I think
some of the preliminary intuitions shoring up a conservative approach
deserve at least the benefit of the doubt. My principal aim in this section
was negative—to show that the language phenomena described by Lewis
and Kratzer do not directly threaten the minimal theory of indicative con-
ditionals I have advanced in the foregoing. We seem to be able to stick to a
uniform treatment of indicatives across the wide range of their uses, which
is in itself a worthwhile achievement. In the rest of this chapter, I will try to
argue that the minimal theory actually fares better on a number of issues
than an interpretation of Adams’s semantics that has become standard.
6.3. Probability and indicatives
I have claimed that abstract systems of logic as a rule trade off generality
for precision in modelling a specific aspect of the inferential behaviour of a
piece of vocabulary, and I believe that Adams’s probability logic is a case in
point. It is extremely useful as an account of why certain valid inferences
involving material conditionals sound paradoxical when translated by
ordinary ifs. However, it leads up a blind alley when conceived as an
account of the latter’s meaning.29
The reasoning behind such a construal seems to be as follows: since
29It is not clear that Adams himself favoured this interpretation—I am inclined to
think not, as he does not tend to express the purport of his theory in this way and avoids
becoming entangled in the philosophical confusions to which it gives raise. I think it is in
this connection that B. Skyrms dubs Adams’s theory ‘pragmatic’, rather than ‘semantic’,
although he doesn’t elaborate much on the distinction: (Skyrms, 1994), p.13.
6.3. PROBABILITY AND INDICATIVES 167
the truth-functional semantics for the material conditional gives rise to
paradoxes, the ordinary ‘if’ cannot be material. This means that it must
possess a different semantics, which yields ‘the right logic’. The proba-
bility interpretation of indicatives has independent motivation and, what
is more, doesn’t validate the controversial inference patterns. This makes
it into a good candidate for elucidating the meaning of natural language
indicatives.
The problem with this argument is that while it rejects the material in-
terpretation of conditionals, it doesn’t question the theoretical framework
in which that interpretation is set. Surreptitiously, it exports to natural
language analysis the way of talking about meaning suited primarily to
the purposes of a formal calculus. But if the hypothesis of the preceding
section is true, then the inferential patterns we observe in natural language
are not the sole product of the meaning of the expressions involved—this is
a mere simplification that makes formal calculi so handy to use. So despite
the appearances, the job of the semantics of a formal system devised to
model the behaviour of a natural language expression does not necessarily
consist in specifying the meaning of the latter.
Possible world semantics provides a particularly telling example in this
respect—it sometimes comes in useful in order to model certain features of
modal talk perspicuously, but it does not offer any insight into the actual
meaning of modals (that is, into the kind of function they perform in our
conversational exchanges) unless one accepts an extreme realism about
possible worlds and a descriptive construal of modal talk. Indeed, an
inadequate conception of the job of formal semantics seems to be at the
heart of such an outlandish philosophical position.30
Adams’s semantics is, in my view, a good approximation to the dy-
namics of our conditional beliefs; in particular, I believe it gives a correct
explanation of our intuitions about the paradoxes of material implication.
But we should not get misled by the word ‘semantics’—the many merits
of Adams’s theory do not compel us to draw the conclusion that indicative
conditionals are mere devices for expressing subjunctive conditional prob-
abilities. And that is just as well, as such a view is ridden with difficulties.
6.3.1. Subjectivity and truth
The first and foremost problem with taking probability semantics for in-
dicatives too seriously is that the latter then seem to be unfettered by any
constraints imposed by objective reality. If the meaning of an indicative is
30See Section 4.3.1.
168 CHAPTER 6. CONDITIONAL SPEECH ACTS
simply ‘My subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the
antecedent is high’, then no matter how outlandish your belief system is,
your assertion of an indicative will be unassailable provided you describe
it correctly. This, of course, is at loggerheads with our intuitions about
conditional assertions—I don’t have to suspect you have been insincere
or confused about your own beliefs in order to put your indicative into
question.
A traditional way to counter this problem is to resort to some kind of
expressivism about indicatives. As we have seen, logical empiricists orig-
inally came up with semantic expressivism as a strategy to account for the
meaning of those utterances that didn’t seem to make claims about pos-
sible experience. They explained moral injunctions, aesthetic judgements
and in general any assertion whose acceptability could not ultimately be
decided by appealing to some sensory experience, such as the outcome of
an experiment, as expressions of subject’s internal states, such as wishes,
preferences, plans or impulses. They were considered to be just a sophis-
ticated alternative to screams, sighs and smiles, and as such they could
not properly be labelled as either true or false—predicates reserved for
descriptions of physical reality as it might appear to our senses.
Even though logical empiricists are few and far in between nowadays,
there has been a proliferation of different sorts of expressivism, with often
very different theoretical backgrounds. Most of them have blurred the
divide between properly empirical or descriptive statements and those that
have expressive content, accepting that truth and falsity can be predicated
of all of them. Sometimes, an expressivist position seems to boil down to
the contention that not all proper assertions are ‘descriptive’.31
In this dissertation I have distinguished between ‘unproblematic de-
scriptions’ and descriptions simpliciter. Unproblematic descriptions are
direct translations of sensory input into basic descriptive vocabulary and
only exist in a linguistic Switzerland.32 However, once we realise that
descriptions are hardly ever this straightforward, I think there is no im-
pediment to attributing a descriptive import even to highly theoretical or
normative vocabulary. It is quite natural to conceive statements such as ‘X
is interesting’ or ‘Person Y holds belief Z’ as describing the environment
or, if you like, ‘the world’—I surmise that those who deny this have in
fact something akin to the unproblematic notion of description in mind.
31See (Fra´polli and Villanueva, 2012).
32A good example of this is the relation between states of affairs and elementary
propositions in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (which, incidentally, deeply inspired logical
positivists)—the immediacy of translation is guaranteed by the structural isomorphism
between the two.
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However, we shall see in the following chapter that even much more el-
ementary claims about the world than those that have traditionally been
consigned to the expressive realm are far from unproblematic.
To sum up, while many contemporary strands of expressivism are
admittedly very subtle, I think that we should in principle be wary of an
explanatory strategy originally necessitated by a conception of language
as inadequate as that of logical positivists. We certainly do not need it in
order to explain the meaning of indicative conditionals. When uttering a
conditional, you simply are making a conditional assertion, an assertion
subject to the antedecedent obtaining. Despite its indirectness, such an
assertion amounts to a valid autonomous move in a language game and it
can in turn be endorsed or rejected by other speakers, which is sufficient
for truth or falsity. There are thus no mysteries about what indicatives
mean and how they accomplish this task.
Now, of course, in order to properly use a conditional, just as with any
other sentence, you should make sure that it is the right thing to assert.
Here is where conditional probability enters the picture. To be certain
about a conditional assertion is often to have confidence that the assertion
will be true should it enter into force. High conditional probability of
the consequent given the antecedent is therefore exactly what you need—
that’s why it was called conditional probability in the first place (long before
disputes about semantics of conditionals saw the light of the day). Just as
the fact that we make ordinary assertions based on the subjective proba-
bility that we award to the proposition thus expressed doesn’t make those
propositions subjective, the fact that we make them based on our subjective
conditional probabilities doesn’t make conditional assertions subjective.
As we have seen, if you make truth into the rock bottom of any seman-
tic inquiry, a simplistic descriptive picture of language is often a natural
consequence. Asked about what makes a particular utterance of a sentence
have the truth value it does, there is, on this picture, not much more to
answer than ‘the way things are’ or simply ‘the world as it is’. Being true
then means representing the reality faithfully. As a result, the fact that
most indicative conditionals are only useful in situations of uncertainty, as
Lewis’s and Edgington’s proofs show, invites the conclusion that they can
almost never be properly said to be true or false.33
I submit we should pay more heed to our linguistic gut feelings and
resist this temptation. Once you conceive of language as a device for hu-
33This is a conclusion that Bennett takes to enormous lengths—with a few careful
exceptions, he never calls an indicative true or false throughout the entire (Bennett, 2003).
What a remarkable and superfluous feat!
170 CHAPTER 6. CONDITIONAL SPEECH ACTS
man communication rather than a bunch of syntactic rules together with
a semantics that divides your sentences into two disjoint classes, truth
itself will be in need of clarification. Truth is then not some kind of mys-
terious property of uttered sentences, but rather a device speakers use
among other things to endorse assertions which they for some reason do
not wish to or cannot repeat themselves.34 The nature of these assertions
is completely irrelevant—they can of course be descriptive, but they can
also convey modalised statements, value judgements, precepts and in-
structions, advice, censure or, for that matter, indicative conditionals. The
grounds upon which speakers may make these assertions are undoubtedly
interesting, but do not seem to have much to do with the nature of truth.
Triviality results, contra a generalised interpretation, do not show that
indicative conditionals are somehow non-factual, as opposed to regular,
descriptive propositions. The only distinction these proofs warrant is be-
tween conditional and non-conditional sentences—the latter may express,
as we have seen, all kinds of non-descriptive propositions. The fact that
conditionals non-trivially increase the expressive power of our language
with respect to non-conditional sentences is no good reason to deny truth-
aptness to conditional assertions. There is no law to the effect that only
assertional contents representable as sets of possible worlds deserve the
lofty title of ‘proposition’. It is people, not possible worlds, who attribute
truth or falsity to assertions. In natural conversation, indicative condition-
als are readily treated as true or false—if our theory forbids this, maybe
we should change the theory instead of our, in this case utterly innocent,
linguistic habits.
6.3.2. Biscuit and other conditionals
Even though many indicatives are asserted based on an inference whose
propriety they in turn serve to sanction, which makes their association
with conditional probabilities natural, this is by no means always the case.
Austin came up with an example that has given a name to a whole group
of such conditionals:
(103) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.35
Note that even though this sentence sounds completely natural to our ears,
it differs from most ordinary indicatives we utter in that the consequent
34This is the view advocated in (Fra´polli, 2013).
35(Austin, 1970), p.210. Austin used this example to show that not all ifs were ‘causal
conditional’, but did not further elaborate on the phenomenon.
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is felt to be independent of the truth of the antecedent. The subordinate
clause does not limit the truth of the main clause—typically, you will be
deemed to have committed yourself to the presence of biscuits on the
sideboard whether I want them or not. Neither does the antecedent play
any role in inferring the consequent; the latter has usually been ascertained
on independent grounds. It seems, rather, that the antecedent specifies the
circumstances in which the contribution made by the consequent would
somehow be to the point.
The foregoing suggests that invoking conditional probability cannot
directly explain the assertibility of the above conditional—arguably, p(C/A)
is high, but this is only because p(C) is high irrespective of the value of A and
Gricean considerations would therefore strongly recommend asserting C
instead of A→ C. However, this doesn’t square with our intuitions about
(103)—in a typical context of utterance, it would be rather more appropriate
than mere
(104) There are biscuits on the table.
How come? If conditional probability is all there is to indicative con-
ditionals, there is no reason to go for a whole conditional instead of its
consequent.36 You may of course try to explain (103) and its kin as deviant
conditionals that acquire their standard interpretation by means of some
kind of pragmatic adjustment, such as conversational implicature. But this
contradicts the spontaneity with which we utter biscuit conditionals—we
don’t seem to perceive any tension in such utterances, as we probably
should if they were to trigger a conversational implicature. Moreover,
it is not clear how you could calculate something like a ‘contextual rele-
vance interpretation’ out of the meagre semantic input provided by the
probability calculus.
According to M. Franke, there are actually two questions to be an-
swered in relation to biscuit conditionals : (i) how their independence
interpretation arises, and (ii) what their discursive function is.37. I think
the answer to the first one has to do with shared world knowledge. Both
you and I know that your wanting the biscuits cannot by any means bring
about their presence on the sideboard, so it is safe for me to conclude that
you have independent grounds to assert the consequent. Furthermore,
36The difference with ‘even-if’ conditionals is that the latter are properly uttered in a
situation where the consequent is by and large accepted and therefore assertible, but there
remains a doubt as to whether it will still hold in the (extreme) circumstances specified by
the antecedent. With typical utterances of biscuit conditionals, however, there is no such
residual doubt—the independence between the antecedent and the consequent is total.
37(Franke, 2007), p.92
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different background assumptions can trigger different interpretations of
the same conditional:
(105) If you need me, I’ll be there.
is ambiguous between a standard and a ‘biscuit’ interpretation. Your
conditional can be interpreted as informing me of the place where I can
find you in case I need help (and which obviously does not depend on my
needing help or not), but also as a conditional pledge to lend me a hand
whenever I cannot fend for myself on my own.38
As for the second question, we have seen that in (103), the antecedent
specifies the condition under which the utterance of the consequent is
relevant, rather than true. But there are other possibilities as well:
(106) The euro is an economic basket case, if you ask me.
(107) If I may say so, your wife has a very strange sense of humour.
In these cases, the function of the antecedent consists in hedging the asser-
tion of the consequent against possible social inappropriateness.
The question is, should we postulate a different meaning for each of
the above uses of conditional clauses (introducing an epistemic, relevance,
and social acceptability restriction)? At this point it should be obvious
that the answer is negative. With our minimal semantics for indicative
conditionals, we can straightforwardly account for this usage. Just as
you can use the same hammer to bang in nails and crush coconuts, you
can condition your assertions to achieve a number of different discursive
effects. Perhaps most of the times it is because you cannot guarantee that
your assertion will be true unless the condition holds, but there are other
possibilities as well.
In (103), your assertion is conditional upon my wanting the biscuits, in
which way you manage to convey information about the intended purport
of your assertion. To understand better what is going on, think of the
following two exchanges:
Dialogue 1
38DeRose and Grandy sometimes speak as if it these implicatures were due to different
speaker’s motivations (relevance and probability) in making the assertion: (DeRose and
Grandy, 1999), pp.413-414. I think the right thing to say is rather that it is the presence of
these contextual implicatures which triggers the biscuit or epistemic reading of the con-
ditional assertion in question. This is just splitting hairs, though—I otherwise agree that
biscuit conditionals provide the best evidence for speech-act-based theories of indicatives
(but see footnote 42).
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You: Do you want any biscuits?
Me: Well, not really—I am a coeliac. But thanks for
asking.
You: Don’t mention it.
Dialogue 2
You: Do you want any biscuits?
Me: Actually I do. I’ve grown rather hungry after all
the hula-hooping.
You: There are some on the sideboard.
Me: Thanks.
You: Don’t mention it.
Observe that in both dialogues, the question that opens the exchange
can be interpreted as making an offer rather than merely asking for infor-
mation, but this is accidental. The main point is that whether you make
your assertion about the biscuits or not depends on my answer to that
question—if I don’t want them, there is no point in drawing my attention
to their location.
The simple contention I want to put forward here is that a biscuit
conditional streamlines the exchange by avoiding the intermediary step
of my explicit answer to your question by transforming the latter into the
antecedent of a conditional. And it can accomplish this task simply in
virtue of the standard meaning of indicative conditionals I have explored
above—there is no need to posit any deviant interpretation of the if-clause.
The different flavours in which biscuit conditionals come have to do more
with the directionality of the conversation at hand than with the actual
meaning of indicatives.39 Far from being ‘jejune’40, the topic of biscuit
39Franke comes to a similar conclusion in (Franke, 2007), but he is in my view overly
optimistic about the prospects of explaining biscuit conditionals with the exclusive re-
course to standard dynamic semantics. If the only purpose of an utterance is to effect
a change in a context set represented by a set of possible worlds, then in case of (103),
updating with the consequent is of course tantamount, or even preferable, to updating
with the whole conditional. It is not clear how contexts thus construed can codify infor-
mation about ‘optimality of utterance’ to remedy this difficulty. I think that to bestow
more plausibility on his approach, Franke implicitly refers to the intuitions underlying and
justifying the dynamic semantics (such as those we have presented here), not the formal
structure itself. In particular, this structure cannot explain utterances of conditionals as
conditional utterances.
40(Bennett, 2003), p.126
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conditionals shows the superiority of a lean account of this meaning.
Finally, while biscuit uses of indicatives are extremely common, as far
as I know nobody has come up with a plausible example of a subjunctive
biscuit conditional. Mackie suggested
(108) He was there all the time, had I but known.41
but it doesn’t strike me as very convincing. It doesn’t seem to admit of
standard paraphrases—it is much better rendered as
(109) If only had I known that he was there all the time!
This further shores up the conjecture, made in Section 6.1.3, to the effect that
subjunctives are used to make simple rather than conditional assertions.42
6.3.3. The futile search for the ‘right’ logic
We have already seen that if you construe indicative conditionals exclu-
sively as vehicles for conveying information about subjective conditional
probabilities, you will be tempted to posit polysemy each time you en-
counter a use resistant to such explanation. This happened with biscuit
conditionals, and this happens again when it comes to the material condi-
tional. In my view, perhaps the most egregious claim that the conflation
of formal and natural languages in modern philosophy of language has
engendered is the claim that in the context of mathematics, our ordinary
indicative conditionals all of a sudden change their meaning and become
truth-conditional. So it would seem that we sometimes utter our condi-
tionals as Adams’s conditionals, sometimes as material conditionals and
sometimes as relevance or biscuit conditionals. On this view, to under-
stand a speaker’s intent in uttering a conditional, you first have to resolve
the vagueness that underlies natural language ifs.
41(Mackie, 1973), p.73
42Even though everything seems to be falling into place, to be perfectly frank with
you, I must admit to some residual doubts about whether this is all there is to be said
about biscuits—there are several grammatical conjunctions apart from if that can switch
between relating contents and speech acts. Compare ‘Since you were so loyal to me, I
haven’t revealed your hideout to the police’ and ‘It was nice of you to accompany me,
but you needn’t have done it’ with ‘Since you were so loyal to me, here are the keys to
my bedroom’ and ‘It was nice of you to accompany me, but now just leave me alone!’ So
maybe we should make the distinction between conditioning contents on the one hand
and speech-acts on the other also for indicatives conditionals. I suspect, however, that
this distinction would make little difference in our case—C conditioned upon A would
count as asserted with A turning out to be true, and there would be no asserted content,
and hence no assertion, in case A came out false.
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I think that this is either a very infelicitous way to express a platitude
(every uttered expression has to be interpreted in a pertinent context if
we want to grasp the speaker’s purport), or a token of a deeply flawed
semantic methodology. Unfortunately, most scholars seem to lean towards
the latter option. Needless to say, one of the main goals of this dissertation
is to show the unreasonableness of gratuitous ascriptions of polysemy to
indicatives.
To think that our conditionals possess different linguistic meanings on
different occasions of use conflicts directly with Grice’s Modified Occam’s
Razor43, which sums up some of the most fundamental intuitions guiding
semantic analysis. This position, moreover, sometimes requires attributing
proficiency in manipulating meanings with which a person may be com-
pletely unfamiliar (in the case of the material conditional). How come that
pre-Fregean mathematicians used conditionals in their work without feel-
ing the urge to warn the reader that their meaning differed substantially
from that of vulgar ifs?
Those who attribute different meanings to what seems to be a unitary
expression have to shoulder the burden of explaining how the homonymy
they posit comes about. In extreme cases, it will be down to pure accident,
as when originally distinct roots evolve into the same linguistic form.
However, this can’t be the case with indicatives, whose divergent uses all
seem to preserve some crucial trappings of conditionality. Our task is thus
to explain what it is about ‘ifs’ that makes them naturally fit to play all
these roles.
We ordinarily tend to chalk up divergent, but acceptable uses of our
vocabulary to contextual pressures triggering a range of pragmatic effects
over a common semantic core. Why, then, should we treat the case of con-
ditionals any different? I think the answer again has to do with the flawed
theoretical background from which we approach the problem. Since to
put forward a theory of conditionals has come to mean tp devise a formal
deductive system with a suitable semantics, if two different systems are
equally useful in different contexts, the recourse to polysemy seems as the
obvious way to go.
Nevertheless, this temptation should be resisted lest we end up riding
roughshod over the MOR. Remember that formal semantics, despite its
name, does not have to be construed as establishing the meaning of the
expression under study. It suffices if the semantics models some features
of its use in a useful and interesting way. These features may be motivated
by its meaning, but they may also be due to accidental properties of a
43See Section 1.3.1.
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prominent context of use. I believe this is exactly the case with the material
interpretation of indicative conditionals.
Mathematicians had been using conditionals in their expositions long
before Frege came up with his ingenious conditional stroke. This tech-
nical device (and Frege never doubted that it was one), despite raising
many doubts as to whether it was an adequate counterpart for ‘if’, proved
miraculously useful in codifying conditionals in mathematics. Hence the
natural idea that this simple truth-functional account, bolstered by a few
pragmatic considerations, might encompass all uses of ‘if’ in our language.
We have by now seen this theoretical hunch to be unsustainable. How-
ever, once they recognised the inviability of the project of reducing all ifs
to material conditionals, most scholars only switched their bets to another
horse, while keeping the reductionist mindset. Instead of returning to the
point of departure, where the material conditional was a mere formal con-
trivance designed to emulate some of the functions of natural indicatives,
they asked: if indicatives are not material conditionals, what are they? Or
in other words: if the truth-functional semantics doesn’t capture the mean-
ing of ifs, which semantics does? And since probability-based semantics
fared far better on most counts (and for a good reason, as we shall presently
see) than the truth-functional one, it was handed the palm by all but a few
eccentric champions of the material conditional.
Let me repeat myself, just to drive this important point home. Applica-
tion of probability to the study of how people use conditionals is more than
welcome. The crux of the problem lies elsewhere—it is the assumption that
formal semantics, including Adams’s, always spells out the core meaning
of the modelled expression. That’s why we have run into problems such
as those I have surveyed in this section—subjectivity, truth and biscuit
conditionals. And here comes another—if we assume that the only job of
indicatives is to express subjective conditional probabilities, then the use
of conditionals in mathematics, where the recourse to probability appears
out of place, becomes a conundrum again.44
With the minimal account of meaning championed here, there is no
reason for such worries. Conditionals perform the same function in math-
ematics as everywhere else. However, the peculiar context of mathematics
has a distinct impact on how this function translates into actual inferential
behaviour. This, I submit, is how we should go about explaining the sur-
prising usefulness of the material conditional in formalising mathematical
reasoning.
Ironically, in order to explain in detail why indicatives behave like ma-
44See (Suppes, 1994), p.5.
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terial conditionals in certain contexts, it is extremely helpful to look at the
positive arguments marshalled by the diehard supporters of the identity
thesis. If we can pinpoint the precise juncture at which they go awry, we
can perhaps identify the assumptions that underlie a material interpreta-
tion of indicatives and show that they typically accompany mathematical
reasoning, but may fail in other contexts.
The arguments by W.H. Hanson in (Hanson, 1991) are a good case in
point. In itself, Hanson’s work shows a crass disregard for the niceties of
the debate about the meaning of indicatives and doesn’t even attempt to
address the many compelling objections that have been raised against the
identity thesis. The argument is surprisingly simple-minded: with the help
of conditional proof (deduction theorem), you can derive a conditional
from a disjunction; since the other direction is uncontroversial and the
conditional proof is valid, conditionals are equivalent to disjunctions—
just as the identity thesis maintained the whole time.45 Naı¨ve as it is, the
very simplicity of this argument allows us to put our finger on the precise
spot where the material interpretation of indicative conditionals kicks in.
Of course, the real question, shrugged off by Hanson, is whether rea-
soning by conditional proof should be regarded as valid for indicatives in
the first place. We have seen that it is not valid for Adams’s conditionals.46
This is because conditional antecedents are treated as new information
that can wreak havoc among the previously accepted premises. Appar-
ently oblivious to Adams’s arguments, Hanson contends that
For the antecedent of the indicative conditional “If A, then B” asks
us to suppose that (in addition to whatever else we may believe) it
is in fact the case that “A”. It thus seems appropriate that cp for
indicative conditionals merely adds “A” to the stock of sentences that
have already been assumed or derived.47
(Hanson, 1991), p.59
So how do antecedents of conditionals work in real life? Can the minimal
theory of meaning (if it deserves such a name at all) I have advanced here
decide this question?
45An analogous argument, with exactly the same weak spots, is presented in (Rieger,
2013), pp.3163-3167.
46See page 38.
47Compare (Rieger, 2013), p.3164, on A |= B → C: ‘What is distinctive about the
indicative conditional is that, in making the assumption of B, we leave A undisturbed.
The conditional concerns how things are, not how they might be, and the supposition of
B plays the role of additional information about the world.’
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The answer is that it cannot and it is good that it cannot, because
the impact of an antecedent on the rest of our beliefs is not a matter of
meaning of the indicative conditional involved, but is rather determined
by the entire inferential context within which the conditional is asserted
or evaluated. Once again, in making a conditional assertion, you commit
yourself to the consequent in case the antecedent turns out to be true. In a
normal setting, you are aware that certain eventualities would make you
change your mind about what is actually the case, and the use of indicative
conditionals naturally reflects this fact. Since Adams’s probability logic is
designed to take the possibility of precisely such changes of mind into
account, it is in a good position to explain why inference patterns such as
CAC and NAAC sound paradoxical.48
However, sometimes your antecedent will be independent of your other
beliefs and as such will function just as an additional premise. Or you may
legitimately decide that you are going to keep some of your premises
fixed, in order, say, to explore their inferential power. This can be done
implicitly, or explicitly, for instance in the form of an axiomatic system.
In such circumstances, the antecedent of an indicative conditional will be
correctly construed as asking you to suppose that it is true in addition to
whatever else you may believe, just as Hanson would have it. It is therefore
no coincidence at all that material conditionals made their entrance in
the philosophy of language together with the first serious attempts at
axiomatising mathematics—as in a monotonic system you can derive a
conditional from a disjunction and vice-versa, you can simply substitute
the former for the latter.
That this fixing of the premises often occurs implicitly and sometimes
even unconsciously is witnessed by the fact that inference patterns such
as contraposition, hypothetical syllogism and antecedent strengthening
(that all have counterexamples in natural reasoning) have been regarded
as valid throughout the history of logic, while there was no question of
justifying them by recourse to a truth-functional semantics for the con-
ditionals involved. This is because it is often very useful to work in a
monotonic inferential system, where your axioms and auxiliary premises
are temporarily sheltered from doubt, in order to see how far you can go
without having to shed them. Once you find the consequences of your
axioms unpalatable, you will be compelled to abandon the system as a
whole and try your luck with another one.49 In the meantime, however,
48See page 10.
49The classical requirement that axioms be ‘self-evident’ is independent from the ax-
iomatic method itself and has been regarded as superseded at least since the advent of
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the idealisation presupposed by keeping the axioms unassailable greatly
streamlines the inferential process by justifying the use of stronger rules of
inference.
Ordinary reasoning, on the other hand, has to adapt dynamically to new
information and cannot choose to protect beliefs from contrary evidence
at will. This is because we use the information at our disposal chiefly to
make decisions. We cannot afford to make wrong decisions ‘for the sake of
the argument’, as their consequences will be here to stay even if we change
our mind afterwards.
Adams’s logic, by taking into account all Kolmogorov probability dis-
tributions, makes allowances for any rational belief change that could take
place upon the impact of the new information conveyed by the antecedent
of an indicative. In a sense, whereas in classical logic your assumptions
represent the rock bottom of your inquiry, for Adams nothing that could
possibly go wrong with the assumptions in view of an additional hypoth-
esis should be glossed over. Ironically, its faithfulness to possible belief
change makes Adams’s logic purely negative with respect to the classical
and as such largely useless in deductive sciences. This logic, just as many
other indicative and counterfactual alternatives to classical logic, doesn’t
seem to have other function besides displaying the adequacy of the associ-
ated semantics by invalidating intuitively suspicious inference patterns. It
is, however, never really used in interesting proofs, as is the case with clas-
sical logic in set theory and analysis. This explains the feeling that classical
logical has a prescriptive flavour to it, whereas the alternative logics we
have surveyed here seem for the most part descriptive; so that predictions
at odds with shared linguistic intuitions are much more deleterious for the
latter than for the former.
So does a disjunction imply the corresponding conditional after all?
I think there is no clear-cut answer, since it depends on the phenomena
you wish to model by means of the posited entailment relation. In formal
languages, relations of logical consequence are exhaustively underwritten
by the semantics of the involved vocabulary. We have seen, however,
that as a rule, inferential relations in natural language are much more
convoluted, depending as they do on a plethora of contextual factors.
There is no one correct entailment relation for natural language, waiting
to be discovered by a particularly shrewd philosophical logician.50
Take any indicative conditional A→ C about the future, say
non-euclidean geometry. Frege, among others, had to learn this the hard way.
50The arguments by J. Etchemendy in (Etchemendy, 1990) can perhaps be interpreted
as pointing in the same direction even for a more formal domain of inquiry.
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(110) If you work hard enough, you’ll finish your PhD on time.
Suppose you’re a new graduate student, you are a little overwhelmed by
the academic environment, and I say (110) to reassure you about your
chances of success. However, as it happens, two months into your PhD,
your supervisor falls in love with a circus performer, loses all his fervent
interest in non-Russellian semantics for definite descriptions and leaves
academia to travel around the world in a caravan. You are left stranded in
a philosophy department whose all other members are too busy untangling
Deleuze’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Despite all your efforts,
your grad school period is an unmitigated disaster and you decide to spend
the rest of your life cultivating a garden.
Seen in retrospect (while you’re digging up some beets, for instance),
my utterance of (110) cannot appear more misguided. It was obviously
false. Whenever A turns out true and C false, the assertion of A → C can
safely be labelled as such, no matter how improbable the events that have
made the inference justifying the conditional fail were at the moment of
utterance. Once you make a public assertion, you lose control over it—in
particular, you cannot retract it if things take an unexpected turn. In a
sense, then, committing yourself to A → C means committing yourself to
(A ∧ B)→ C for whichever B might occur; otherwise we couldn’t evaluate
your assertion as false in a situation where A, B and ¬C all hold.
However, this of course does not mean that if I believe in (110), I should
by the same token believe in
(111) If you work hard enough and your supervisor falls in love with a
circus performer, loses all his interest in your topic and leaves the
academia, you will finish your PhD on time.
What really happens is that in asserting (110), I bet that all those circum-
stances (most of which I cannot as much as envisage) that would defeat the
inference shoring up my conditional prediction will not in fact occur.51 I
can therefore both believe A→ C and disbelieve (A∧B)→ C without being
irrational. This implies that at the level of beliefs, they are compatible.
My contention is simply that different viable conditional logics model
different inferential relations between conditional assertions. There is no
unique correct logic of indicatives, and neither does deviant inferential
behaviour of some indicatives in certain contexts justify us in attributing
51In the next chapter, I will say that you bet that the events will follow a particular
script. Since subjunctives are primarily used to explore such scripts, their inferential
behaviour is analogous to this ‘logic of conditional beliefs’. This, I submit, is the link
between indicatives and subjunctives.
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a different meaning to them. Again, in classical logic, premises are treated
as unassailable, so conditionals can easily be construed as monotonic with
respect to the strength of their antecedent. This is useful in modelling
situations where adopted commitments are for some reason not retractable,
such as those explored in axiomatic systems. Non-monotonic logics, on
the other hand, are good at modelling the principles according to which
individual people award credence to conditional assertions.
I think these considerations also explain the clashing intuitions people
have about the validity of SDA, at least for indicative conditionals. If I
assert that
(112) If you work hard enough or plagiarise some obscure German trea-
tise, you will finish your PhD on time,
I may do so only because I am convinced that out of the two possibilities
mentioned in the antecedent, the first one is by far the most likely and it
does guarantee your finishing on time. However, should you against all
odds secretly take evening German classes, spend a summer burrowing
into some Bavarian philosophy library and get flunked at the defence by
a committee suspicious of your predilection for interminable sentences
and mind-boggling agglutination of nouns, adducing the reasons I might
have had for asserting (112) will be to little avail. My assertion will be
irremediably false.52
Here intuitions seem to be even clearer than in the previous case, be-
cause my explicit mention of the second disjunct in the antecedent of (112)
is felt to commit me quite strongly to the conditional
(113) If you plagiarise some obscure German treatise, you will finish your
PhD on time,
as I’m assumed to have given some thought to such a possibility (this
can certainly be explained on the strength of some Gricean principles).
But overall, the moral is very much the same as before—once your con-
ditional is publicly asserted, you lose control over it and any way that
the antecedent may come out true is relevant for evaluating it. This is
also the reason why simplification of disjunctive antecedents is so intrin-
sically linked to antecedent strengthening—replacement of equivalent an-
tecedents only plays an intermediary role on this picture, by making it
possible to spell out the tacitly undertaken commitments. This explains
52M. Woods also argues that SDA poses a problem for accounts entailing that assertibil-
ity of indicatives is exhausted by corresponding conditional probability: (Woods, 1997),
p.27.
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the somewhat surprising fact that classical logic with the material condi-
tional actually fares much better with respect to our intuitions about SDA
than most of the alternatives.
The above phenomenon can be exploited by speakers in order to ex-
plicitly convey that they do not regard certain options as live possibilities.
It has frequently been observed that SDA seems to fail in examples such
as the following:
(114) If the United States devotes more than half of its national budget to
defence or to education, it will devote more than half of its national
budget to defence.53
(114), the argument goes, cannot be taken to imply
(115) If the United States devotes more than half of its national budget
to education, it will devote more than half of its national budget to
defence,
as it is plainly unacceptable. However, this might be the whole point
of asserting it—to signal that the speaker considers the possibility of the
US earmarking more than half of its budget for schools to be far-fetched.
Compare
(116) If the United States devotes more than half of its national budget to
education, then pigs have wings.
Here, the speaker doesn’t mislead us at all by using a disjunct she has
already ruled-out, as her utterance makes this perfectly clear.54 All in all,
by shifting the focus on the actual assertive use of indicatives instead of
treating them as mere vehicles for expressing conditional probabilities,
we can shed a lot of light on what is at stake in the debates about their
inferential properties.
53Based on (Nute and Cross, 2001), p.29
54Note that this problem doesn’t only arise with disjunctions, but existential quantifi-
cation as well: ‘If the US devotes more than half of its national budget to anything, it
will be defense.’ For a discussion of SDA in the context of subjunctives, much of which,
however, applies equally to indicatives, see page 76.
Chapter 7
Indicative and subjunctive
conditionals
Up to now, I have for the most part been busy showing how many of the
apparent semantic conundrums indicative conditionals face us with are
due to an excess, rather than a lack of philosophical theorising. It turned
out that we had all the ingredients for a viable account on the table—we
only had to shed some philosophical prejudice and combine them correctly
in order for the global picture to fall into place. It sufficed to put down the
sledgehammer and go for a nutcracker instead.
I believe the situation is different with subjunctives. We use them every
day in all kinds of situations, but our theoretical understanding of how they
work is sorely deficient. They are assertions about unrealised possibilities
and as such challenge our natural tendency to revert to a simplistic view
of language as a mirror of the world (as if ‘the world’ were a completely
unproblematic notion). I think that the fact that we still lack a full-fledged
theoretical alternative to a Tractatus-like conception of language is the main
reason why so many aspects of our use of subjunctives remain shrouded
in mystery.
How can this be, given the exorbitant amount of philosophical research
into this topic since the 1950s? There has undoubtedly been some progress,
at the very least in ruling out inviable theoretical options, but it has been
painfully slow. All too many years were spent talking about the formal
properties of an unfathomable similarity relation, which rather than throw
light upon subjunctives made them seem even more arbitrary and pur-
poseless. Given our methodological decision to treat language as a tool
kit and to explain the meaning of individual expressions in terms of the
role they are conventionally fitted to play in speech acts, such a theory
must at this point inevitably appear suspicious. Leaving Gauker’s and
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Lycan’s largely vacuous theories aside, neither did Kratzer’s attempt to
merge insights from both cotenability and similarity theories prosper. We
have seen that in the end it was the causal theories that seemed to have
done the best explanatory job; however, it was at the cost of making the
formal semantic machinery practically redundant.
In this chapter I’ll make a rather speculative attempt at explaining the
relation between indicatives and subjunctives, combining insights inspir-
ing both causality theories and the Adams-Dudman-Edgington approach
based on the analogy between subjunctives and future indicatives. I think
that this analysis suggests that an adequate and interesting treatment of
subjunctives requires a profound change in how we look at both language
and human cognition. I will not be in a position to give all the details of a
full blown alternative theory, but I will try at least to point out the way I
deem worthy of exploring.
7.1. Subjunctives as past predictions
Since the very beginnings of the analytic inquiry into conditionals, scholars
have searched for a theory that could bridge the gap between indicatives
and subjunctives. Cotenability theorists, as we have seen, thought that the
distinction did not warrant any special attention—according to them, the
subjunctive form was preferred when the antecedent was disbelieved, but
there was no question of two different conditional functions. It was not
until Adams came up with his pair of Oswald conditionals that philoso-
phers awoke to the more fundamental differences between them.1 Since
then, however, another extreme position has come to hold sway in the
literature—given the lack of overlap in the most popular semantics for
the two constructions, they are regarded as fundamentally different and
the very project of looking for connections between them is rejected as
misguided.2
We should avoid both extremes. Adams’s pair shows that indicatives
and subjunctives convey different contents; but there are numerous paral-
lelisms as well.
1See page 6.
2I think D. Lewis, hypostasing formal semantics while defending completely diver-
gent ones for indicatives and subjunctives, bears a lot of blame for the success of such
a view. Usually, this theoretical position is adopted rather tacitly (take for instance Ben-
nett, whose account of the link between the two types boils down to a few casual remarks
about the formal structures behind their logic: (Bennett, 2003), pp.174-175), but an explicit
avowal can be found in (Gibbard, 1981).
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First, there are of course syntactic analogies. To express both indicative
and subjunctive conditional contents, we make use of largely overlapping
linguistic structures. The most obvious example is the grammatical con-
junction ‘if’, but a plethora of others (‘on condition that’, ‘in the event that’
‘provided that’, etc.) work just as well for both of them. Furthermore, in
English, a typical subjunctive conditional can be obtained from a future in-
dicative by means of a past tense shift—‘does-wills’ become ‘did-woulds’,
which can further be transformed into ‘haddone-wouldhaves’.3
Syntactic links between indicatives and subjunctives come accompa-
nied with similarities at the level of content. In particular, the important
symmetries between
(i) future indicatives and subjunctives, and
(ii) future indicatives and past subjunctives uttered at a later point
also suggest that there is a lot these two constructions have in common.
The first point is illustrated by the fact that indicatives and subjunc-
tives about the future are felt to make basically the same assertion (there
is a slight preference for the subjunctive if the antecedent is deemed un-
likely, but this does not substantially affect its interchangeability with the
corresponding indicative):
(117) If Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine, the EU will consider
sending another protest note.
(118) If Russia continued its aggression in Ukraine, the EU would con-
sider sending another protest note.
The second point is witnessed by the fact that someone who on Novem-
ber 21, 1963 claims that
(119) If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, no one else will.
could exactly for the same reasons have claimed on November 23, 1963
that
(120) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, no one else would have.
These and analogous observations have led some theorists to conceive
of counterfactuals as expressing some kind of past tense of future indica-
tives. I shall present two such theories: E. Adams’s epistemic past tense
3We shall see that whereas the first point holds across many different European
languages, the second one does not.
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construal of subjunctives and V. Dudman’s relocation theory. Afterwards,
I shall systematically explore the scenarios in which the symmetry be-
tween does-wills and had-woulds fails, trying to glean a clear view of the
kind of contribution counterfactuals really make. We shall see that this in-
quiry will naturally connect a (duly qualified) tense-shift account with the
prominent role causal considerations are deemed to play in our evaluation
of counterfactuals.
7.1.1. Adams’s and Edgington’s ‘past probability’
As I have already noted, the position that has become quite standard
in the literature (witness for instance J. Bennett or F. Jackson) combines
probability semantics for indicatives and some kind of similarity semantics
for subjunctives. We have seen good reasons to be suspicious about both
of them; however, their combination produces yet another undesirable
effect—an almost complete disconnection between the functions of the two
sorts of conditionals. A theory is therefore called for that could account
not only for their differences, but also for the many parallels.
E. Adams sketched a theory of subjunctives that would connect them
with indicatives through a probabilistic interpretation of the latter. Even
though ultimately unsuccessful, Adams’s attempt (together with Dud-
man’s theory analysed in the next section) will provide us with some
resources for an amended account along similar lines. I shall argue, fol-
lowing Adams himself, that such an account will probably have to make
use of the notion of (causal) dependence.
Probabilities of counterfactuals as prior conditional probabilities
The fundamental insight behind Adams’s take on counterfactuals is rather
straightforward—after affirming an indicative and finding out that its an-
tecedent, consequent, or both happen to be false, we often forfeit the right
to the indicative itself, but can still affirm the corresponding subjunctive.
Subjunctive mood in conditionals can therefore be regarded as an ‘epis-
temic past tense’ of sorts.4 Adams gives the following example:
Two men are walking in the woods and spy a bird in the shadow
in such a way that its colour cannot be made out. One man might
use the indicative in telling the other “If that bird is a canary it will
be yellow.” Now, however, suppose that the bird flies out into the
sunlight, where it is clearly seen to be blue and not yellow. Under
4(Adams, 1975), p.103
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the circumstances the first man will be unlikely to continue to affirm
the indicative [...]. On the other hand the first speaker will be likely
to ‘substitute the counterfactual for the indicative’ and affirm “if that
bird were a canary it would be yellow.”
(Adams, 1975), p.104
So it seems that the function of the subjunctive might consist in expressing
conditional probabilities prior to ascertaining the falsity of the proposition
conditionalised upon. Of course, since by no means does a neat story such
as the one above invariably accompany our assertions of subjunctives,
these prior probabilities may be merely hypothetical.
This construal, according to Adams, gives a hint about why in infor-
mal renderings of Modus Tollens inferences counterfactuals are strongly
preferred to indicatives. The moment that the two men clearly see that the
colour of the bird is blue, they can no longer endorse the indicative
(121) If that bird is a canary, it is (will be) yellow.
since not even the hypothesis that it is a canary can offset the obviousness
of its colour. However, they can still affirm
(122) If that bird were (had been) a canary, it would (have) be(en) yellow.
Adams argues on Bayesian grounds that except for a few special cases, a
person who awards high value to p(B/A) should attach high probability
to ¬A upon learning ¬B, while lowering her value of p(B/A) accordingly.
That’s why, on the past epistemic interpretation of the subjunctive mood, a
subjunctive conditional can, whereas an indicative usually cannot, feature
in a Modus Tollens.
Some problems
I think that just as in case of indicatives, while recourse to probability can
undoubtedly shed light upon certain phenomena of the logic of subjunc-
tives, it can be misleading if it is expected to give the whole story.5 The
acceptability of a counterfactual A  C for which a past assertion of a cor-
responding indicative A → C is conceivable seems to correlate more with
the endorsement of some kind of inferential relationship between A and C
in the circumstances than with the actual or hypothetical past acceptance
of A→ C.
5Adams seems to have ended up admitting that much. He only addresses subjunctives
in passing in his definitive (Adams, 1998), and is non-committal as to his stance towards
the theory propounded in (Adams, 1975).
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Take one of the special cases where Modus Tollens fails. Sometimes you
may give credence to A → C only because you are already quite certain
about C itself. Of course, in such circumstances you won’t be inclined
to conclude ¬A after learning that C is not the case after all. However,
and this is a crucial point, you cannot make out from a simple probability
distribution that awards high values to both p(C) and p(C/A) whether your
belief in C is the reason for believing A→ C.
A variation on an example by Adams will make this clearer. Suppose
that before descrying the bird in the shadow, you believe for some reason
that all birds in the area are yellow. Then your conditional probability of
‘That bird is yellow’ given ‘That bird is a canary’ will be high and you can
certainly assert (121). What will happen once you see that the bird is blue?
Obviously, you will no longer believe that all birds in the area are yellow.
But what about the bird being a canary? There are at least two possibilities.
If your belief in the yellowness of all birds was your only reason for
asserting (121), then you obviously lack any right to apply Modus Tollens
after knowing better. However, if despite the failure of that belief you still
sincerely accept that all or almost all canaries are yellow, to conclude that
the bird is not a canary is still the right thing for you to do. Observe that
while there is no way to distinguish the first scenario from the second at-
tending exclusively to (conditional) probability values, the counterfactual
(122) is supported if and only if the Modus Tollens inference goes through.
And, pace Adams, this doesn’t occur only in special cases, since the
dynamics of our beliefs doesn’t always conform to the smooth model of
Bayesian conditionalisation. Even when you accept A→ C on independent
grounds, upon learning ¬C you may choose either to keep endorsing the
inference and conclude ¬A or abandon the inferential principle sustaining
A→ C in the first place. Again, the acceptability of A  C will go hand in
hand with that of the inference and not with the prior probability bestowed
upon A→ C.6
As always, an example may help make this point clearer. Suppose that
a friend of yours is baking a cake and asks for your meaning about three
options for the filling—cream, marmalade or chocolate. You believe that
unless he goes for chocolate, the cake will wind up quite hopeless. You
6Since we have argued that material conditionals can properly replace indicatives
in contexts where, as opposed to everyday reasoning, the logical power of premises
cannot become impaired by further assumptions (see Section 6.3.3), the foregoing explains
the somewhat surprising fact that material conditionals are so good at rendering the
function of counterfactuals in Modus Tollens. For Adams, on the other hand, the use of
material conditionals in formalising MT was based on ‘doubly questionable assumptions’.
(Adams, 1975), p.106.
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deem marmalade better than cream, though still pretty bad. Given that
your friend does not seem inclined to use cream anyway, you say to him:
(123) If you use marmalade, the cake won’t be tasty.
Your friend, however, does use cream in the end and to your great surprise,
the cake turns out to be delicious. The point is that upon learning that the
cake is filled with cream while being tasty, you may not only give up your
prior conditional belief cream → bad, but very likely also the conditional
marmalade→ bad. In that case, you will reject
(124) If you had used marmalade, the cake wouldn’t have been tasty.
despite having awarded high prior conditional probability to its indicative
counterpart. Note that there might have been no way for you of finding
out before actually sampling the cake.
Finally, if you find it distracting that apart from learning that the cake
is tasty you also learn that it was filled with cream in the example, think of
a variant where you are not sure about the actual ingredients in the filling
upon taking a bite. The flavour of the cake surprises you, and you come
to believe that it would have come out delicious no matter what.
The morale is that it is strange to talk about conditional probabilities
prior to learning new information in order to account for counterfactuals
in situations where this very information makes you revise the inference
that sustained your earlier conditional probability assignment.7 Both these
and the If-I-were-you examples naturally divert our attention from sheer
probabilities towards the inferences that hide behind their values, which
are often causal in nature.
7.1.2. Dudman’s relocation theory
Both the importance of the inference grounding the conditionals and the
connections between indicatives and subjunctives we have seen before
(the syntax, the future-future and future-past link) inspired V. Dudman
to explore the possibility of redrawing the internal frontiers within the
realm of natural language conditionals. This attempt by and large failed,
but it deserves our attention for its very audaciousness and some useful
insights upon which it drew. It is also important to see that the phenomena
we have been inspecting in this chapter do not undermine the traditional
7This is also the case with the clever counterexample that Adams levels against his
own theory. Interestingly, he argues that the most straightforward amendment must take
into account causal relations between dispositional states. (Adams, 1975), pp.129-133
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distinction between indicatives and subjunctives, so that we can justify an
account of meaning that follows these categories.
‘Judgements’ vs. ‘propositions’
Dudman claims that contemporary literature on conditionals has fallen
prey to a fundamentally flawed categorisation of conditionals and, as a
result, has further addled our understanding of these structures by con-
structing a lofty theoretical edifice on rather shaky foundations.
His starting point is the observation to the effect that there is a frequent
mismatch between the tense of an English sentence, and the time the
message conveyed by the sentence intuitively adverts to. He calls such
messages judgements.8 Some examples of judgements include
(125) The countess will go home.
or
(126) The countess might have walked home.
The grammatical tense of (125), according to Dudman, is present, al-
though under its standard interpretation it refers to a future event. Like-
wise, the tense of (126) is past perfect, whereas the event described, if it
took place at all, did so in the past simpliciter. Dudman explains this time
shift by positing that the tense of these sentences determines the temporal
location of the so-called factual basis of the judgement. In forming a judge-
ment, we begin with what we know of some factual historical situation and
then we let it develop in our imagination in ways we have learned to ex-
pect. After inspecting the result, we reach a verdict, which determines our
choice of modal. On Dudman’s account, judgements are tensed verdicts—
the tense of a judgement indicates where on a timeline we should look for
the facts to be used as inputs in this thought experiment.
Unlike judgements, Dudman’s propositions are statements of hard fact
and have a definite truth value—there is no imagination involved in their
assessment. That is why the tense of a sentence that expresses a proposi-
tion tallies with the time the proposition intuitively is about.9 It follows
immediately that there are no hard facts about the future, only forecasts
based on present facts and the expected course of events; a result that
agrees with many of our intuitions.
8(Dudman, 1989), p.593
9(Dudman, 1984), p.144 and (Dudman, 1989), p.594
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In this dissertation I have been more generous with the label of ‘propo-
sition’ than perhaps most contemporary scholars, not hesitating to award it
to the content of practically any acceptable assertion. My foremost reason
for doing so is that to say that a certain assertive sentence fails to express a
proposition usually strikes us as a very radical statement, while the actual
theoretical motivation for making the distinction between propositions and
non-propositions tends to be rather subtle. In such cases, I think it more
appropriate to talk about different kinds of propositions, or about different
qualifications (like hedging or conditioning) to which a proposition can be
subjected.
I believe this is also the case with Dudman’s theory. What he calls
‘judgements’ are simply certain modalised statements—the fact that these
are often made on the strength of an inference, rather than on direct ev-
idence, doesn’t, in my view, warrant setting them radically apart from
non-modal ones. Again, the grounds on which a proposition is accepted
have nothing to do with truth—truth-talk can easily encompass all legiti-
mate assertions, even in cases where there is no straightforward algorithm
that could decide for us whether to endorse them or reject them.
And I find it therefore even less justified to pick out as special those
modalised statements that are based on a certain type of inference, for in-
stance a predictive one. I really don’t think that utterances of the following
sentences
(127) He may be one of the invited guests.
(128) He may come to the dinner tonight.
should be regarded as belonging to two distinct categories of assertions.
On the positive side, observe that Dudman’s theory of ‘judgements’
bears quite some resemblance to Kratzer’s theory of modals—in both cases,
there is a modal base, that is, a set of facts against which the proposition in
the scope of the modal is evaluated. The choice of the modal depends on
the inferential relation between the base and the proposition in hand; the
difference between Kratzer and Dudman resides chiefly in the nature of
this relation. In Kratzer, this inference is based simply on the relation of en-
tailment, while Dudman postulates a non-formal predictive inference from
a factual basis that need not be made completely explicit, as in Kratzer’s
case.
I believe Dudman has an upper hand here, as Kratzer is forced to
codify the propriety of the inference in question in terms of non-accidental
generalisations, with all the associated problems (which we have seen
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come to the fore especially with counterfactuals).10 Reducing non-formal
inference to explicit entailment is notoriously difficult—it is often more
worthwhile to look for another way of characterising it. We shall explore
this phenomenon in what follows, but first we have to take a look at what
Dudman has to say about conditional clauses.
Dudman’s classification of if-sentences
To be sure, not all ‘if-sentences’ are conditionals in Dudman’s idiom—this
term is reserved only for judgements with embedded if-clauses. Dudman
says that these if-clauses encode a complication of the message conveyed by
the judgement. That means, they introduce an event that impacts on the
imagined development of the situation contemplated as a basis, possibly
leading to a huge divergence from the original course of history. Since
if-clauses do not alter the location of the factual basis of the judgement,
they agree in tense with the main clause; however, they refer to a time
which lies somewhere in between the temporal location of the basis and
the time the judgement as a whole is intuitively about. This explains
the presence of a time-shift also in the subordinate clause.11 To see how
an if-clause can complicate the judgements (125) and (126), consider the
following examples:
(125if) If she misses the last bus, the countess will walk home.
and
(126if) If she had not had enough money, the countess might have walked
home.
For Dudman, non-conditional if-sentences, on the other hand, are real
compounds joining two independent sentences, which can express either
a judgment or a proposition. They consist of a ‘subsidiary if-string’ and
an independent sentence. Whereas a genuine conditional expresses only
one, if complex, message, in the case of non-conditional if-sentences we
have two messages linked in a particular way. The independent message
is presumptively affirmed on the hypothesis that the dependent message
is true. Examples include typical cases of syllogistic reasoning, such as
(129) If some man is mortal, then some mortal is a man.
10See Section 5.2.5.
11(Dudman, 1989), p.595
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but, for instance, also cases in which the if-clause introduces a presuppo-
sition necessary for a felicitous utterance of the independent clause:
(130) If the mayor is married, his wife did not accompany him that
evening.
Now, it is clear that for Dudman, given the time-shift in ‘does-will’ con-
ditionals, they fall into the same category as subjunctives, despite having
traditionally been considered as indicatives.12 A further argument he ad-
duces in favour of this classification is our intuition that most ‘does-wills’
have a ‘had-would’ counterpart, which only differs from them in tense.13
Assessment
To begin with, observe that Dudman can take in his stride most of the
difficulties besetting Adams’s account that I have touched upon in the
previous section. His account does not make use of the distinction between
prior and posterior beliefs and he is thus not compelled to constrain the
impact of new information to the ‘factual base’. He can easily admit that
new information can affect both our take on what the facts are and the way
in which we imagine they will develop.
Rather than that, my reservations with respect to Dudman’s ingenious
analysis have to do with the pride of place it awards to syntax. Syntax can
often give us a nudge in the right direction, but we should not expect the
accidental means a language has developed for communicating particular
contents to be more illuminating than the contents themselves. Indeed,
the scope of Dudman’s analysis seems somewhat constrained to English.
Although a range of time-shift phenomena has been reported for many of
them, there does not seem to be a general systematic pattern that would
allow seamless extrapolation of Dudman’s insights to other Indo-European
tongues. And to make matters worse, the linguistic evidence available on
the employment of ‘fake tense’ (Iatridou) seems to corroborate, rather than
undermine, the traditional classification of conditionals.14
It is precisely the contested ‘does-will’ conditionals that put on a variety
of linguistic forms across languages, departing most radically from what
should be expected on Dudman’s account. For his analysis, it is essential
that English expresses future tense by means of a modal, ‘will’, so that he
can argue in favour of a future time-shift in these constructions. However,
12(Dudman, 1984), p.148. Bennett endorsed this theory of woulds in his (Bennett,
1988).
13See page 184.
14See (Iatridou, 2000) and (Schulz, 2012).
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this is by no means the rule within many European language families.
Romance languages, as well as most Slavic languages, are equipped with
a proper future tense and do not have to resort to a modal auxiliary. And
whereas Romance languages often require a time-shift in future-oriented
if-clauses (though not in the main clause)15, there is no difference in tense
between the main and the subordinate clause of a ‘does-will’ conditional
in most Slavic languages. Nevertheless, these languages do mark very
clearly the distinction between ‘does-will’ conditionals and those that have
traditionally been considered as subjunctive.
Another shortcoming of Dudman’s theory, expressly acknowledged by
him, is that it cannot account for the existence of the so-called ‘hybrid’
cases. Future-to-past conditionals such as
(131) If you feel sick tomorrow, then the pizza wasn’t baked properly.
are diagnosed as anomalous, even ‘monstrous’ in Dudman’s own words.16
On his account, this ‘would-be conditional’ contains a complication (hence
the time shift in the if-clause), without there being a judgement in which it
could be embedded. In practice, none the less, these conditionals, predicted
to sound natural on the traditional classification, do not pose any difficulty
to their users—the other day, I was told by a repairman returning my
bicycle to me:
(132) If you don’t come back, the repair was successful.
Crucially, ‘wills’ can do many things analogous to those that can be done
by sentences expressing Dudman’s propositions. They can for instance be
used to perform all kinds of different speech acts apart from predictions
(promises, threats or advice). And just as with ‘propositions’, the scope
of these acts can be restricted by means of indicative if-clauses, which can
refer to future, present or past events. On the other hand, ‘woulds’ seem
to be used exclusively in assertions, and have no use without a subjunctive
antecedent—if this antecedent against all expectations turns out to be true,
the would-conditional doesn’t seem to commit the speaker to anything.
All in all, I think Dudman is wrong in classifying sentences according to
the grounds on which they are properly affirmed. The fact that claims about
15An exception is, for instance, Portuguese, which uses a special future subjunctive
tense in the subordinate clauses of future-oriented conditionals. This tense also exists in
Spanish, but is nowadays only used in a highly formal register proper to solemn legal
texts. Latin itself allowed future tense both in protasis and apodosis, see (Allen and
Greenough, 1903), p.323.
16(Dudman, 1989), p.600
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future can only be based upon predictions doesn’t affect their status of
assertions about the actual course of events. If at the time they advert to the
corresponding assertion about the present is true, they are true, otherwise
they are false. That’s why the whole time-shift issue is a red herring—it
is irrelevant for the function of claims about the future whether they are
expressed by a modal or by a special grammatical tense. Subjunctives, on
the other, talk about alternative scenarios and therefore do not commit the
speaker to any indicative statement.17
Let us take stock. We have seen that Dudman’s recategorisation of
conditionals has misfired chiefly for the following reasons:
(i) it is based on a syntactic phenomenon that is peculiar to English
(ii) it associates this phenomenon with the grounds on which condition-
als are accepted, not their function in discourse
(iii) it fails to account for certain perfectly acceptable conditionals
And as I have already announced, in the next section we shall analyse some
further problems that Dudman shares with Adams. There it will become
clear why I find the debate on whether had-woulds are merely past-tensed
does-wills so fruitful for our purposes.
Regardless of the arguments of the next section, though, we have
seen that the intuitive distinction between indicatives and subjunctives
has withstood Dudman’s attacks. This is good, because it entitles us to
construe indicatives as conditional assertions, and subjunctives in turn as
devices for assessing the tenability of indicatives. In this manner, I shall
interpret non-conditional assertions, indicative conditionals and subjunc-
tives as forming layers, each of which depends for its functionality on that
of the previous one.
7.1.3. The benefit of the hindsight
Up to this point, we have focused on problems due to peculiar features
of either Adams’s or Dudman’s theory. In this section, however, I shall
systematically examine at least the most conspicuous ways in which our
posterior assessment of a counterfactual can diverge from a prior assess-
ment of a future-oriented indicative.
Good grounds for asserting an indicative do not always translate into
good grounds for asserting a subjunctive at a later point. Examples that
17However, they can be used to justify inferences about the actual state of affairs,
because their job is to spell out how the world hangs together.
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support this point pose difficulties to both Adams’s and Dudman’s theory;
however, if we abandon the strictures of their excessively narrow take
on the problem, we can learn a thing or two about our actual use of
counterfactuals. In the rest of the chapter, the results gleaned from this
discussion will be put into perspective, shored up with theoretical insights
hailing from rival theories.
Example 1: no conceivable past indicative
Adams’s theory of counterfactuals relies heavily on the notion of a ‘hy-
pothetical past assertion of an indicative’, while Dudman’s posits a past
factual base, with respect to which the subjunctive is evaluated in the very
same way as a future-oriented indicative would be if this factual base were
actual. Nevertheless, with quite a few counterfactuals it is rather diffi-
cult to envisage the past circumstances under which the corresponding
indicative could have been affirmed:
(133) If I were you, I would consider taking off that Superman costume.
(134) If Bosnian Muslims were bottle-nosed dolphins, the world would
not have allowed their slaughter.18
It won’t do to shrug these examples off as somehow irrelevant.19 If-I-
were-you-counterfactuals are among those most frequently used by ordi-
nary speakers. And the second example, far from fanciful, was put forward
in order to drive home a very dramatic point at the height of the Bosnian
war.
The upshot for Adams’s account is that it is utterly implausible that the
above examples inform about any kind of prior conditional probability of
the consequent given the antecedent. On the other hand, neither they are
based on an alternative course of events, as Dudman’s theory requires—a
counterfactual such as (133) is not based on an imagination of a past factual
situation derailed by my suddenly turning into you. Even better, in
(135) {x | x < B} fails to be a set, for its union with B would be the class of
all sets.20
there is no question of an imagined temporal development within which
the absolute complement of B suddenly becomes a set.
18Adapted from (Luttwak, 1993).
19See (Adams, 1975), p.104. In a similar vein, (Bennett, 2003), p.284-287.
20Adapted from (Enderton, 1977), p.27.
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It seems that despite the many analogies between subjunctives and past
future-oriented indicatives, we must not think that once we get a grip on
the latter, we will be able to explain the former by recourse to a simple time-
shift. The inferential principles that sustain the examples in this section do
not involve a temporal variable; they are not used to justify predictions. I
think it is the other way round—conditional predictions must be based on
a certain type of inferential apparatus that can in turn usually also support
counterfactuals. Arguably, causal schemata constitute a core element of
this apparatus, and that’s why so many subjunctives are causal in nature.
However, as the examples above witness, causality can’t be the last word
about them.
The examples above show that a valid inferential principle can be ap-
plied even to hypotheses that are so silly that they cannot be plausibly
entertained as real epistemic possibilities by any reasonable person, and,
as a result, hypotheses extremely difficult to construe as viable indicative
antecedents. The fundamental question, which I will attempt to answer in
the second part of this chapter, is then how such extravagant claims can
still be informative for the audience. Before that, however, we should give
some thought to a few more mundane examples.
Example 2: unexpected defeaters
Once we have ascertained that time does not have to play a prominent
role in counterfactual reasoning, let us now have a closer look at examples
where it does, but which nonetheless put the symmetry between indica-
tives and subjunctives in question. The first case occurs when the benefit
of the hindsight provides you with information that could not have been
foreseen, but if it had been, it would have effectively defeated the original
inference. Think of the following example: you and a friend are about to
take a train at 3.00 p.m. and you say
(136) If we leave at 2.30 p.m., we’ll get to the station on time.
However, you become embroiled in household chores, miss the train and
finally take the one at 5.00 p.m. Contemplating the landscape quickly
sliding past your window, you say to your friend with a sigh
(137) If we had left at 2.30 p.m., we would have got to the station on time.
But your friend knows better. As it happens, there was actually a spec-
tacular accident at 2.40 p.m. on the access road to the station, blocking all
traffic for an entire hour. If you had left at 2.30 p.m., you would have got
stuck in a jam and missed the train anyway.
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I think we can safely assume that at least some events relevant for
our predictions cannot be foreseen. Even those that can be anticipated in
principle are often beyond human reach and can only be learned a posteriori.
Since you didn’t leave at 2.30 p.m., on the theory I have advanced in the
previous chapter, your assertion of (136) is void. However, it is clear
that the inference on which you based your assertion failed—the fact that
you couldn’t have foretold the improbable accident and its consequences
doesn’t let you off the hook. Your inference has simply been trumped by
reality.
These considerations provide the leading idea for what I regard as the
most promising approach to subjunctives—I believe their basic discursive
function consists in sanctioning the propriety of inferential principles that
sometimes underlie indicatives. I think this is the crucial insight that
inspires Dudman’s, Adams’s and Edgington’s treatment of subjunctives.
In my view, it is mostly due to the fact that they all tried to incorporate it
within a much too restrictive framework that it didn’t come to full fruition.
In order to evaluate the inference in question you don’t have to restrict
yourself to the information available at the moment when it might have
been used in a genuine prediction, as both Adams and Dudman would
have it. You can of course help yourself to any facts that only become
known a posteriori.
Let us return to our example. For the very reason that your assertion
of (136) is felt to have been unjustified, (137) uttered at a later point will be
considered false. Observe that if you somehow had been able to predict the
accident, you wouldn’t have given much credence to (136) in the first place.
Here it is of course critical, both for the indicative and the subjunctive, that
the occurrence of the accident should be deemed independent from your
leaving at 2.30 p.m. That’s where causality enters the picture.
I shall take up the issue of causality in the following section; however,
I first have to address J. Bennett’s criticism of Dudman’ relocation thesis,
which also seems to put into question an account of subjunctives as devices
designed to evaluate indicative conditionals.
Example 3: incomplete scenarios
J. Bennett adopted Dudman’s classification of conditionals, though not all
the details of Dudman’s proposal in (Bennett, 1988). He based such a move
chiefly on the time-shift phenomenon and the purported quasi-equivalence
between does-wills and had-woulds. Nevertheless, he retracted his adher-
ence to Dudman’s classification in his later work, offering a few arguments
as to why the traditional way of drawing the line between conditionals
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should be regarded as correct.
Bennett points out that there is an entire class of proper utterances of
does-will conditionals that do not support the corresponding counterfactu-
als: they occur when the antecedent eliminates alternative explanations of
a piece of evidence, while the consequent follows from the only hypothesis
left standing. The following story will make this point clearer:
We are standing on a balcony and we can see a truck approaching
our block of flats. Being rather short-sighted, I cannot make out what
kind of truck it is and I utter the following conditional: ‘If the driver
gets off and starts shouting “Butane!” in a wild fashion, we’ll finally
be able to take a warm shower today.’
Variation on an example in (Bennett, 2003), p.345-346
The evidence we are presented with is the arrival of a truck, and my
antecedent is meant to make plausible the hypothesis that it belongs to the
gas delivery company. The prospect of a warm shower follows from such a
hypothesis. However, this, according to Bennett, is not enough to support
the counterfactual (138) once the lorry passes the building indifferently:
(138) If the driver had got off and started shouting ‘Butano!’ in a wild
fashion, we would finally have been able to take a warm shower
that day.
Assuming that the antecedent of my conditional turns out to be false,
the best possible explanation is that the truck belonged to the greengrocer
instead, or that it belonged to the gas company, but had no gas bottles left
for sale.
Bennett argues that if you nevertheless accept my conditional on dif-
ferent grounds, such as if you believe that the shouts of the driver will
wake up the gas delivery man living on the first floor of our building and
goad him into doing his duty, your basis will support the counterfactual
in (138). Since most does-wills can be accepted on different grounds in
the same situation, the necessary link between does-wills and had-woulds
cannot be sustained.
I find Bennett’s analysis of the example impeccable. I would only like
to underscore some analogies with the previous one, so that we can glean
some insights for our own take on subjunctives. In both cases there is a
piece of information missing that, had you been aware of it, would have
made you change your mind about the indicative. In the second example,
it was the occurrence of the traffic accident and the ensuing jam; in this one,
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it is the fact that the truck belongs (say) to the greengrocer. In both cases
this crucial information was out of your reach—either because of its unpre-
dictability or your short-sightedness. This of course does not prevent you
from making sensible conditional assertions, just as you are often forced
to make regular assertions in the absence of all relevant information—the
fact that you can hedge them by dint of a conditional clause makes it even
easier. However, when the benefit of the hindsight completes the factual
panorama, you may see that the inference you drew, though justified in
view of what you might reasonably have been expected to believe in the
circumstances, was not supported by them.
7.2. Inferential scenarios
It is high time we looked closer at the inferences that we found at the basis
of our utterances of counterfactuals. Up to now, I have been deliberately
vague about their nature, but that must stop, lest we should render those
considerations largely irrelevant. Everybody admits that some kind of
inference underlies our use of subjunctives—what is at stake is the best
way of characterising them. My purpose in reviewing all the major recent
attempts at such characterisation in Chapters 2-4 was to ram home the
fact that despite all the ingenuity and strenuous efforts with which they
set about it, most of them fail badly at this task. We also saw that the
most fruitful approach, the one that made direct use of information about
causal networks, felt a little like cheating. Once you are allowed to use
such highly structured input, formal semantics becomes a trite exercise in
mathematical modelling.21
This should give us pause. If we think about an ordinary counterfactual,
such as Edgington’s
(55) If I had known you were coming, I’d have baked a cake,
we are often at a loss to know the explicit grounds one may have for such
an assertion—it does not always seem to fit into a neat causal pattern.
However, when we are given a fully specified inferential system, such as
one implemented by an axiomatic system or a causal network, accounting
for counterfactual reasoning all of a sudden becomes surprisingly easy.
We have seen causal networks in action in Section 5.3; for a non-causal
example, just recall
21See Section 5.3.
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(135) {x | x < B} fails to be a set, for its union with B would be the class of
all sets.
You have simply entertained a hypothesis, which, as it happens and pos-
sibly unbeknownst to you, is excluded by your system (that the absolute
complement of a set should also be a set). After that, you have seen that
this hypothesis, in view of the inferential principles validated by the sys-
tem, leads to a conclusion you already know to be false (that is, that the
universal class should be a set). This makes counterfactuals naturally fit
for use in Modus Tollens arguments.
I will try to exploit this insight (that the use of counterfactuals against
the background of a smooth deductive system is unproblematic) in order
to account for subjunctives with no obvious basis in a clear inferential
framework. I think the most straightforward way of cashing in this intu-
ition is by admitting that our representation of the world is inferentially
structured from the very beginning.
7.2.1. The meaning of subjunctives
On various occasions in this chapter I have already hinted at what I deem
the most promising approach to the meaning of subjunctives. Just as with
indicatives, this account will most likely disappoint those who have come
to expect startling new discoveries from the semantic theory. However,
I for one wonder why the meaning of vocabulary that we use on a daily
basis should have any surprises in store for us. The interesting thing is not
what subjunctives mean, but rather which of them are true and why.
The standard way of proceeding in semantics conflates these two ques-
tions, because it analyses the meaning of an expression in terms of its
contribution to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it appears.
However, we have seen that this strategy leaves a lot to be desired, as
(i) it is based on the unjustified assumption that meanings of complex
expressions can be reduced to ‘less problematic’ ones, which also
raises the issue of infinite regress
(ii) it invites trivial analyses (often disguised by sophisticated mathemat-
ical paraphernalia)
(iii) meanings of all too many expressions cannot be captured in this way.
The alternative I advanced in the previous chapter advocates explaining
the meaning of an expression by identifying the function it performs in
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discourse. Any natural language is a highly complex system designed
to carry out a panoply of very specific tasks, and words can plausibly be
construed as conventional tools to achieve these goals. This was, after
all, until very recently the standard way in which meaning used to be
explained. It was the advent of formal semantics in natural language
analysis, with its extrapolation of methods often more suited to the study
of formal languages, that changed the picture and our perception of what
constitutes the standard procedures.
I argued that the function of indicative conditional clauses consisted in
restricting the validity of the speech act performed by the main clause. We
also saw that the main clause of would-conditionals could not be used in-
dependently, so this explanation could not be straightforwardly extended
to them. Subjunctives seemed to be used to make assertions of a peculiar
kind—and now we are in a position to see which.
In line with the considerations in the previous sections, subjunctives are
used to state the consequences a hypothesis has in the inferential scenario
under discussion. These consequences are calculated by applying inferen-
tial principles to the hypothesis as well as to any other relevant propositions
inferentially independent of it. That’s why the use of subjunctives within
explicit deductive systems is so clear-cut.22
Of course, this doesn’t give you any handle on the truth of particular
subjunctives, but then, I believe that is not the job of a theory of meaning.
Moreover, you still need to plug in the additional input specifying the
inferential system in hand. This is easy when it is fully spelled out, but
it is much more difficult to view our everyday representations of our
environment as inferentially articulated. However, in the next section I
will argue that this is exactly what we should do in order to understand
the most common uses of subjunctives.
The much sought-after link between indicatives and subjunctives is
suggested by the fact that most indicatives are based on inferences. Leaving
biscuit conditionals aside for a moment, the truth of a typical conditional
A → B cannot as a rule be ascertained by direct observation. Hence the
need for an inferential cognitive module for making conditional assertions.
Subjunctives can in turn be used to make the properties of such modules
explicit—without even having to pretend that the speaker is regarding
the antecedent as a live possibility and is willing to commit herself to
the consequent should it turn out to be true. The difference between
an indicative and a corresponding subjunctive comes to the fore when
there is uncertainty about what the relevant inferential scenario actually
22See example (135) again.
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is. Compare (135) to
(139) If the absolute complement of any set is also a set, then something
must have gone terribly wrong in my set theory classes.
We have seen that the impact of indicative antecedents on our beliefs
is tantamount to that of new information, as we become committed to
the consequent should the condition turn out to hold. In the course of
such a revision, all kinds of adjustments can take place—we have to recre-
ate a picture of the world coherent with the new data. In the interesting
cases, involving an antecedent contrary to our beliefs, the facts to be ac-
counted for do not only include the conditional hypothesis, but also for
instance the fact that we falsely believed its negation. This can have dra-
matic consequences—you may be forced to radically reinterpret what you
thought you knew was the case in the light of this new information.
In subjunctive reasoning, on the other hand, you treat the picture of
the world you have fashioned as a given and you explore how it hangs to-
gether by testing the impact of different hypothetical interventions. When
this inferential scenario is fixed, acceptability of indicatives and subjunc-
tives converges. This happens typically with future conditionals, as our
predictions are entirely based on the inferential scenarios we use for this
purpose. A closer look at how they work in practice is in order.
7.2.2. Knowledge of the past
The phenomenon of explanation
To understand how we think about the future, we paradoxically first have
to turn our eyes towards the time gone by. Let us begin with a simple
question: have you ever wondered why we are interested in the past at
all? What happens in the present can still affect us; knowledge of what
will happen in the future enables us to make better decisions. However,
whatever took place in the past cannot be changed, and can only exert
influence upon us through its present and future consequences—arguably,
familiarity with the latter should be all that you need to deal with the
challenges posed by everyday life. If describing reality is like painting
a landscape, we only seem to need a picture of how it looks like at the
present moment. So why are we nevertheless often so keen to know how
the landscape we’re cruising has changed throughout the time?
A first stab at an answer might suggest that to know what preceded
the current situation is necessary to understand it properly. I think this is
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roughly correct, but it only shifts the focus of our inquiry—we are still left
in the dark about what it means to understand a situation.
An example may make this clearer. Suppose that upon returning home
this evening, you find one of your windows smashed, with a stone lying
inside. You are surprised, and you are looking for an explanation. At first,
it should of course be a scientific one along Hempel’s lines, but that’s fairly
trivial business—it doesn’t take a brilliant mind to imagine the kind of
event and the natural laws governing it that may have left in their wake a
hole in a brittle glass pane and a stone on your carpet. No, what you really
are after is who flung the stone and what their motivation was. And there
do not seem to be any hard scientific laws that might do the trick.
The nomological-deductive theory has been found lacking because it
treats rigorous scientific explanation as a model for explanation in general.
However, alternative proposals have often indulged in the very same error.
I therefore think a more promising approach to explanation is to inspect
how they work in everyday life and only with that knowledge analyse the
peculiar features they acquire in highly specialised contexts.
Let us get back to our broken window. Why is it important to know
what exactly happened? The damage has already been done; knowing how
it came about (or anything else for that matter) won’t undo it. However,
a proper explanation will be crucial in determining what you should do
next. Was it the nice neighbours’ rogue children? Maybe you should drop
by and ask them to see about the repair, taking some of their delicious cake
with you to make good for all the trouble. Was it the grumpy neighbour
who still bears you a grudge for that unfortunate sewage accident? Maybe
you should retaliate by slipping a rotten vegetable in his mail box. Was it
the work of a paramilitary militia rampaging through the town it has just
conquered? Maybe it’s time to forget about the window and take to your
heels. A good explanation, therefore, restores your grip on the world and
provides you with information that is crucial for predicting what the most
useful course of action will be in the circumstances.
Not all that happens is in need of explanation. If nobody throws a
stone into your window today, you do not need to find out why it has
remained unscathed; things are just as they should be. We don’t even
think of you as having learned anything new upon your arrival home—it is
simply so that your expectations have been tacitly confirmed. On the other
hand, if a hurricane blasts its way through your town and your windows
weather it without any casualty, that will certainly qualify as something
to be explained, if only because it defies our expectations. Surprising
facts show us that our grip on the world is deficient, that we lack some
information that in turn may be relevant for making new predictions.
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Either something happened that escaped our attention, or else we did
know all the relevant facts, but failed to judge them correctly. In the first
case, a good explanation will consist in pointing out the missing fact; in
the second, in stating the relation between the facts you already knew
and the one that surprised you. And, of course, combinations of both are
perhaps the most common. It follows that it is at least partly the needs
of the audience that determines what constitutes a good explanation in
a given context. You must know why someone is surprised by a fact in
order to supply her with the information she needs. There is therefore no
detailed blueprint that would fit all cases of explanation, as some theories
in philosophy of science would have it. Explanation is essentially dialogic
in nature.
The above shows that knowledge of past facts is relevant for our expec-
tations and, as a result, for our predictions. The broken window surprises
you because you expected it to be sound, and would have predicted it to be
so if asked. A creature that bases all its predictions on present facts might
be conceptually possible, but such an arrangement would be extremely
impractical—it would have to be aware of too many things at the same
time and moreover, it would need some outstanding sensory capacities.
Two different processes (think, for instance, of extreme joy and grief) often
share the same outward appearance, and an ordinary human can tell them
apart only by looking at their distal causes.
We are thus constantly using the information about the world at our
disposal, past and present, to make defeasible inferences about the future,
more often than not without as much as being aware of them. And the
bulk of this takes place in the deepest layers of our consciousness—even
the crudest sensory input is interpreted against the expectations about how
the world should behave, most of which are pretty much hard-wired in
our nervous system.
Think of how you last got scared out of your wits by an unsuspecting
family member. It may only have been afterwards that you realised you
had assumed you were alone at your place—your expectations had ad-
justed to a particular scenario even without your explicit noticing. And
yes, the odds are that the first thing you did after that mad scream was to
demand an explanation: ‘What are you doing here? Shouldn’t you be at
work/school/in prison?’ You thought you knew what was going on, but
the shock taught you otherwise. Now you are aware that you have to catch
up on facts—hence the demand for explanation.
For an example of a really unconscious expectation, just think of any
sensory illusion—your brain associates a particular affection of the sensory
organs with the cause that regularly produces it. All conscious perceptive
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input is inevitably primed by our hard-wired expectations about the nor-
mal course of things. There is no other way of making sense of crude
mechanical impacts of raw matter upon our bodies.23
All the foregoing considerations make it extremely implausible to con-
strue these inferences as ultimately logical in nature. We have seen that
we often do not have much conscious control over them, which would ar-
guably have to be the case if the conclusions on which we act were logically
deduced from a sufficient set of premises. And since this is basically the
same kind of inferences that inferior animals also draw (think, for instance,
of the expectations that underlie their spectacular yearly migrations), re-
ducing them to logical consequence would necessitate the attribution of
logical prowess to shrimps and dung beetles. I don’t think this is the way
we want to go.
In theory we are of course aware of the extent to which human life is
driven by pre-rational impulses and assumptions. In practice, however,
philosophy tends time and again to slip back to the picture of human mind
as a giant calculator, where all input and output, as well as the interme-
diary computations, are directly accessible in terms of linguistic premises
and rules for processing them. There is no questioning the appeal of such
a clean-cut conception, but it simply cannot withstand closer scrutiny.
And this approach remains dubious even if advertised as a ‘rational re-
construction’ of such practice—I can’t see any guarantee that this kind of
reconstruction must always be possible.
When it comes to expressing the results of these inferences in language,
which can be achieved in different ways, the simplistic picture of mind I
have sketched above is directly encouraged by our unreflecting acceptance
of the truth-conditional approach to meaning. This is because this way of
looking at things doesn’t distinguish between what assertions convey and
what leads us to make them. When you ask whether an endorsement of
an inference is justified, people are naturally prone to treat the underlying
argument as an enthymeme, enrich it with alleged tacit premises and check
for the logical validity of the outcome. However, the actual inferential
process, whether or not it is relevant for the meaning of the analysed
expression, might have looked quite different—we usually do not have
23By the way, these considerations about ‘Lorenzian a-priori’ (as expounded for in-
stance in (Lorenz, 1978)) allow us to give a surprising twist to the problem of induction—if
the world were not regular in nature, no natural adaptation and thus evolution would be
possible, and hence we would never be able to state the problem in the first place. No won-
der that especially the more ancient parts of our brain rely heavily on such regularities.
Now of course, this is not the kind of justification of induction a traditional epistemologist
might be after, but then, I doubt we can ever live up to his sky-high standards anyway.
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conscious control of all the variables required for making the argument
logically valid. To make the reconstructed inference look better, we are thus
often compelled to make it rely on non-accidental generalisations together
with tacit ceteris paribus clauses in their formulation. The problems with this
approach are notorious. Our failure at properly fathoming non-accidental
generalisations is perhaps the most striking corollary of this unfortunate
mindset.24
Predictions and counterfactuals
I believe the moral of the failure of most theories of counterfactuals not
based on causal networks is that we cannot successfully account for our
use of these expressions unless we regard our representations of reality
as intrinsically structured. The phenomenon of explanation, as we have
analysed it in the previous section, supplies yet another reason for posit-
ing such structure. We do not just learn loads of loose facts about the
world—we organise them in patterns, schemes, scenarios and scripts.25
Unexpected facts are surprising because they do not fit in the script we
tacitly expected things to follow. That’s why we cannot just shrug our
shoulders and simply accept these facts for what they’re worth—we need
to know how to amend the running script in order to come back to grips
with the world.
To understand the past means to know both all the relevant facts and
the connections between them. Facts are arranged in schemes or scripts.
Subsuming the information at our disposal under such a template often
enables us to predict future developments and choose the most suitable
course of action. And even when such past facts are not directly related to
the immediate future, knowing the ins and outs of a given script will give
us an edge next time we are in a situation that warrants its use.
How can you bring out the structure of the facts? There is of course
explicit causal vocabulary at your disposal, with verbs such as ‘trigger’, ‘en-
gender’, ‘spur’, ‘evidence’... Also, many conjunctions (‘because’, ‘where-
fore’) and adverbial constructions (‘as a result’, ‘in consequence’...) make
24Here I take issue especially with Kratzer’s theory of modals. I have never found her
addressing the question as to how her theory should be interpreted. In particular, I find
it very optimistic to assume that you can always spell out the content of conversational
backgrounds linguistically, so that you can reduce necessity to logical consequence and
possibility to logical compatibility. I believe that the fact that Kratzer’s analysis of coun-
terfactuals seems to have foundered on the very matter of generalisations may be due to
this problem.
25In what follows, I will use these terms more or less interchangeably.
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the connections between facts explicit. However, you can often achieve
an equivalent effect by sheer choice of words when talking about what
happened. By simply uttering
(140) Oswald shot Kennedy,
you have already told half a story: you imply that Oswald fired a weapon
launching a projectile that hit Kennedy, who died as a result. Both the
existence and the connection of these three events are suggested by your
utterance. Examples of vocabulary capable of conveying such causally-
laden information abound:
(141) She finally convinced him to take mambo classes.
(142) They cooked a lentil stew for dinner.
(143) He took offence at her implication.
(144) At last she took her revenge for that spiteful comment of his.
There doesn’t seem to be a neat distinction between stating loose facts and
describing whole chunks of the tapestry they make up, and in view of the
suggestions of the previous section, this shouldn’t come as a surprise. At
no level is the information we acquire about the world wholly free from
our expectations about it.
The relation between causally laden reports of the past and counterfac-
tuals was not lost on some historians. For a long time, the received view in
historiography (as in philosophy of language) had been that counterfactual
reasoning belonged to the realm of idle speculation and should therefore
be shunned by a serious historian.26 However, it eventually dawned on a
younger generation of scholars that to eschew any kind of counterfactual
considerations would mean to abandon causal vocabulary altogether—
and we have just seen that causality lurks in the most unexpected linguistic
hideaways. All in all, without being able to say what followed from what,
history books would become intellectually stale compilations of random
trivia.
To spell out the connections among past facts means to arrange them
into a familiar pattern supplied by a script. In (140), Oswald’s pulling the
trigger, the gun’s firing and the sudden stop of Kennedy’s bodily functions
are subsumed under the script ‘shooting someone’. Since it is assumed that
the incident followed this script, the counterfactual hypothesis to the effect
that Oswald didn’t pull the trigger will block the entire chain of events that
26See for instance (Tetlock and Belkin, 1996), pp.3-4; (Ferguson, 1999), pp.4-7; (Lebow,
2000), pp.551-557.
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occurred in the wake of his actually pulling it. In general, just as in causal
networks, several alternative events can in principle occupy a particular
slot in a script, which determines the overall consequences given the other
things that happened. This is why scripts can be used both to formulate
conditional predictions (in the form of indicative conditionals) as well as
to sustain counterfactual speculations (in the form of subjunctives).
I believe this is the main point of contact between the two sorts of
conditionals. When we expect the future to follow a certain pattern and it
really turns out this way, our prior does-will conditional will correspond
neatly to a posterior had-would one. And since scripts anchored in our
knowledge about the past and the present are our only handle on what
is likely to happen next, future-oriented indicatives and subjunctives are
readily seen as conveying the same message. Conditional probabilities are
therefore not the last word about conditionals—they are awarded based on
the information stored in scripts (remember that they cannot in general be
derived from simple non-conditional probabilities).
In section 7.1.3 we explored some cases in which the usual analogy
between does-wills and had-woulds failed. We saw that in Examples
2 and 3, the difference was due to the subject’s insufficient grip on the
reality, which was corrected by the benefit of the hindsight. I argued
that had we had access to the decisive piece of information in each case
when making the conditional prediction, it would have coincided with the
counterfactual uttered at a later point. These cases, therefore, do not pose a
major problem unless you want to defend a very rigid parallelism between
future indicatives and counterfactuals, which is certainly not necessitated
by the present casual account.
Example 1 is different, though, since there are no plausible indicative
counterparts to counterfactuals of the ‘if-I-were-you’ variety nor to coun-
terfactuals exploring the consequences of a false mathematical statement
for the sake of a reductio. This shows that we must conceive the function of
counterfactuals broader than as consisting exclusively in the assessment of
possible past indicatives. In these cases, inferential scenarios are explored
for purposes different from their use in predictions or conditional asser-
tions. Though there is obviously no chance of me taking charge of your life,
openly entertaining such a possibility can give you a new idea about how
to tackle a particular problem, or at least make you feel better about the
decision you have already taken. And as regards hypotheses contravening
axioms of the set theory, a counterfactual experiment can clearly show you
why such an assumption is a non-starter. There is thus no need whatsoever
to posit a difference in meaning between typical ‘causal’ counterfactuals
and those that we use to speak about other sorts of inference, even if the
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latter are not likely to undergird indicative conditionals.
Sharing scripts
Counterfactual reasoning about actual events is thus no different from that
which takes place within the confines of other inferential systems. We
ponder a hypothesis, insert it in the inferential scenario in hand and see
where it leads us in view of other independent facts and inference rules.
When thinking counterfactually about the past, we change one element in
the inferential landscape and run the corresponding script, which tells us
what we can expect in such circumstances.
Exploring the associated counterfactual possibilities is part and parcel
of learning from the past. As we have already noted, it brings out the
structure of events. Crucially, scripts underlying these structures are liable
to be shared among people. No coordinated animal activity would be
conceivable without shared expectations about natural events and other
animals’ reaction to them. In lower animals, these expectations are shared
mainly as an essential part of their instincts. We humans, however, can
not only follow our expectations and handle according to them, but we are
also endowed with the marvellous capacity of informing our companions
about them in advance, of putting them on the table for public scrutiny.
And one way of achieving this objective is by means of counterfactuals.
We usually utter counterfactuals in order to enrich the scripts of our
interlocutors. Great many scripts we use on a daily basis are learned, not
hard-wired in our nervous system and counterfactuals offer a manner of
passing this knowledge on people who lack our experience and expertise.
Counterfactual utterances about the past may at first sight appear as mere
exercises in Monday morning quarterbacking, and some of them may
indeed be quite unhelpful. Yet if you realise how often they pop up in all
kinds of public discourse, you will soon be wary of dismissing them as
futile by-products of flights of fancy.
Often the lesson imparted by a counterfactual is quite straightforward.
For instance,
(145) If you had pulled the cat’s tail (as was your original intention), it
would have attacked you.
(146) If you had stayed out of the fire, your fringed cowboy jeans might
still be intact.
are readily construed as warnings against behaviour that is prone to bring
unpleasant consequences in its wake. However, we may just as often make
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counterfactual assertions about situations that are too complex or peculiar
to repeat themselves in their entirety:
(147) If the Dutch central bank had intervened earlier, the bankruptcy of
Vie d’Or might have been prevented.
This does not mean that such affirmations do belong to the category of
Monday morning quarterbacking. On the contrary, our interest in these
cases resembles a professional chess player’s study of famous games—
most likely, she will never find herself in the exact same situation that she
analyses, but knowledge of some of the possible strategies can be of great
help in tackling analogous, even if new challenges. Sometimes we can
reasonably estimate the degree of analogy between the new situation and
a familiar one and try to control for the confounding variables in applying
the old script. And, of course, sometimes it will be the best we can do
anyway—if such an attempt at extrapolation fails, at least we’ll have one
more experience to learn from.
Just as it is necessary that we share many of our expectations with our
fellow human beings, it is also inevitable that different live experiences and
attitudes will give rise to divergent takes on what the future may bring.
In our weaker moments, we are all prone to momentarily slip to magical
thinking, unable to shake off the suspicion that the whole world is against
us:
(148) If I hadn’t forgotten my umbrella, it wouldn’t be raining now.
Most of us become immediately ashamed of such puerile thoughts, but
there are also those who award them much more credence than they de-
serve. You only need to enter a debate on world politics, though, to see
how much people’s expectations can differ. These are opinions that make
the rounds in certain circles:
(149) If Germany had not recognised Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian war
could have been avoided.
(150) If it hadn’t been for Western meddling, Putin would never have
invaded Ukraine.
(151) If Cuba hadn’t been subjected to the US embargo, it would be a
prosperous country now.
Unreasonable though some counterfactuals may be, there is often simply
no knock-down argument to decide in favour or against them. After all,
they are based on expectations, and these can be pretty subjective. This
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doesn’t of course mean that you cannot level good arguments against them,
for instance by pointing to similar cases where analogous expectations
(would) have failed. However, it may well be so that the ultimate value of
our scripts can only be ascertained in practice, and not in theory. It is just
as well that most home-made political theorists will never be able to put
their ideas to work.
It may appear too radical to think that there is often no guaranteed
method to decide between the truth and the falsity of a counterfactual.
However, from another point of view, it only amounts to stating the obvi-
ous. Many past situations are simply too complex for us to apply a straight-
forward, universally shared script to them. All counterfactual speculation
to that effect will therefore necessarily contain an element of chance. Dis-
agreement and uncertainty, even among reasonable and informed people,
are the rule—we should not just shrug them off as some sort of anomaly.
7.2.3. Laws
Some may argue, though, that if the cotenability approach to the truth of
counterfactuals (perhaps in some sophisticated Kratzerian variant) even-
tually succeeds, we will have a decision method to separate the wheat from
the chaff after all. That may well be so; however, I am quite sceptical about
the prospects of this project.
The main reason is that in propping counterfactuals up with laws you
do not really succeed in reducing them to something better understood
and more amenable to study; you only shift the burden of expressing
generality around. If you think about it, why should a prior inquiry into
laws be deemed preferable to studying counterfactuals directly? Our long-
standing reductive tradition in formal semantics makes such a strategy
appear natural, but at this point we know better than to follow its practice
blindly.
A possible reply may be that laws are the chief building blocks of
scientific theories, which are our best shot at the constitution of the world.
With this I cannot but wholeheartedly agree. I also think that it provides a
clue of why explaining counterfactuals in terms of laws is misguided.
Our faculty to make predictions and think counterfactually about worldly
events greatly precedes, both historically and conceptually, our capacity
to formulate sophisticated scientific theories. The latter explores abstract
relations between magnitudes in a fairly general manner; the former, de-
spite containing elements of generality, is still firmly anchored to particular
situations. They are of course closely related, but I think they differ as to
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their function in our thought, as witnessed by Goodman’s problem—the
alleged law covering the match-striking scenario does not provide a crite-
rion to distinguish background variables from those liable to be altered by
the introduction of a counterfactual hypothesis. However, it is intuitively
obvious that the status of ‘dryness of the match’ and ‘presence of oxygen’
is quite distinct from that of ‘not lighting’. This additional information is
simply missing in the law, because laws serve slightly different purposes
than counterfactuals.
That’s also why we have so many counterfactuals that do not seem
to rest upon any law worthy of the name. We have already discussed
Edgington’s cake example27, but their number is virtually unlimited:
(152) If you had come, we would have had so much fun!
(153) If he cared at all for me, he’d buy me a fur coat.
(154) If her mother had tried to advise her, she wouldn’t have listened.
The job of laws is to make explicit the general principles that underwrite
our expectations in particular cases. That’s why, if available, laws can
serve to justify such expectations. However, sometimes the latter are so
parochial that it is difficult to come up with a reasonably succinct general
rule they might exemplify. That of course doesn’t make the predictions
based on them less rational—in real life, there is an end to all demands for
justification.
A language game is conceivable, where participants can make predic-
tions and use counterfactuals without partaking in law-talk.28 Should we
therefore consider their ability to use and process counterfactuals in any
way impaired? Or should we conclude that while they can use counter-
factuals competently, they are at a loss for what these really mean? I have
my doubts about the former suggestion, and I don’t think I can so much
as make sense of the latter. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to
imagine users of lawlike generalisations devoid of the capacity of counter-
factual thinking. That’s why explaining counterfactuals in terms of laws
is redolent of putting the cart before the horse.
As I’ve said, I believe that one of the reasons why attempts to reduce
counterfactual reasoning to logical inference featuring laws and relevant
conditions seem so appealing is our striving for objectivity. We would
27See page 55.
28Actually, I don’t recall my grandparents ever using something like a non-accidental
generalisation—in any case, they are very frugal with them. They do use counterfactuals,
though, with great success (witness all the wonderful hypothetical consequences of my
having grown up in the country).
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like to have objective criteria to decide which counterfactuals are true
and which are false. We tend to think of laws as completely subject-
independent, determined only by the world and discovered by natural
scientists—so, the reasoning goes, if we could find a way to distinguish
relevant conditions from the variable ones, counterfactuals would be re-
deemed from all suspicion and awarded the seal of approval of respectable
discourse.
Behind this reasoning again hides a view of language that likens it to
one particular Alpine country.29 The attitude of most theorists is ‘give me
the data and I will tell you which counterfactuals are true and which false.’
I am afraid, however, that life, and hence language, are not as simple as
the Switzerland conception would have us think. And fortunately so—
otherwise they would be hopelessly boring. A more fitting metaphor for
language would be a wild forest, whose apparently haphazard structure
flexibly adjusts to the terrain and climate conditions, always liable to ac-
commodate new circumstances. And these can vary as much as its diverse
inhabitants, who are often compelled to pull off all kinds of improbable
stunts in order to get by. Although we are quite adept at finding our
way through the familiar spots, we cannot encompass the forest in all its
vastness and unpredictability.
To return to our problem, it is not the world, it is other people who
evaluate our utterances and judge them true or false. Sometimes they
will have good reasons for doing so, sometimes they won’t; sometimes
they will be certain and sometimes they will opt for an alternative only
because suspending belief is not an option in the circumstances. They will
accept your counterfactual if they credit you with the experience sufficient
for forging reliable expectations; they will endorse it if their expectations
tally with yours.30 Ultimately, the scripts you use for your predictions
will be tested in practice—but since you cannot rerun history (let alone
implement some impossible antecedents), you might never get to know
exactly what would have happened in the one situation over which there
is disagreement. This doesn’t mean that we cannot rationally argue about
our counterfactuals—it only casts a shadow of doubt on the possibility to
provide them with definitive grounding.
Laws will not help with this task for one simple reason—the ceteris
paribus clauses. Sometimes they are construed as magical formulas that
can make all the application problems go away. But you should be wary of
29See Section 6.1.1.
30This, I think, is the point Edgington makes about objective probability in (Edgington,
2007), p.181.
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magical panaceas if you live in a wild forest. What a ceteris paribus clause
really says is ‘that there in principle may be relevant variables outside our
control, but we are going to ignore them for now’. There is a plethora
of conditions that can make the inference from ‘presence of oxygen’ and
‘striking a dry match’ to ‘the match will light’ fail and we will never be in a
position to control them all. The assumption that the conditions are normal
and the ceteris paribus clause is fulfilled, wherefore the law can be applied,
is never risk-free. Our most reasonable expectations can go wrong, and
among them figure those about the world following a particular law-like
regularity.
Suppose my grandmother doesn’t know that oxygen has to be present
for something to catch fire. Is her utterance of
(42) If this match had been struck, it would have lighted.
therefore somehow deficient? I don’t think so. She identified the situation
as one in which the corresponding expectation would be warranted. I
happen to know that the presence of oxygen is necessary for the match’s
lighting, but I am aware that there was plenty of oxygen around, so my
grandmother was right. There may be other defeating conditions I am not
aware of, and I may therefore at some point get corrected by someone who
knows better, or else a failed prediction may teach me that checking for
oxygen and dryness is not always enough. In the meantime, though, both
my grandma and I will have to get by on the meagre knowledge we do
possess. The point is that I am not substantially better off than her.
If you object that ‘a complete description of the world’ would settle
these questions once and for all, you are already embarked on a flight from
Amazonia to Bern. There are no complete descriptions of all the paths you
can take through the ticket—surprise is an essential part of a forester’s life.
7.2.4. Backtracking, ramps and other red herrings
The problem
There is yet another case of a successful theory of counterfactuals giving
rise to spurious problems. We have seen that similarity semantics is to a
large extent hollow and apart from the logic (which it was specifically de-
signed to yield), it doesn’t make any substantial predictions about concrete
counterfactuals.31 However, even though presented as a mere ‘framework
for the formulation of the substantive problems’32, similarity semantics
31See Section 3.2.
32(Stalnaker, 1984), p.129
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based on possible worlds still manages to engender theoretical puzzles
that bear no relation to our actual use of counterfactuals.
When evaluating a counterfactual such as
(67) If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, no one else would have,
similarity theorists tell you to look at the closest world where Oswald fails
to kill Kennedy and ‘check’ whether there is anyone else that kills him
there. This looks pretty abstract and innocent, but we have already seen
that there is a tension between the desideratum of closeness and that of
supporting the antecedent. A similarity theorist will strive to keep as many
actual facts, especially the past ones, true in the selected world(s), and so
he will be tempted to come up with a story of how the divergence from
actuality comes about. That is where the ‘small, localised, simple’ miracles
of Lewis’s make their entrance.33 In Bennett’s idiom, you have to devise a
‘ramp’34 that connects the actual course of history with the counterfactual
event specified by the antecedent.
So in the case of (67), you have to think of a last-minute accident that
prevents Oswald from killing Kennedy. Either he gets overwhelmed by
remorse while aiming, or his hand shakes involuntarily in the crucial mo-
ment, or a gust of wind slightly diverts the trajectory of the bullets. The
most plausible of these stories is supposed to win the contest for ‘closest’.
But why stop there in trying to find out what would have to have
been different for the antecedent to come out true? Why should strange
last-minute accidents have primacy over more profound structural differ-
ences that nevertheless do not require miracles? Maybe if Oswald hadn’t
killed Kennedy, it would have been because he had been mentally stable
in the first place. P. B. Downing suggested a more plausible example,
paraphrased by Lewis:
Jim and Jack quarrelled yesterday, and Jack is still hopping mad. We
conclude that if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would not help
him. But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He never would ask for help
after such a quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack for help today, there would
have to have been no quarrel yesterday. In that case, Jack would be
his usual generous self. So if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would
help him after all.
(Lewis, 1979), p.456. Example from (Downing, 1959).
33(Lewis, 1979), p.472
34(Bennett, 2003), p.214
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Bennett coined the name ‘backtracking arguments’ for considerations
akin to the above one.35 Their common trait is that they change the past in
order to accommodate a counterfactual hypothesis. As Downing’s puzzle
shows, such a change can in turn lead to the endorsement of a counterfac-
tual that we had confidently rejected before engaging in ‘backtracking’.
Lewis’s explains this phenomenon by admitting a non-standard vague-
ness resolution of the similarity relation that is triggered in ‘some special
contexts’, for instance, if someone puts forward such a counterfactual. In
a similar vein, A. Arregui analyses most backtrackers as featuring layered
modalities, as they tend to sound much more acceptable if the ‘would’ in
the consequent is complemented with ‘have to’.36 According to Arregui, in
backtrackers the original standard similarity relation is composed with the
accessibility relation corresponding to an ontic necessity modal havemod.37
The embedded modality’s task is to ‘shift the emphasis back to laws’38,
since Lewis’s standard similarity relation doesn’t frown upon small mira-
cles. Bennett, on the other hand, came eventually to regard backtrackers as
nothing out of the ordinary—backtracking and ramps amounted for him
essentially to the same phenomenon.39
Although there are undoubtedly valid intuitions at work in these ex-
planations, I find them unsatisfactory for the very same reason I have been
hammering on throughout this essay. It may sometimes be worthwhile to
draw up a neat formal model of the semantic contribution of a piece of vo-
cabulary, but it seldom provides deep insight into why it is actually used.
The same goes for backtracking—we are left in the dark about why the
standard similarity resolution with ‘tiny miracles’ is so strongly preferred
by normal people to the law-abiding backtracking one. I will try to throw
some light upon this question in what is left of this section.
Lewis’s example gives us a hint. If I ask you ‘If Jim asked Jack for
35(Bennett, 1973), p.391
36Actually, if you take a close look at Lewis’s rendering of Downing’s example, you
will find that at no point in the story a mere ‘would’-counterfactual about the past is
asserted.
37See (Arregui, 2005b), Chapter 3.
38(Arregui, 2005a), p.13.
39(Bennett, 2003), pp.276-287. This came after a detour through a completely symmet-
rical theory with respect to the past and the future in (Bennett, 1984). I will henceforth
disregard Bennett’s final (for the time being) theory of backtrackers and assume that they
do require a ‘different resolution of similarity’ than regular counterfactuals. Bennett’s
theory predicts with respect of Downing’s puzzle that assertions of ‘If Jim asked Jack for
help today, Jack wouldn’t help him’ and ‘If Jim asked Jack for help today, there would
have to have been no quarrel’ should be perceived as incompatible. I don’t share this
intuition.
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help today, would Jack help him?’, you are obliged to take into account
all elements of the current situation in order to reach a verdict. By no
means can you leave out the fact that there was a quarrel yesterday. It is
irrelevant that Jim would never ask for a favour after such a quarrel—that
Jack would not help him might be Jim’s very reason for refraining from
doing so. We always evaluate counterfactuals against the backdrop of a
particular situation, even if we are ignorant of some of its details. Past
events form part of this backdrop—you cannot change them at will. The
quarrel makes Jim’s asking for help highly improbable, but it does not rule
it out completely, so the counterfactual scenario is easily imaginable.
The fact that our representations of the world come in structured by
default exonerates us from racking our brains as to how to accommo-
date counterfactual hypotheses. Facts are modular from the very begin-
ning (this is belied by their construal as members of the power set of the
universe of possible worlds)—we can, as it were, throw some out and
substitute them for others without affecting the background. That’s why
counterfactual backtracking is so controversial and also why there is abso-
lutely no need for ramps, let alone any kind of miracles in our theory. If
they are not possible for examples from Section 7.1.3, they are not needed
for more common counterfactuals either.
Rationale for ramps
We have seen that this confusion is to a large extent theory-driven, but
some of it has intuitive roots as well. Take ramps first. It may admittedly
be disconcerting for a person to reflect for the first time on her unstudied
use of counterfactuals and see the range of antecedents she has up to now
used without second thoughts. ‘If my husband were blond, if the Soviet
Union had been a democratic country, if Challenger hadn’t crashed—how
is all that supposed to happen?’. These are traits, states and events that
in real life cannot just emerge out of the blue. The temptation to come up
with some story to justify use of counterfactual antecedents is therefore
considerable, and if on top of that you employ a semantic theory that
entreats you to evaluate consequents in alternative world-histories, it will
become almost irresistible. However, after understanding a little better
why people use counterfactuals in the first place as well as how they work,
we know better than that. Real use of counterfactuals doesn’t require
connecting antecedents with the actual history in any way.
The real reason why sometimes we do engage in supporting our coun-
terfactuals with ramps is not so much to underscore their plausibility as
to bring out the contextual relevance of our assertion. In view of the role
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counterfactuals play in our intellectual life, it is often (though not always)
important for the antecedent to have been a live possibility, that is, its nega-
tion must not be regarded as overdetermined by the circumstances. If you
are to draw a lesson from the past, it usually doesn’t help if the alternative
explored by a counterfactual was not really an option.
Suppose you and your friend are hopelessly lost in a maze at a theme
park. It is getting dark, children with lollipops have all left, the park is
closing and everybody seems to have forgotten about you. Between sobs,
your friend says
(155) If we had a map, we could find the way out.
Talk about irritating! And certainly not because what your friend said is
false—on the contrary, its very obviousness makes it a stupid thing to say.
The management of the park didn’t reckon with the possibility that anyone
could be so thick as to get lost in the simple maze, so there are no maps
available. Your friend is right, but his contribution is rather inadequate, as
it doesn’t teach you anything worthwhile about the past.
But let us change the example a little. Imagine now that at the en-
trance of the maze, there had been girls handing maps to each visitor—
you wanted to make an impression and smugly refused to take one. Your
friend’s assertion is now presented in a new light. It may be just as an-
noying, but for a different reason. You could easily have got hold of a
map—your friend’s assertion makes it clear just how bad your decision at
the entrance was.
Popular wisdom has long warned that counterfactual reasoning with
irrelevant antecedents can easily slide into daydreaming. The point of the
many adages concerning unrealisable possibilities, perhaps the funniest
example of which is the Polish
(156) If granny had a moustache, she would be the grandpa.40
is not the futility of all counterfactuals, but only those that explore alterna-
tives that are neither here nor there. Unfortunately, similar examples have
bedevilled philosophical literature (think, say, of Bizet and Verdi, or Caesar
in the Korean war), upsetting our intuitions and giving rise to distracting
puzzles.
Imagined ramps put forward to make a case for a counterfactual’s rele-
vance usually start at a decision point or, in general, at a point considered
40‘Gdyby babcia miała wasy, toby była dziadkiem.’ I learned about this proverb
through F. Veltman, who collects them. Two rough English equivalents are ‘If “ifs” and
“ans” were pots and pans, there would be no work for tinker’s hands.’ or perhaps the
better known ‘If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.’
220 CHAPTER 7. INDICATIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
underdetermined by the script used to interpret and organise the events.
In this way, the antecedent is more or less guaranteed to refer to a relevant
alternative. Regardless of the question of determinism, it is a platitude that
we cannot predict everything that will actually happen.41 A script cannot
therefore always reduce the range of possible outcomes to one and has to
allow for more of them. The other possibilities, in a sense, remain live even
after one is realised. It is through their use in describing reality organised
in scripts that ontic modalities (‘it could/might have been so’) connect with
epistemic ones (‘it can/may be so’).
Possible-world semantics, coupled with the intuition that ramps are
sometimes relevant for assessing counterfactual assertions, led Bennett
and Lewis to think that each and every worthwhile counterfactual needed
such a grounding. And, indeed, for most counterfactuals you can come up
with some kind of story that shows that the antecedent was a possibility
after all (although in a way irrelevant for most practical purposes). That’s
the job of the ‘small, localised, simple miracles’. ‘A particle swerving a little
or a neuron firing’42 are events that typically strike us as unpredictable and
thus can serve as universal ramp-initiators. Yet, of course, people had used
counterfactuals long before learning about neurons or quantum mechanics.
The use of reasonable antecedents is especially important in counter-
factual history. You can certainly speculate about how the existence of
a functional telephone network connecting Aztec villages might have af-
fected the course of the Spanish conquest, but you will most likely be found
to be playing a child’s game. Serious historians are usually more interested
in close calls and near misses. In this manner, they can underscore the im-
portance of certain decisions or unexpected events. It also enables them
to explore alternatives that historical actors themselves were compelled to
(or at least should have) entertain, thus throwing light upon the rationale
(or lack of it) behind their decisions.
No wonder that this desideratum features prominently in theoretical
work on counterfactual reasoning in history. However, in these writings
as well, a counterfactual’s germaneness is often confounded with its plau-
sibility. And such a theoretical attitude also appears to percolate among
practising historians, as the following passage in Tony Judt’s Postwar at-
tests:
41Actually, determinism may be construed as the thesis that there is a gigantic global
script that encompasses all our partial ones and regulates all events. Seen in this light, it
dangerously resembles wishful thinking, a forest prowler’s daydream of a tranquil life in
a Swiss village.
42(Bennett, 2003), p.217
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The appeal of neutrality-as an alternative to defenceless confrontation-
was growing, in Germany and France alike. If the Korean War had
not broken out just at this moment (a reasonable counter-factual, since
it nearly didn’t) the contours of recent European history might look
very different indeed.
(Judt, 2005), p.151.
Here, ‘reasonable’ must of course be read as ‘relevant’. Korean war was
(or was not) of paramount importance in shaping recent European history
regardless of whether it was a close call or not.
Rationale for backtracking
Let us now turn to backtracking. I have defended, pace Bennett, that it is
a slightly different phenomenon from ramps. A ramp suggests a way of
changing the past in order to show that the antecedent of an asserted sub-
junctive ‘was something to be reckoned with in the circumstances’; back-
tracking changes the past in order to make it possible for the antecedent to
come true.
Let us recall Downing’s puzzle (page 216). Given the tiff, Jack wouldn’t
help Jim if asked to do so. Of course, Jim most likely wouldn’t ask Jack in
the first place, but it is only up to him—he could change his mind at any
moment if he wanted to. However, he is aware that such a change of mind
would be fruitless—that’s why for him to ask, there would have to have
been no quarrel yesterday or they would have to make up first.
Suppose now that they still haven’t made up. You may find yourself
inclined to give different answers to
(157) If Jim asked Jack for help today, would Jack help him?
and
(158) If Jim asks Jack for help today, will Jack help him?
By most people lights, as the literature shows, the counterfactual is false.
However, you can argue a case for the indicative being true. The reason is
that when making a conditional prediction, you have to take into account
the fact that for Jim to ask Jack for a favour, it is necessary that they
should have made up first. On the other hand, in order to evaluate the
counterfactual, you need a complete inferential scenario—and since it is
not at all certain that Jim and Jack will make up, you may stick to what
things are like at the present moment. Of course, the indicative will be
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forced to take the same value as the counterfactual if we replace ‘today’
with ‘now’.43
This example suggests that to ask what would/will have to happen for
Jim to ask Jack for help or for Jack to help Jim is to make a slightly different
kind of question than the above counterfactual poses—one about the con-
ditions required for something to happen. As we have seen, these can be
relevant in evaluating indicatives. They are also vital for planning, as they
point out the course of action that must be pursued if a particular goal is
to be achieved. Just as the standard counterfactual reasoning, the search
for necessary conditions is based on our expectations and hence on scripts.
This is further witnessed by the fact that they support counterfactuals of
the form ‘the goal would not (have) be(en) achieved if the necessary con-
ditions weren’t fulfilled’. However, while regular counterfactuals explore
the consequences a script associates in a given situation with the event
introduced by the antecedent, no matter how it comes about, the search for
necessary conditions looks for events that must occur for the contemplated
outcome to take place. The former looks forward, the latter backward.44
This difference looms large also on the grammatical level. As we have
seen, it has often been remarked that in general, backtrackers sound better
with a modalised consequent. Thus,
(159) If Jim asked Jack for help today, there would have been no quarrel
yesterday.
is much better rendered as
(160) If Jim asked Jack for help today, there would have to have been no
quarrel yesterday.
While this is certainly an improvement, I still think it stops halfway. The
really adequate rendering of the intended proposition is, in my view, as
follows (this is also the syntactic structure I have inconspicuously been
using the whole time):
(161) (In order) for Jim to ask Jack for help today, there would have to have
been no quarrel yesterday.
43An analogous point seems to be made in (Woods, 1997), p.86, but I think Woods is
wrong about the indicative conditional, which he assumes to be on the same footing as
the subjunctive at all times (he follows Dudman in setting does-wills apart from the rest of
indicatives). None the less, Woods does suggest that the result of the Ramsey-test would
in this case be at odds with the procedure for evaluating does-wills and had-woulds.
44The meaning of ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient condition’ in colloquial language tends
to be time-bound. That’s why the logician’s abstract use of these notions sometimes
engenders perplexity in non-sophisticated users.
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So in the most favourable circumstances, backtrackers’ difference from
standard counterfactuals is brought out in the dependent clause as well as
in the main one. This is a phenomenon encountered across a number of
languages (for simplicity I only use forward-looking examples):
(162) For Jack to help Jim, they would have to make up first.
(163) Para que Juan le ayudase a Jaime, tendrı´an que reconciliarse antes.
(164) (Nato) aby Ja´n pomohol Jakubovi, museli by sa najprv pomeritˇ.
(165) Opdat Jack Jim zou helpen, moesten zij eerst tot een verzoening
komen.
My suggestion is, therefore, that bare backtrackers can sometimes
squeak through as sloppy ways of expressing necessary conditions for
the eventuality stated in their antecedents. This is enabled by the fact that
the proper constructions for conveying such messages are close relatives of
counterfactuals, coupled with the fact that counterfactuals can in general
be evaluated against different inferential scenarios (not only rough causal
scripts). Just because standard causal resolution is the default setting for
counterfactuals about actual events, in order to avoid confusion, language
provides special syntactic structures to express backtracking inferences.
7.2.5. Fatalism
To close this chapter, and with it the whole essay, I will try to show that what
we have learned about indicatives and subjunctives can give us insight
into what is wrong about the famous ‘fatalist argument’, as exposed by
Dummett:
The standard form of the fatalist argument was very popular in Lon-
don during the bombing. The siren sounds, and I set off for the air-raid
shelter in order to avoid being killed by a bomb. The fatalist argues,
‘Either you are going to be killed by a bomb or you are not going to
be. If you are, then any precautions you take will be ineffective. If
you are not, all precautions you take are superfluous. Therefore it is
pointless to take precautions.’
(Dummett, 1964), p.344
Of course, nobody has ever been swayed by this reasoning, but never-
theless, scholars have found it surprisingly difficult to agree on which of
the above inference moves should be branded as invalid. Since the argu-
ment essentially relies on conditionals, this is another indication of how
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little the profuse literature on the subject has furthered our understanding
of them.
As with any paradox, our task is twofold—on the one hand, we must
identify the source of the problem and on the other, it behoves us to explain
the intuitive appeal of the invalid reasoning. I shall begin with a schematic
representation of the argument. Let us define K as ‘You are going to be
killed by a bomb’, P as ‘You will take precautions’45, I as ‘Any precautions
will be inefficient’ and S as ‘Any precautions will be superfluous’. Then
the argument goes as follows:
1. K ∨ ¬K Tautology
2. K→ I Premise 1
3. ¬K→ S Premise 2
4. K→ (I ∨ S) WC; 2
5. ¬K→ (I ∨ S) WC; 3
6. I ∨ S E∨; 1,4,5
Dummett himself believed that Premise 1 and Premise 2 must feature
different types of conditionals. Stalnaker put the problem down to the rule
of disjunction elimination, which allegedly merges together two indicative
conditionals that are both reasonable, but in slightly different contexts. I
will try to show that, fortunately, the solution to the puzzle is much more
simple and does not require sophisticated tinkering with our logic nor the
hackneyed recourse to polysemy.
I actually think that it is quite obvious that the main culprit in the above
derivation is Premise 2. It simply is not true that if you survive the raid,
the precautions will have been superfluous. You may well survive only
thanks to having taken them. On the other hand, Premise 1 seems OK—if
you do not survive, then any precautions you may have taken must have
been inefficient indeed.
Now for the second, more interesting task—we have to elucidate why
Premise 2, despite being false, has been able to baﬄe such eminent minds
for so much time. To pin down the source of its apparent plausibility, let us
reconstruct the reasoning that may lead to its acceptance. We will proceed
by conditional proof, but we will avoid importing outside premises that
renders it probabilistically invalid.46
45This proposition will not appear in the reconstruction itself, but will be useful in the
subsequent analysis.
46For a long time I had thought that the fallacy was due to an inconspicuous application
of a probabilistically invalid inference rule to complex conditionals. I now think that the
problem with the derivation is much simpler, and is not logical in nature.
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So assume for a moment that you will not be killed in the raid. Given
this assumption, whether or not you take precautions, you will survive
the raid. Well, the reasoning goes, this is exactly what it takes for the
precautions to be superfluous, isn’t it? Ergo, assuming that you will not
be killed in the raid, the precautions will be superfluous.
To see what is wrong with this argument, just transpose it into the past
tense. Suppose the raid is over and you are looking for a friend. Either he
was killed in the raid or he survived. If he got killed, then the precautions
he may have taken must have failed. But if he survived, then he did so even
if he hadn’t taken any precautions, no matter how long the odds. Does
this mean that if he survived, the precautions he might have taken were
superfluous? Suddenly it doesn’t strike one as plausible at all. Whatever
happened?
What we really need in the past scenario in order to conclude that the
precautions were superfluous is not an indicative, but rather a subjunctive:
(166) If he hadn’t taken any precautions, he would still have survived the
raid.
This is because the subjunctive explores the general structure of the raid
script, unfettered by how it actually ran. And ‘superfluous’ characterises
an action with respect to a script as a whole—it states that the relevant
outcome was or would have been unaffected by it.
Usually we do not need scripts in order to obtain information about the
past. Someone may simply tell you that your friend survived, or you may
make him out in a crowded street. None of this will make you conclude
that the precautions he most likely took to stay alive were superfluous.
However, the situation is different with respect to our knowledge of the
future, which typically is based on scripts. Therefore, when we are told
that ‘we will survive even if we do not take precautions’, our tendency is
to interpret this information as being sustained by the relevant script and
thus warranting the conclusion that the precautions are really superfluous.
Since this is the paradigmatic scenario, future indicatives and correspond-
ing subjunctives usually share their truth value. However, in our case
the indicative is not based on a script, but only on a prior hypothetical
assumption—hence the confusion.47 The corresponding subjunctive is un-
affected by the assumption and may well be false.
To sum up, the indicative ¬P → ¬K doesn’t in general warrant belief
in S, just as its past variant doesn’t warrant belief in the past variant of S.
47This, by the way, is not the only possibility—the same goes for a case in which a
time traveller tells you that you will survive. That’s why this difficulty is not due to an
indiscriminate use of conditional proof.
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We need a subjunctive to do the job. In this special case, the truth value of
the future subjunctive may diverge from that of the indicative. We are led
to confusion because this is so exceptional in future conditionals. In past
conditionals, on the other hand, the divergence is common, and therefore
the past version of the argument fools no one.
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Conclusion
If you have made it thus far, I’d better not keep you much longer. Let me
just sketch with broad strokes the central theses of the last two chapters:
1. The use of model-theoretical methodology in the study of natural
language invites the idea that the expression(s) under study must be
paraphrasable in a more elementary vocabulary.
2. Since nothing guarantees the existence of such a vocabulary, many
analyses surreptitiously smuggle in ingredients dependent for their
interpretation on the analysed expression.
3. Truth-conditional approaches generally conflate the meaning of an
utterance with considerations about its justification. They often tac-
itly assume that translations into the privileged vocabulary can be
straightforwardly checked for their truth.
4. Rather than that, I suggest that the meaning of an expression is more
naturally explained in terms of the standard function it performs
in a conversational exchange. This holds not only for non-truth-
conditional vocabulary, but also for a plethora of truth-conditional
expressions.
5. In view of the above, indicative conditional clauses are best viewed as
devices for suspending the performance of the speech act conveyed
by the main clause, regardless of its illocutionary force.
6. Subjunctive conditionals, on the other hand, are used to make sim-
ple assertions about the inferential potential of rejected propositions
against the backdrop of a contextually salient inferential scenario.
7. Our takes on what the world is like are at all times inferentially
articulated—they guide our expectations and predictions. Informa-
tion about this inferential articulation is stored in scripts. Through
them, subjunctives connect with future indicatives.
This thesis was born out of frustration. My chief goal in writing it was
to explain, or perhaps I should say rationalise, the lack of enthusiasm with
which I assimilated most of the current literature on conditionals, despite
finding the topic to be of an extraordinary importance. I do think the
course that has been set must change dramatically; however, to borrow
an aphorism, it is always the rearguard that complains that we should be
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running in the opposite direction. So maybe it’s just that I have failed
to appreciate the value of the work in this field, lacking the ability to
contribute in any worthwhile manner. It is for you to decide.
Appendix A
Some technicalities for Chapters 4
and 5
A.1. Stalnaker
α is a well-order
We will check for antisymmetry, strong connectedness, transitivity and
well-foundedness.
a) Antisymmetry. Assume β α γ and γ α β. Then, by definition,
f ({β, γ}, α) = β and f ({γ, β}, α) = γ. By definition of a set by extension
and since f is a function, β = γ.
b) Strong connectedness. Take any β and γ. By Constraint 1, f ({β, γ}, α) ∈
{β, γ}. Hence, f ({β, γ}, α) = β or f ({β, γ}, α) = γ. In the first case, β α γ,
in the second, γ α β.
c) Transitivity. Assume β α γ and γ α δ and suppose β α δ for reductio.
By strong connectedness, either β α δ or δ α β, so by disjunctive
syllogism δ α β. I will show that this can only occur if β = γ = δ. By
Constraint 1, f ({β, γ, δ}, α) equals either β, γ or δ. Suppose it’s β. As
β ∈ {β, δ}, f ({β, δ}, α) = δ and δ ∈ {β, γ, δ}, by Constraint 4, β = δ. But we
know that γ = f ({γ, δ}, α) = f ({γ, β}, α) = β. So β = γ = δ. The argument
for f ({β, γ δ}, α) equal to γ or δ is analogous. By strong connectedness,
we have β α β, and together with the above equality, β α δ after all.
d) Well-foundedness. We shall show that for any A such that JAKα , ∅,
f (A, α) is the unique least element of JAK. Set β = f (A, α). By Constraint
1, we know that β ∈ JAK. Suppose that there is a γ ∈ JAKα such that
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γ α β. Hence, by definition of α, f ({β, γ}, α) = γ. But then we have
both f (A, α) = β ∈ {β, γ} and f ({β, γ}, α) = γ ∈ JAK, so by Constraint 4,
γ = β and β is the unique least element of JAK. This also warrants the
assertion that f always selects the closest antecedent world to the actual
world.
a
Proofs of the invalidity of certain inference patterns on Stalnaker frames
Antecedent strengthening: A > C 0 (A ∧ B) > C
Let α, β, γ be the only worlds in K and let α ≺α β ≺α γ.1 Set β ∈ JA∧¬B∧CK
and γ ∈ JA∧ B∧¬CK. Then you have that A > C is true, while (A∧ B) > C
is false at α.
Transitivity: A > B,B > C 0 A > C
Let K be as before. Setα ∈ J¬A∧¬B∧¬CK; β ∈ J¬A∧B∧CK; γ ∈ JA∧B∧¬CK.
Then you have that A > B and B > C are true, while A > C is false at α.
Contraposition: A > C 0 ¬C > ¬A
Take again K as before. Setα ∈ J¬A∧CK; β ∈ JA∧CK; and finallyγ ∈ JA∧¬CK.
At α, you have A > (still) C together with ¬C > A.
Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents: (A ∨ B) > C 0 (A > C) ∧ (B > C)
Let K be as always and set α ∈ J¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬CK; β ∈ JA ∧ ¬B ∧ CK; γ ∈J¬A ∧ B ∧ ¬CK. As a result, A > C as well as (A ∨ B) > C are true, while
B > C is false in α.
a
Antecedent strengthening makes all conditionals strict
A > C ≡ (A ⊃ C)
Sufficiency
1. A > C Premise
2. (A ∧ ¬C) > C From 1 by AS
3. (A ∧ ¬C) > (¬A ∨ C) From 2 by CW
4. ¬(A ⊃ C) > (A ⊃ C) From 3 by def ⊃ and REa)b)
5. (A ⊃ C) From 4 by def 
Necessity
1Here, β ≺α γ is of course defined as β α γ ∧ β , γ.
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1. ¬(A ⊃ C) > (A ⊃ C) Premise
2. (A ∧ ¬C) > (A ⊃ C) From 1 by REa) and def ⊃
3. (A ∧ ¬C) > A CI + CW
4. (A ∧ ¬C) > ((A ⊃ C) ∧ A) From 2,3 by CC
5. (A ∧ ¬C) > C From 4 by REb)
6. (A ∧ C) > C CI + CW
7. ((A ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧ ¬C)) > C From 5,6 by AD
8. A > C From 7 by REa)
a
A.2. Lewis
Partial truth conditions
TC Counterfactuals No Uniqueness Assumption IJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | JAKα = ∅∨ (∀β ∈ JAKα)((@γ ∈ JAK)(γ ≺α β) ⊃ β ∈ JCK)}
TC Would-Counterfactuals No Uniqueness nor Limit AssumptionJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | JAKα = ∅ ∨ (∃β ∈ JAKα)∀γ(γ α β ⊃ γ ∈ JA ⊃ CK)}
TC Might-Counterfactuals No Uniqueness nor Limit AssumptionJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | JAKα , ∅ ∧ (∀β ∈ JAKα)∃γ(γ α β ∧ γ ∈ JA ∧ CK)}
General truth conditions
The truth conditions given for the case without the Uniqueness and the
Limit Assumption prescinded from the existence of genuine incompara-
bilities, and thus would in their presence change the truth value of some
counterfactuals with respect to the truth conditions given before. Intu-
itively, think of several incomparable chains of A-worlds. Pursuant to the
truth conditions we employed prior to giving up the limit assumption,
A  C would come out true only if C were true in the closest world of
each of the chains. However, now we would only have to find one chain
with a world k below which all words are C-worlds, and forget about the
other chains. This is definitely not what we want. A simple tweak would
involve requiring instead that any chain whatsoever should contain some
such k—this would be more in line with the intuition underlying the orig-
inal truth conditions. The following formulation implements this insight:2
2See (Lewis, 1981), p.230.
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TC Would-Counterfactuals GeneralJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | JAKα = ∅ ∨ (∀δ ∈ JAKα)(∃β ∈ JAKα)(β α δ ∧ ∀γ(γ α
β ⊃ γ ∈ JA ⊃ CK))}
and for might-counterfactuals
TC Might-Counterfactuals GeneralJA  CKM = {α ∈ K | JAKα , ∅ ∧ (∃δ ∈ JAKα)(∀β((β ∈ JAKα ∧ β α δ) ⊃
∃γ(γ α β ∧ γ ∈ JA ∧ CK))}
On the logical level, admission of incomparabilities can be accom-
plished by pruning away Strengthening with a Possibility:
(ASP) (¬(A  ¬B) ∧ (A  C)) ⊃ ((A ∧ B)  C)
or, more simply, using might-counterfactuals:
(ASP♦) ((A  B) ∧ (A  C)) ⊃ ((A ∧ B)  C)
Is there a case for rejecting ASP? There is a neat counterexample in (Gins-
berg, 1986), p.50. The following argument doesn’t sound valid:
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi and Satie might have
been compatriots.
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Satie would (still) have been
French.
∴
If Bizet, Verdi and Satie had been compatriots, Satie would (still) have
been French.
The first premiss is true, because Verdi might have been French; the second,
because the hypothesis of Verdi and Bizet’s being of the same nationality
presumably wouldn’t have any bearing on where Satie hails from. How-
ever, the conclusion is false, because the possibility that Bizet, Verdie and
Satie might all be Italian should not be discarded. From this argument,
Ginsberg concludes that Lewis’s assumption of transitivity of the relation
of being equally close is too restrictive. However, most authors have been
reluctant to abandon (ASP), perhaps because the counterexamples to it are
admittedly a little recherche´3 and the model becomes all too complicated in
its absence.
3This is a general point. We usually do not use counterfactuals in arguments so as to
derive new counterfactuals, but rather to make factual points—most typically in Modus
Tollens. In order to assess arguments such as Ginsberg’s we therefore often have to shore
up our intuitions with theory, with the corresponding threat of circularity. The virtue of
Ginsberg’s example is that even if we help ourselves to Lewis’s system of spheres (which
presupposes almost-connectedness), the argument doesn’t sound right.
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Cotenability from similarity without ASP
JBK is cotenable with the counterfactual assumption JAK at α iffJBKα = [α]R ∨ (∀δ ∈ JAKα)(∃β ∈ JAKα)(β α δ ∧ ∀γ(γ α β ⊃ γ ∈ JBK))
A.3. Kratzer
TC would-counterfactuals KratzerJA  CKg =
{k ∈ K | (∀x ∈ Xg(k)∪{JAK})(JAK ∈ x ⊃ (∃y ∈ Xg(k)∪{JAK})(x ⊆ y ∧⋂ y ⊆ JCK))}
As long as we can count on the existence of maximally consistent subsets
of g(k)∪{JAK} containing JAK4 (in particular, when g(k)∪{JAK} is finite), the
above truth condition boils down to JCK following from each of them.
TC might-counterfactuals KratzerJA  CKg =
{k ∈ K | (∃x ∈ Xg(k)∪{JAK})(JAK ∈ x∧(∀y ∈ Xg(k)∪{JAK})(x ⊆ y ⊃ ⋂(y∪{JCK}) , ∅)}
4This requirement is shown in (Lewis, 1981), p.228, to be equivalent to the limit
assumption on Stalnaker-Lewis frames.

Appendix B
Resumen en espan˜ol
En mi disertacio´n doctoral me ocupo del problema de las oraciones condi-
cionales, tal y como ha quedado circunscrito en la tradicio´n analı´tica de la
filosofı´a actual. Este problema abarca cuestiones tales como el significado
de las oraciones condicionales y sus condiciones veritativas (sema´ntica), las
peculiaridades de su uso en la pra´ctica comunicativa (pragma´tica), la justi-
ficacio´n cano´nica de las proferencias de estas oraciones (epistemologı´a), y
su comportamiento inferencial (lo´gica). Una de las tesis principales de esta
disertacio´n es que a pesar de su estrecha relacio´n, estas cuestiones deben
distinguirse nı´tidamente, ya que cada una de ellas exige una aproximacio´n
metodolo´gica particular.
Introduccio´n
El llamado problema de los condicionales surge con el advenimiento de la
lo´gica cla´sica moderna y la barra condicional con la que Frege codifico´ los
contenidos condicionales en la matema´tica. En el sistema de la Concepto-
grafı´a, afirmar un contenido condicional consistı´a simplemente en negar
la posibilidad de la afirmacio´n del antecedente y negacio´n del consecuen-
te. Esta sencilla concepcio´n de la condicionalidad fue implementada por
Russell en su definicio´n de la implicacio´n material, que en el sistema de los
Principia Mathematica hacı´a las veces de la barra condicional fregeana.
Si bien las ideas de Frege y Russell cosecharon un enorme e´xito en el
a´mbito de la fundamentacio´n de la matema´tica, al parecer los fundadores
de la lo´gica matema´tica no pretendı´an extrapolar sus resultados al ana´lisis
del lenguaje natural. La tendencia a identificar el significado de conectores
naturales con el de sus contrapartidas formales es posterior a Frege y
Russell y se debe al e´xito en la aplicacio´n de la lo´gica cla´sica al estudio de
algunos feno´menos lingu¨ı´sticos.
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Ahora bien, este u´ltimo proyecto ha puesto en evidencia las deficiencias
del condicional material a la hora de codificar el significado de las oraciones
condicionales cotidianas. En primer lugar, los hablantes no tienden a con-
siderar la falsedad del antecedente ni la verdad del consecuente suficientes
para la aceptabilidad un condicional—lo cual aparentemente serı´a el caso
si los condicionales de nuestro lenguaje fuesen materiales. Esta intuicio´n
es au´n ma´s clara en el caso de los condicionales subjuntivos, tambie´n lla-
mados contrafa´cticos, cuyos usos normales presuponen la falsedad de su
antecedente. Otra razo´n para sospechar de la interpretacio´n material de los
condicionales naturales es que algunos patrones deductivos va´lidos para
fo´rmulas con condicionales materiales tienen instancias contraintuitivas si
los condicionales materiales se sustituyen por el ‘si-entonces’ del lenguaje
natural.
Una de las estrategias para hacer frente a estas paradojas consiste en
desterrarlas al a´mbito de la pragma´tica y mantener la identificacio´n del
‘si-entonces’ y el condicional material a nivel de significado lingu¨ı´stico. Es
la vı´a que ha explorado P. Grice en varios de sus trabajos.1 Segu´n Grice,
la intuicio´n de que la verdad del consecuente o la falsedad del anteceden-
te no garantizan la verdad del condicional se puede deber al hecho de
que en tales circunstancias, la afirmacio´n de un condicional material serı´a
inapropiada. El llamado Principio de Cooperacio´n nos insta a maximizar la
informatividad de nuestras contribuciones conversacionales, y dado que
el condicional material es estrictamente ma´s de´bil desde el punto de vista
lo´gico que su consecuente o la negacio´n de su antecedente, afirmar aque´l
en conocimiento de alguno de e´stos serı´a censurable.
Una estrategia similar, defendida por F. Jackson, identifica las condicio-
nes veritativas del condicional material y natural, pero no su significado
lingu¨ı´stico.2 La parte adicional del significado del condicional indicati-
vo natural (la llamada implicatura convencional a la que da lugar su uso)
garantiza la aplicabilidad de la regla inferencial del Modus Ponens—el
condicional natural debe ser robusto con respecto a la verdad de su ante-
cedente.
El objetivo ta´cito de los teo´ricos de la identidad es defender la tesis
de que la lo´gica cla´sica es la lo´gica del lenguaje natural, y que los con-
traejemplos tienen que ver ma´s con los objetivos comunicativos para los
que los condicionales se usan que con su significado lingu¨ı´stico traduci-
ble en te´rminos de condiciones veritativas. Es este u´ltimo que sostiene las
inferencias sema´nticas.
1Ve´ase (Grice, 1989).
2(Jackson, 1987)
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A pesar de toda su sofisticacio´n, los teo´ricos de la identidad no consi-
guen dar cuenta de todas las anomalı´as del comportamiento del condicio-
nal material. Poco o nada tienen que decir sobre la relacio´n de los condi-
cionales indicativos, supuestamente materiales, y los subjuntivos, que se
resisten a tal interpretacio´n. Y por si fuera poco, algunos de los argumentos
que estos teo´ricos esgrimen se levantan sobre cimientos sospechosos. Por
todo ello, la mayorı´a de los autores que trabajan en el campo ha concluido
que la Tesis de la Identidad es insostenible y que un tratamiento correcto
de los condicionales debe romper ma´s radicalmente con la tradicio´n.
Parte I. Las teorı´as.
En los capı´tulos 2-5 se exponen y someten al escrutinio las teorı´as de los
condicionales alternativas a la Tesis de la Identidad que ma´s impacto han
tenido a lo largo de la segunda mitad del s.XX. Estas teorı´as incluyen la
teorı´a probabilı´stica de los condicionales indicativos, la teorı´a basada en
las premisas co-sostenibles (cotenability theory) y la teorı´a basada en la
similitud de mundos posibles de los subjuntivos, y las teorı´as que combi-
nan diferentes elementos de las anteriores, defendidas por C. Gauker, W.
Lycan, A. Kratzer y F. Veltman. Un lugar importante lo ocupan tambie´n las
teorı´as causales, desarrolladas principalmente para resolver algunos pro-
blemas resistentes del ana´lisis de los subjuntivos. La conclusio´n general
de esta parte de la disertacio´n es que la proliferacio´n de los estudios sobre
los condicionales no ha redundado en un avance sustancial de nuestra
comprensio´n de los feno´menos relacionados con ellos.
El capı´tulo segundo esta´ dedicado a la teorı´a del condicional proba-
bilı´stico, cuyos orı´genes se retrotraen al pensamiento de F. P. Ramsey.3 Ha
sido elaborada y defendida principalmente por E. W. Adams y, ma´s re-
cientemente, D. Edgington, pero ha encontrado amplio eco entre los ma´s
diversos autores.4 La idea principal que sustenta este enfoque es que la
probabilidad del condicional indicativo A→ C equivale a la probabilidad
condicional de C dado A (la llamada Tesis de Adams). Este supuesto, al pa-
recer inocente, tiene varias consecuencias sorprendentes. Como ha probado
D. Lewis, la Tesis de Adams implica que el contenido de los condicionales
indicativos no puede representarse, como es habitual con las proposicio-
nes ordinarias, como un subconjunto del espacio muestral.5 Esto tambie´n
requiere modificaciones en la definicio´n de validez deductiva: Adams ha
3(Ramsey, 1929)
4Ve´ase principalmente (Adams, 1975) y (Adams, 1998), (Edgington, 2007) y (Bennett,
2003).
5Ve´ase (Lewis, 1976) y (Lewis, 1986b).
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sustituido el concepto tradicional por el de la validez probabilı´stica, que
difiere de aque´l justo cuando entre las premisas se encuentran condiciona-
les indicativos. La interpretacio´n probabilı´stica del condicional indicativo
invalida los patrones inferenciales sospechosos respaldados por la Tesis de
la Identidad.
Las muchas virtudes de la teorı´a de Adams, sin embargo, han lleva-
do algunos a sobrestimar su alcance. En vista del e´xito de la aplicacio´n
de la sema´ntica probabilı´stica a los condicionales indicativos, muchos han
concluido que e´stos no expresan contenidos proposicionales sobre los que
quepa un debate objetivo, sino que su funcio´n estriba meramente en trans-
mitir informacio´n sobre el sistema de creencias del hablante.6 Ahora bien,
tal doctrina contradice muchos aspectos del uso declarativo de los indica-
tivos y no explica la presencia de oraciones condicionales subordinadas en
oraciones principales con distinta fuerza ilocutiva. Adema´s, invita la con-
clusio´n de que no hay ninguna relacio´n interesante entre los condicionales
indicativos y subjuntivos.7 La probabilidad por lo tanto no puede ser la
u´ltima palabra a la hora de explicar los condicionales.
Los capı´tulos tercero y cuarto esta´n dedicados a teorı´as de los con-
dicionales subjuntivos. La primera, ma´s antigua, se propone la tarea de
delimitar el conjunto de premisas verdaderas y co-sostenibles con el an-
tecedente de un subjuntivo, que junto con e´l impliquen el consecuente
si y so´lo si el subjuntivo es verdadero. En otras palabras, estos teo´ricos
pretenden reducir la dependencia contrafa´ctica a implicacio´n lo´gica. La
virtud de este planteamiento consiste en otorgar a los contrafa´cticos un
papel transparente en las pra´cticas argumentativas humanas, dispersando
la apariencia de irracionalidad o arbitrariedad que a veces suscitan. Sin
embargo, el proyecto de especificacio´n de las premisas colaterales se ha to-
pado con obsta´culos formidables, sobre todo en lo tocante a la naturaleza
de las generalizaciones nomolo´gicas y la direccionalidad de las relaciones
causales entre feno´menos. Este u´ltimo problema, expuesto nı´tidamente por
N. Goodman y conocido por el de nombre de e´ste, se ha convertido en la
piedra de toque de las teorı´as de subjuntivos, independientemente del tipo
de aproximacio´n por el que se decanten.8
La teorı´a actualmente ma´s popular de subjuntivos es sin lugar a dudas
la de Stalnaker-Lewis, basada en la similitud entre mundos posibles.9 Esta
teorı´a nos va a ocupar en el capı´tulo cuarto. En su versio´n ma´s sencilla,
define un contrafa´ctico verdadero como aquel cuyo consecuente es verda-
6Ve´ase por ejemplo (Bennett, 2003), p.126.
7(Gibbard, 1981)
8(Goodman, 1947)
9(Stalnaker, 1968) y (Lewis, 1973a)
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dero en el mundo posible ma´s similar al actual en el que el antecedente es
verdadero.
Parece que la principal fuente de atractivo de esta teorı´a reside en la
belleza matema´tica del sistema al que da lugar. Las propiedades formales
que uno atribuya a la relacio´n de similitud determinara´n el comporta-
miento lo´gico de los contrafa´cticos, por lo que el sistema ofrece un alto
grado de flexibilidad y un amplio foro para debates sobre la lo´gica con-
trafa´ctica ‘correcta’. Sin embargo, a lo largo del capı´tulo intento mostrar
que estos debates distan mucho de ser concluyentes, lo cual compromete
la verificabilidad de la teorı´a.
Los cimientos teo´ricos sobre los que se levanta este ana´lisis de subjun-
tivos son los conceptos de mundo posible y la similitud entre ellos. Ahora
bien, a mi modo de ver, ambos conceptos de por sı´ tan solo desplazan
las cuestiones fundamentales relacionadas con nuestro uso de subjunti-
vos: la razo´n de ser y los usos pra´cticos del vocabulario modal, ası´ como
el papel que el pensamiento contrafa´ctico desempen˜a en nuestras vidas
intelectuales. En particular, los ana´lisis de la relacio´n de similitud que se
han propuesto son ad-hoc en un grado extremo y ni siquiera ası´ consiguen
sortear todas las objeciones de sus crı´ticos. El resultado es, en las palabras
del propio Stalnaker, que esta teorı´a de los contrafa´cticos no resuelve nin-
guna cuestio´n sustancial, sino que tan solo ofrece un marco formal para su
planteamiento.10 En vista de su vacuidad, es difı´cil de justificar el grado
de atencio´n que esta teorı´a ha recibido en la bibliografı´a, sobre todo dado
que la mayorı´a de los autores se ha centrado casi exclusivamente en las
cuestiones formales.
Desafortunadamente, teorı´as poco informativas de los condicionales
abundan en el campo. En el capı´tulo quinto se debaten dos teorı´as de
este tipo: la de W. G. Lycan y la de C. Gauker.11 Su rasgo comu´n es que
su ana´lisis hace un uso desmesurado de variables cuyo valor se adapta
flexiblemente al resultado que se desea obtener en cada caso. En Gauker,
este papel lo desempen˜an los contextos conversacionales, mientras que en
Lycan todo el trabajo lo realiza el conjunto de posibilidades contempladas
por el hablante. En consecuencia, estas teorı´as, a pesar de su sofisticacio´n
formal, no nos ensen˜an nada muy relevante sobre nuestro tema de estudio.
Una buena parte del capı´tulo 5 esta´ dedicada a la sema´ntica de premisas
de A. Kratzer.12 La intuicio´n que guı´a su tratamiento de los condicionales
es que estos siempre funcionan como restrictores de cuantificacio´n, sea
10(Stalnaker, 1984), p.122
11(Lycan, 2001) y (Gauker, 2005)
12Ve´ase (Kratzer, 2012).
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implı´cita o explı´cita, esta´ndar o modal. Esta intuicio´n la llevo´ a postu-
lar una modalizacio´n implı´cita en los consecuentes de los condicionales
indicativos. Adema´s, Kratzer intento´ reconstruir la relacio´n de similitud
entre mundos posibles con ingredientes ana´logos a los de la teorı´a de la
co-sostenibilidad para dar cuenta de los subjuntivos. Para hacer frente a
los problemas con los que sin e´xito habı´an lidiado los teo´ricos anteriores,
Kratzer introdujo la nocio´n de ‘bulto de pensamientos’ (lump of thought):
algunas premisas no se podı´an an˜adir al antecedente por separado, sino
tan solo en conjunto con un bulto de otras. Sin embargo, Kratzer hizo un
uso mucho ma´s amplio de esa nocio´n de lo que justificaban las intuicio-
nes que habı´an respaldado su introduccio´n. F. Veltman intento´ adaptar la
teorı´a otorgando un papel clave a las generalizaciones nomolo´gicas, pero
su intento naufrago´ en el problema de Goodman.
En vista de los frecuentes fracasos a la hora de evitar problemas como
los de Goodman o Tichy´, numerosos autores han optado por implementar
la direccio´n de la dependencia causal directamente en el engranaje formal
de una teorı´a de subjuntivos. Mientras que sus rivales pretenden obtener
este resultado a partir de ingredientes ma´s elementales, los teo´ricos cau-
sales suelen asumir que la relacio´n de causalidad es irreducible y tiene
que figurar entre los inputs de una teorı´a formal de condicionales con-
trafa´cticos: esto les permite evitar los mencionados problemas de un solo
golpe. Ahora bien, el precio es que el andamiaje formal de las teorı´as en
sı´ no contribuya a una mejor comprensio´n del razonamiento contrafa´ctico.
El recurso directo a la causalidad desplaza todo el intere´s teo´rico de una
teorı´a de contrafa´cticos desde la sema´ntica formal hacia la comprensio´n
del papel que las consideraciones causales juegan en nuestro pensamiento.
Parte II. La propuesta.
En los capı´tulos sexto y se´ptimo de esta tesis defiendo que la ruptura
con la Teorı´a de la Identidad se quedo´ a medio camino. Muchos teo´ricos
que rechazaron la interpretacio´n material de los condicionales se lanzaron
en busca de una interpretacio´n alternativa, sin cuestionar los principios
metodolo´gicos del antiguo paradigma. En particular, entre e´stos figuran
los siguientes supuestos:
1. El significado se debe explicar en te´rminos de condiciones veritativas.
2. La sema´ntica formal siempre define el significado de la expresio´n
analizada. Con la proferencia de un condicional, el hablante se com-
promete con que el estado correspondiente a la intepretacio´n formal
del condicional es el caso.
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3. El significado, tal y como viene enunciado por la sema´ntica formal,
determina la lo´gica de la expresio´n analizada.
En el capı´tulo 6 muestro que el primero de estos supuestos suele ir
acompan˜ado con la creencia ta´cita en la existencia de un vocabulario pri-
vilegiado para la tarea de enunciar las condiciones veritativas de expresio-
nes complejas; de otra forma no cabrı´a justificar el intere´s de este proyecto
sema´ntico. No obstante, nada parece garantizar la existencia de tal voca-
bulario: no hay razo´n para pensar que la contribucio´n de las expresiones
ma´s interesantes de nuestro lenguaje deba de ser reducible a la de otras,
en principio ma´s rudimentarias. La vacuidad de muchas teorı´as en boga
quiza´ se deba a la imposibilidad de reproducir el contenido de un condicio-
nal sin recurrir a alguna nocio´n artificial, introducida apelando a nuestra
comprensio´n previa de los condicionales.
En contra de la metodologı´a sema´ntica veritativo-condicional, sugiero
que la mejor manera de explicar el significado de una expresio´n es remitir
a la funcio´n esta´ndar que e´sta realiza en un intercambio conversacional.
El significado de muchas expresiones no-veritativo-condicionales solo se
puede explicar de esta forma, e incluso en el caso de expresiones que
contribuyen a las condiciones de verdad de las proferencias en las que
intervienen, este tipo de explicacio´n es muchas veces ma´s iluminador.
Aplicado a nuestro objeto de estudio, un ana´lisis ana´logo sugiere que
las oraciones subordinadas condicionales indicativas sirven para limitar
el alcance del acto de habla llevado a cabo a trave´s de la proferencia de
la oracio´n principal. La validez de ese acto (que puede ser asertivo, direc-
tivo, compromisorio, etc.) esta´ sometido al cumplimiento de la condicio´n
enunciada por la oracio´n subordinada.
Un ana´lisis semejante ciertamente roza la trivialidad, pero eso no cons-
tituye ninguna excepcio´n entre las explicaciones de significado. Adema´s,
pese a ello el ana´lisis permite evitar la frecuente conclusio´n, basada en el
supuesto 2 arriba mencionado y el e´xito de la sema´ntica probabilı´stica, de
que los condicionales indicativos tan solo expresan hechos acerca del sis-
tema de creencias del hablante y por lo tanto no pueden ser considerados
verdaderos ni falsos. Si bien la alta probabilidad condicional de C dado
A es esencial para una afirmacio´n veraz de A → C y la alta probabilidad
subjetiva de A es esencial para una afirmacio´n veraz de A, A y A → C no
se reducen a afirmaciones sobre las correspondientes probabilidades.
La sema´ntica probabilı´stica, por lo tanto, es una buena herramienta pa-
ra explorar la dina´mica de nuestras creencias condicionales, pero no agota
el significado de los condicionales indicativos. Y por lo tanto, tampoco de-
termina la lo´gica del condicional indicativo. En la vida real, el comporta-
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miento inferencial de una expresio´n no depende tan so´lo de su significado,
sino que viene parcialmente determinado por el contexto en el que las in-
ferencias se realizan. Normalmente, al hacer una aseveracio´n condicional,
tenemos que tener en cuenta el impacto de la eventualidad introducida por
el antecedente sobre todas nuestras creencias: es nuestra mejor manera de
garantizar que nuestra afirmacio´n tendra´ las de resultar verdadera. Ahora
bien, en contextos especiales podemos legı´timamente decidir proteger una
serie de creencias de toda duda, para ver hasta do´nde podemos llegar sin
tener que desvincularnos de ellas. En esas circunstancias, tı´picas de un sis-
tema axioma´tico tradicional, un condicional indicativo sera´ interderivable
con la correspondiente disyuncio´n, y su comportamiento por tanto sera´ el
de un condicional material. El significado del condicional indicativo por
sı´ solo no puede fijar el marco inferencial en el que va a ser utilizado.
El u´ltimo capı´tulo esta´ dedicado a condicionales subjuntivos y tiene
un cara´cter ma´s especulativo. Mi propuesta esta´ basada en las intuiciones
que motivan el tratamiento de los subjuntivos como predicciones pasadas,
intentando evitar los escollos que acosan tal tratamiento echando mano
de los aciertos de las teorı´as causales.13 La idea principal es que los seres
humanos estructuran su concepcio´n del mundo en escenarios o guiones in-
ferenciales, que tienen un importante componente causal. La inmensa ma-
yorı´a de lo que llamamos ‘hechos’ esta´ mediada teo´ricamente: el concepto
de mundo es un concepto en un alto grado construido. Los contrafa´cticos
sobre el pasado, por lo tanto, nos informan acerca de la estructura de los
hechos y las expectativas que una persona razonable podı´a haber tenido
con respecto a ellos. Ello a su vez ayuda a que nos forjemos expectativas
razonables sobre situaciones ana´logas en el futuro. Lejos de ser arbitrarios
o irrelevantes, los contrafa´cticos juegan un papel fundamental a la hora
de compartir la informacio´n sobre lo que cabe esperar en determinadas
circunstancias.
No todos los contrafa´cticos son causales, ni tampoco todos esta´n basa-
dos en leyes. De acuerdo con mi propuesta, los condicionales subjuntivos
se utilizan para realizar afirmaciones simples sobre relaciones entre propo-
siciones dentro de un marco inferencial ma´s amplio. Por eso pueden usarse
tanto para transmitir contenidos de la teorı´a de conjuntos como a la hora
de explorar las consecuencias hipote´ticas de haber tomado una decisio´n
equivocada en algu´n asunto mundano. El punto en comu´n es que los dos
casos conforman escenarios inferencialmente articulados.
13(Adams, 1975), (Dudman, 1989) y (Edgington, 2007).
Bibliography
Ernest Adams. The logic of conditionals. Inquiry, 8:166–197, 1965.
Ernest Adams. Subjunctive and indicative conditionals. Foundations of
Language, 6:89–94, 1970.
Ernest Adams. The Logic of Conditionals. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975.
Ernest Adams. A Primer of Probability Logic. CSLI Publications, Stanford,
California, 1998.
J.H. Allen and J.B. Greenough. New Latin Grammar. Ginn and Company,
London, 1903.
Luis Alonso-Ovalle. Counterfactuals, correlatives and disjunction. Lin-
guistics and Philosophy, 32:207–244, 2009.
Ana Arregui. Layering modalities: the case of backtracking counterfac-
tuals. Unpublished manuscript, available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/ aar-
regui/ana arregui files/layering-modalities.pdf [Last Access: 28/01/15],
2005a.
Ana Arregui. On the Accessibility of Possible Worlds: The Role of Tense and
aspect. PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2005b.
John L. Austin. Cans and ifs. In Philosophical Papers, pages 205–232. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1970.
Kent Bach. The myth of conventional implicature. Linguistics and Philoso-
phy, 22:327–366, 1999.
Jonathan Bennett. Counterfactuals and possible worlds. Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, IV(2):381–402, 1973.
Jonathan Bennett. Counterfactuals and temporal direction. Philosophical
Review, 93:57–91, 1984.
243
244 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jonathan Bennett. Farewell to the phlogiston theory of conditionals. Mind,
97(388):509–527, 1988.
Jonathan Bennett. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University
Press, New York, 2003.
Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke, and Yde Venema. Modal Logic. Cam-
bridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2004.
Diane Blakemore. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Blackwell, Oxford,
1987.
Diane Blakemore. Relevance and Linguistic Meaning. The Semantics and Prag-
matics of Discourse Markers, volume 99 of Cambridge Studies in Linguistics.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
Robert Brandom. Making it Explicit. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1994.
Robert Brandom. Articulating Reasons. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2001.
Rachael Briggs. Interventionist counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, 160
(1):139–166, 2012.
David Butcher. An incompatible pair of subjunctive conditional modal
axioms. Philosophical Studies, 44:71–110, 1983.
Roderick Chisholm. The contrary-to-fact conditional. Mind, (55):289–307,
1946.
Roderick Chisholm. Law statements and counterfactual inference. Analy-
sis, 5(15):97–105, 1955.
Keith DeRose and Richard E. Grandy. Conditional assertions and ‘biscuit’
conditionals. Nouˆs, 33(3):405–420, 1999.
John Divers. Possible Worlds. Routledge, New York, 2002.
P. B. Downing. Subjunctive conditionals, time order, and causation. Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59:125–140, 1959.
Oswald Ducrot et al. Les Mots du Discours. Minuit, Paris, 1980.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245
Victor H. Dudman. Conditional interpretation of If -sentences. The Aus-
tralian Journal of Linguistics, 4:143–204, 1984.
Victor H. Dudman. Indicative and subjunctive. Analysis, 48(3):113–122,
1988.
Victor H. Dudman. Vive la revolution! Mind, 98(392):591–603, 1989.
Michael Dummett. Bringing about the past. Philosophical Review, 73:338–
359, 1964.
Dorothy Edgington. Do conditionals have truth conditions? Crı´tica: Revista
Hispanoamericana de Filosofı´a, 18(52):3–39, 1986.
Dorothy Edgington. On conditionals. In D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenth-
ner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 14, pages 127–221.
Springer, Netherlands, 2nd edition, 2007.
Paul Egre´ and Mikae¨l Cozic. If-clauses and probability operators. Topoi,
30:17–29, 2011.
Herbert B. Enderton. Elements of Set Theory. Academic Press, London, 1977.
John Etchemendy. The Concept of Logical Consequence. Harvard University
Press, Harvard, 1990.
Niall Ferguson. Virtual history: Towards a ‘chaotic’ theory of the past. In
Niall Ferguson, editor, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals,
pages 1–90. Basic Books, 1999.
Kit Fine. Critical notice on (Lewis, 1973a). Mind, 84(1):451–8, 1975.
Kit Fine. Counterfactuals without possible worlds. Journal of Philosophy,
109(3):221–246, 2012.
Michael Franke. The pragmatics of biscuit conditionals. In Maria Aloni,
Paul Dekker, and Floris Roelofsen, editors, Proceedings of the 16th Ams-
terdam Colloquium, pages 91–96. University of Amsterdam, 2007.
Gottlob Frege. Compound thoughts. Mind, 72(285):1–17, 1963.
Gottlob Frege. Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon that
of arithmetic, for pure thought. In Jean van Heijenoort, editor, From
Frege to Go¨del: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, pages 1–82. Harvard
University Press, 1967.
246 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Marı´a J. Fra´polli. The Nature of Truth. An Updated Approach to the Meaning of
Truth Ascriptions, volume 29 of Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science.
Springer, 2013.
Marı´a J. Fra´polli and Neftalı´ Villanueva. Minimal expressivism. dialectica,
66(4):471–487, 2012.
David Galles and Judea Pearl. An axiomatic characterization of causal
counterfactuals. Foundations of Science, 3(1):151–182, 1998.
Cristopher Gauker. What is a context of utterance. Philosophical Studies, 91:
149–172, 1998.
Cristopher Gauker. Conditionals in Context. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005.
Allan Gibbard. Two recent theories of conditionals. In W.L. Harper, R. Stal-
naker, and G. Pearce, editors, Ifs, pages 211–247. D. Reidel, Dordrecht,
1981.
Matthew L. Ginsberg. Counterfactuals. Artificial Intelligence, 30(1):35–79,
1986.
Nelson Goodman. The problem of counterfactual conditionals. Journal of
Philosophy, 5(44):113–128, 1947.
Nelson Goodman. Parry on counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy, 54:442–5,
1957.
Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 4th edition, 1983.
Herbert Paul Grice. The causal theory of perception. Reprinted in his
(1989), pp.224-247, 1961.
Herbert Paul Grice. Indicative conditionals. Reprinted in his (1989), pp.58-
87, 1967.
Herbert Paul Grice. Logic and conversation. Reprinted in his (1989), pp.22-
40, 1975.
Herbert Paul Grice. Further notes on logic and conversation. Reprinted in
his (1989), pp.41-57, 1978.
Herbert Paul Grice. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1989.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 247
William H. Hanson. Indicative conditionals are truth-functional. Mind,
397:53–72, 1991.
W.L. Harper, R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce, editors. Ifs. Reidel, Dordrecht,
1981.
Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Black-
well, Oxford, 1998.
Hans G. Herzberger. Counterfactuals and consistency. Journal of Philosophy,
76(2):83–88, 1979.
Alan Ha´jek. Probabilities of conditionals - revisited. Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 18:423–428, 1989.
Alan Ha´jek. The fall of ‘Adams’ thesis’? Journal of Language, Logic and
Information, 21:145–161, 2012.
Alan Ha´jek and Ned Hall. The hypothesis of the conditional construal
of conditional probability. In Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms, editors,
Probability and Conditionals. Belief Revision and Rational Decision, pages
75–111. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
Ted Honderich. Causes and if p, even if x, still q. Philosophy, 57:291–317,
1982.
Sabine Iatridou. The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality. Lin-
guistic Inquiry, 30(2):231–270, 2000.
Frank Jackson. A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 55(1):3–21, 1977.
Frank Jackson. Conditionals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
Tony Judt. Postwar. Penguin Press, New York, 2005.
Makoto Kanazawa, Stefan Kaufmann, and Stanley Peters. On the lumping
semantics of counterfactuals. Journal of Semantics, 22:129–151, 2005.
Stefan Kaufmann. Causal premise semantics. Cognitive Science, 37:1136–
1170, 2013.
William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1962.
248 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu, and Aho Tuomo. Modal logic from Kant to
possible worlds semantics. In Leila Haaparanta, editor, The Development
of Modern Logic, pages 516–550. Oxford University Press, New York, 2009.
Angelika Kratzer. What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 1:337–355, 1977. Reprinted in her (2012), pages 1-20.
Angelika Kratzer. Conditional necessity and possibility. In R. Ba¨uerle,
U. Egli, and A. von Stechow, editors, Semantics from Different Points of
View, pages 117–147. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg and New York, 1979.
Angelika Kratzer. Partition and revision: the semantics of counterfactuals.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10:201–216, 1981a.
Angelika Kratzer. The notional category of modality. 1981b. Reprinted
with modifications in (Kratzer, 2012), pp.27-69.
Angelika Kratzer. An investigation of the lumps of thought. Linguistic and
Philosophy, 12:607–653, 1989.
Angelika Kratzer. Conditionals. 1991. Reprinted with modifications in
(Kratzer, 2012), pp.86-108.
Angelika Kratzer. Constraining premise sets for counterfactuals. Journal of
Semantics, 22:153–158, 2005.
Angelika Kratzer. Modals and Conditionals. Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2012.
Richard Ned Lebow. What’s so different about a counterfactual? World
Politics, 52:550–585, 2000.
Clarence I. Lewis. Implication and the algebra of logic. Mind, 21(84):
522–531, 1912.
Clarence I. Lewis. A Survey of Symbolic Logic. University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1918.
David Lewis. Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, 1973a.
David Lewis. Counterfactuals and comparative possibility. Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, 2(4):418–446, 1973b.
David Lewis. Causation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(11):556–567, 1973c.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 249
David Lewis. Adverbs of quantification. In Edward L. Keenan, editor, For-
mal Semantics of Natural Language, pages 178–188. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1975.
David Lewis. Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.
Philosophical Review, 86(3):297–315, 1976.
David Lewis. Possible-world semantics for counterfactual logics. Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 6:359–363, 1977.
David Lewis. Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Nouˆs, 13(4):
455–476, 1979.
David Lewis. Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfac-
tuals. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10:217–234, 1981.
David Lewis. On the Plurality of Worlds. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986a.
David Lewis. Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities II.
Philosophical Review, 95(4):581–589, 1986b.
Konrad Lorenz. Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwa¨rtiger
Biologie. In Irena¨us Eible-Eibesfeld, editor, Das Wirkungsgefu¨ge der Natur
und das Schicksal des Menschen, pages 82–109. Piper, Mu¨nchen, 1978.
Edward N. Luttwak. If Bosnians were dolphins. Commentary, 96:27–32,
October 1993.
William G. Lycan. A syntactically motivated theory of conditionals. In
Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein, editors,
Causation and Causal Theories: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, volume 9,
pages 437–455. University of Minnesota, 1984.
William G. Lycan. Real Conditionals. Oxford University Press, New York,
2001.
John L. Mackie. Counterfactuals and causal laws. In R. J. Butler, editor,
Analytical Philosophy, pages 66–80. Blackwell, Oxford, 1962.
John L. Mackie. Truth, Probability and Paradox. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1973.
Richard B. Miller. Moderate modal realism. Philosophia, 28(1-4):3–38, 2001.
Peter Milne. Bruno de Finetti and the logic of conditional events. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48:195–232, 1997.
250 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Donald Nute. Counterfactuals and the similarity of worlds. Journal of
Philosophy, 72(21):773–778, 1975.
Donald Nute and Charles B. Cross. Conditional logic. In D.M. Gabbay and
F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 4, pages
1–98. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2 edition, 2001.
William Tuthill Parry. Ree¨xamination of the problem of counterfactual
conditionals. Journal of Philosophy, 54(4):85–94, 1957.
Judea Pearl. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000.
John L. Pollock. Subjunctive Reasoning. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976.
Willard van Orman Quine. Methods of Logic. Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
New York, 2nd edition, 1966.
Frank P. Ramsey. Universals of law and fact. Published posthumously in
his (1978), pages 128-132, 1928.
Frank P. Ramsey. General propositions and causality. Published posthu-
mously in his (1978), pages 133-151, 1929.
Frank P. Ramsey. Foundations. Routledge, London, 1978.
Franc¸ois Recanati. Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Nicholas Rescher. Belief-contravening suppositions. Philosophical Review,
(70):176–196, 1961.
Nicholas Rescher. Conditionals. MIT Press, London, 2007.
Steven Rieber. Conventional implicatures as tacit performatives. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 20(1):50–72, 1997.
Adam Rieger. Conditionals are material: the positive arguments. Synthese,
190:3161–3174, 2013.
Bertrand Russell. Principles of Mathematics. Routledge Classics, Oxon, 2010.
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. Principia Mathematica. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 1964. Reprinted to ∗56.
Gilbert Ryle. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson, London, 1949.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 251
David H. Sanford. If P then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning.
Routledge, London, 1989.
Katrin Schulz. ‘If you’d wiggled A, then B would’ve changed’: Causality
and counterfactual conditionals. Synthese, 179:239–251, 2011.
Katrin Schulz. Fake tense. Available at http://www.uva.nl/over-de-
uva/organisatie/medewerkers/content/s/c/k.schulz/k.schulz.html [Last
Access: 19 November 2014], 2012.
Brian Skyrms. Adams conditionals. In Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms,
editors, Probability and Conditionals. Belief Revision and Rational Decision,
pages 13–26. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
Robert Stalnaker. A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher, editor, Studies in
Logical Theory, number 2, pages 98–112. Basil Blackwell, 1968.
Robert Stalnaker. Probability and conditionals. Philosophy of Science, 37(1):
64–80, 1970.
Robert Stalnaker. Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5(3):269–286, 1975.
Robert Stalnaker. Letter to van Fraassen. In W.L. Harper and C.A. Hooker,
editors, Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and Statistical
Theories of Science, volume I, pages 302–306. D.Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976.
Robert Stalnaker. A defense of conditional excluded middle. In William
L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, editors, Ifs, pages 87–104.
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981.
Robert Stalnaker. Inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984.
Peter Frederick Strawson. ‘If’ and ‘⊃’. In Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends.
Patrick Suppes. Some questions about Adams’ conditionals. In Ellery Eells
and Brian Skyrms, editors, Probability and Conditionals. Belief Revision and
Rational Decision, pages 5–11. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1994.
Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin. Counterfactual thought experiments
in world politics. In Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, editors, Coun-
terfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, methodological and
psychological perspectives, pages 3–38. Princeton University Press, 1996.
252 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pavel Tichy´. A counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis analysis of counter-
factuals. Philosophical Studies, 29:271–273, 1976.
Pavel Tichy´. A new theory of subjunctive conditionals. Synthese, 37:433–
457, 1978.
Pavel Tichy´. Subjunctive conditionals: Two parameters vs. three. Philo-
sophical Studies, 45:147–179, 1984.
Bas van Fraassen. Probabilities of conditionals. In W.L. Harper and C.A.
Hooker, editors, Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and
Statistical Theories of Science, volume I, pages 261–301. D.Reidel, Dor-
drecht, 1976.
Frank Veltman. Prejudices, presuppositions and the theory of counterfac-
tuals. In J. Groenendijk and M. Stokhof, editors, Amsterdam Papers in
Formal Grammar, volume 1, pages 248–281. University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, 1976.
Frank Veltman. Logics for Conditionals. PhD thesis, University of Amster-
dam, Amsterdam, 1985.
Frank Veltman. Making counterfactual assumptions. Journal of Semantics,
22:159–180, 2005.
Frank Veltman. Counterfactuals, the standard theory. ILLC, University of
Amsterdam: lecture notes, 2012.
Ken Warmbro¯d. A defense of the limit assumption. Philosophical Studies,
42:53–66, 1982.
Michael Williams. Problems of Knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2001.
Timothy Williamson. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2000.
Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber. Relevance theory. In Laurence R. Horn
and Gregory Ward, editors, Handbook of Pragmatics, pages 607–632. Black-
well Publishing, Oxford, 2004.
Michael Woods. Conditionals. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press,
1997.
